Crowder v. Fiala

175 A.D.3d 1408

109 N.Y.S.3d 333

In the Matter of Todd A. CROWDER, Petitioner,

v.Barbara J. FIALA, etc., et al., Respondents.

2018–07545

Index No. 2387/2018

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—May 30, 2019

September 18, 2019

Larkin, Ingrassia & Tepermayster, LLP, Newburgh, N.Y. (Michael Collado of counsel), for petitioner.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Andrew W. Amend and Mark S. Grube of counsel), for respondents.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, ROBERT J. MILLER, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board dated November 6, 2017, affirming a determination of an administrative law judge dated May 25, 2017, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and revoked his driver license.

ADJUDGED that the determination dated November 6, 2017, is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

On April 14, 2017, a New York State Trooper (hereinafter the arresting officer) initiated a traffic stop after observing the petitioner's vehicle on several occasions cross a double-yellow line. While executing the traffic stop, the arresting officer observed that the petitioner had slurred speech and bloodshot watery eyes, and he smelled the odor of alcohol on the petitioner's breath. The petitioner admitted to the arresting officer that he had consumed champagne and wine at dinner. The petitioner failed three field sobriety tests, and was then arrested. The petitioner, despite being warned of the consequences, refused to submit to a chemical test three times.

At the conclusion of a license revocation hearing conducted pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(c), the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter the ALJ) found that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and ordered that his license be revoked. The ALJ's determination was affirmed by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking review of the revocation of his driver license.

Here, the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ; Matter of Schoonmaker v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 165 A.D.3d 677, 678, 85 N.Y.S.3d 222, affd 33 N.Y.3d 926, 99 N.Y.S.3d 760, 123 N.E.3d 244 ). The evidence adduced at the hearing, including the testimony of the arresting officer, the officer's written report of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a chemical test, and the petitioner's own testimony, demonstrated that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had committed a traffic infraction and had been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that the officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner, that after the petitioner's arrest, the petitioner was given sufficient warning of the consequences of refusing to submit to a chemical test, and that three times the petitioner refused the officer's request to submit to the chemical test (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c] ; Matter of Schoonmaker v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 165 A.D.3d at 678, 85 N.Y.S.3d 222 ; Matter of Gazda v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 159 A.D.3d 903, 904–905, 72 N.Y.S.3d 555 ; Matter of Barr v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 155 A.D.3d 1159, 1160, 63 N.Y.S.3d 599 ; Matter of Hickey v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 142 A.D.3d 668, 669, 36 N.Y.S.3d 720 ).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the arresting officer lawfully stopped his vehicle. A police officer may lawfully execute a traffic stop of a vehicle when he or she has probable cause to believe that...