Crowder v. Barrett

1

Marva Crowder, Plaintiff, v. Thomas Barrett, et al., Defendants.

No. 17 C 0381

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John Robert Blakey United States District Judge

Plaintiff Marva Crowder brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging unlawful pretrial detention. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the complaint for preliminary examination proffered in support of an armed robbery charge filed against him was fraudulent. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Defendant Mark Griffin formerly an assistant state's attorney, seeks judgment in his favor because: (1) he is entitled to absolute immunity or in the alternative, qualified immunity; (2) probable cause existed to approve felony charges against Plaintiff; and (3) there is no evidence in the record that Griffin engaged in improper conduct. See [187]. The remaining Defendants, Chicago Police Officers Thomas Barrett, Thomas Giudice, Daniel Freeman and the City of Chicago ^[1] argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) probable cause bars Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim (2) the City Defendants did not falsify documents; (3) the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey bars Plaintiff's claims; (4) collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff's claims; (5) Defendants Giudice and Freeman were not personally involved in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's rights; and (6) the City Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See [192]. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants' motions [187] [192]. The Court denies Plaintiff's motions seeking sanctions for perjury [217] [218] [219]. Given the disposition of this case, the Court also denies the City Defendants' motion to consolidate this case with Crowder v. Harris, No. 20 C 5137 [196].

BACKGROUND

Before turning to the merits of Defendants' motions, the Court considers two preliminary matters: Plaintiff's motions to strike and the impact of Local Rule 56.1 on the parties' submissions.

I. Plaintiff's Motions to Strike

On September 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed three motions [217], [218], and [219], which the Court interpreted as motions to strike the declarations that Defendants submitted in support of their summary judgment motions. See [220]. In subsequent filings, Plaintiff has stated that the Court misinterpreted these motions: he states that he in fact was not asking the Court to strike the declarations but instead was asking the Court to deny Defendants' motions for summary judgment due to perjury; he asks the Court to impose penalties under a federal law pertaining to false declarations before a grand jury or court. See, e.g., [226] at 2. The Court denies the requests for two reasons. First, based upon this Court's review of the pleadings, Plaintiff's allegations of perjury lack merit. Second, even if that were not the case, this Court has no authority to pursue perjury charges in the manner Plaintiff seeks. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”); Sahagian v. Dickey, 646 F.Supp. 1502, 1506 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (court does not have jurisdiction to order that a criminal complaint be filed).

II. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing and responding to motions for summary judgment in this Court. The rule is intended “to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). Local Rule 56.1(a) requires the moving party to provide a statement of material facts that complies with Local Rule 56.1(d). LR 56.1(a). Local Rule 56.1(d) requires that “[e]ach asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the specific page number, that supports it. The court may disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a citation.” LR 56.1(d)(2).

The opposing party must then respond to the movant's proposed statements of fact. Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005); LR 56.1(e). In the case of any disagreement, “a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material.” LR 56.1(e)(3). A district court “is not required to wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Mere disagreement with the opponent's factual statement is inadequate unless made with appropriate citation to the record. Id.

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Defendants jointly served him with a “Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment, ” as required by Local Rule 56.2. [190]. Defendants also jointly submitted a Statement of Facts, to which Plaintiff responded. See [189], [204].^[2] Plaintiff also submitted his own statement of additional facts. [205].

The Court notes, however, that the vast majority of Plaintiff's responses and purported factual statements lack citations to the record or are otherwise unsupported by the record. Further, they are in large part irrelevant, argumentative, or consisting of legal arguments or mere conclusory statements.

As such, the Plaintiff bears the consequences of his failures to comply with the rules of procedure. For example, Plaintiff was questioned and held on the armed robbery charge that is the subject of this complaint after initially being arrested for an unrelated domestic battery. Plaintiff contends that something went wrong in the process of holding him on the armed robbery, but he is unable to coherently explain how his constitutional rights were violated, and many of his contentions and objections in response to Defendants' motions for summary judgment find no basis in the record or the operative complaint, [104].

Such objections illustrate Plaintiff's failure to follow proper procedure: while he objects to most of Defendants' statements of facts, his objections fail to pertain to the content of the statements themselves, and instead remain premised on the notion that the armed robbery is unrelated to his claim and that statements of fact concerning the robbery are prejudicial. For example, in response to a statement of fact concerning a lineup for the robbery, Plaintiff asserts the following:

“Plaintiff disputes [D]efendants['] Statement of Facts and objects to the evidence in support of [sic]. Plaintiff filed his [§] 1983 complaint on 1-17-17 in regards to the only arrest and charges of domestic battery under booking number 19061928[, ] incident number HY151105. [P]laintiff has never been prosecuted or arrest[ed] for armed robbery under incident number HW 171572.”

See [204] at ¶ 70. In support of this statement, Plaintiff cites the misdemeanor domestic battery complaint, the felony armed robbery complaint, his fingerprints, and what appear to be portions of police reports regarding his February 14, 2015, arrest. See [205] at 11-12, 16-17, 18, 21-24. Essentially, Plaintiff's objection contends that the Defendants arrested or prosecuted him under the wrong booking and/or incident numbers or that he was maliciously prosecuted because the armed robbery charge was filed under the same “Records Division” number as the domestic battery for which he was arrested on February 14, 2015. See, e.g., [204] at ¶¶ 10-11, 48. Plaintiff's objections are irrelevant and/or otherwise not properly supported by the record. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim in this case arises from the investigation of this robbery, not the domestic battery. His references to incorrect booking or Records Division numbers used by the Chicago Police Department do not describe a violation of his federal rights. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that § 1983 “protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state law or . . . departmental regulations”).

Because of the inadequacy of such responses by the Plaintiff, the Court accepts Defendants' factual statements as true unless otherwise noted. The Court will entertain Plaintiff's factual statements and responses only to the extent they are supported by the record, or to the extent he could properly testify himself about the matters asserted. See Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F.Supp.2d 849, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

The Court therefore will recite the facts based upon Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement and Plaintiff's factual assertions that are properly supported or about which he could testify, and then decide whether, on that factual record, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. In so doing, the Court remains mindful that although Plaintiff has largely failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1, Defendants must still demonstrate that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2012). With these guidelines in mind, the Court turns to the facts of this case.

III. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a resident of Cook County, Ill. [189] at ¶ 1. At all times relevant, Defendant Mark Griffin was a Cook County Assistant State's Attorney (ASA Griffin), Id. at ¶ 2, and Defendants Thomas Barrett, Thomas Giudice, and Daniel Freeman were employed by the Chicago Police Department. Id. at ¶...