Crowley v. Goauto Ins. Co.

286 So.3d 466

Justin CROWLEY

v.GOAUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, Brionne L. Myles, and Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company

NO. 2019-CA-0643

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

NOVEMBER 27, 2019

R. Brent Cueria, CUERIA LAW FIRM, L.L.C., 700 Camp Street, Suite 316, New Orleans, LA 70130, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Dianna Duffy Willem, Charles V. Giordano, Michael E. Escudier, HEBBLER & GIORDANO, L.L.C., 3501 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 400, Metairie, LA 70002, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Karen M. Dicke, LEWIS, BRISBOIS, BISGAARD & SMITH, L.L.P., 400 Poydras Street, Suite 1300, New Orleans, LA 70130, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

(Court composed of Judge Edwin A. Lombard, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Tiffany G. Chase )

Judge Tiffany G. Chase

The plaintiff, Justin Crowley (hereinafter "Mr. Crowley"), appeals the trial court's judgment granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant, Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company (hereinafter "Progressive"), on the basis that Progressive's insurance policy excludes coverage for plaintiff's alleged damages. After consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September 20, 2017, wherein Mr. Crowley sustained personal injuries when he was allegedly rear-ended by defendant, Brionne Myles (hereinafter "Ms. Myles"). At the time of the accident, Mr. Crowley was working in his capacity as a Lyft driver and logged on to the Lyft ride-sharing application waiting for a ride request. Mr. Crowley was insured as a resident driver under a Progressive automobile policy issued to his wife, Juliette Crowley. The policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (hereinafter "UM") with limits of $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for each accident.

Mr. Crowley filed a petition for damages against Ms. Myles, her insurer Go Auto Insurance Company; and his insurer, Progressive, seeking UM coverage. Mr. Crowley subsequently amended his petition to assert an additional claim for UM coverage against Lyft's insurer, Steadfast Insurance Company.

On July 23, 2018, Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that its policy excludes coverage for Mr. Crowley's UM claims. Specifically, Progressive avers that Mr. Crowley was engaged in ride-sharing activities, an excluded activity under the UM policy. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Progressive submitted deposition testimony of Mr. Crowley wherein he acknowledged, at the time of the accident, that he was logged on to the Lyft application, searching for a passenger near the New Orleans Convention Center. Progressive also introduced a certified copy of the insurance policy. Mr. Crowley opposed the motion for summary judgment urging the trial court to find that the exclusion violates public policy. He argues that the law favors coverage under an insurance policy and that the exclusion adversely affects his ability to receive complete reparation for his damages. Moreover, Mr. Crowley notes that Progressive failed to establish the procedural requirements for a knowing waiver of UM coverage. After a hearing, the trial court granted Progressive's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Crowley's claims against Progressive, with prejudice. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether an insurance policy provides or excludes coverage as a matter of law is an issue that can be resolved by summary judgment. Chapital v. Harry Kelleher & Co., Inc. , 2013-1606, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/4/14), 144 So.3d 75, 82 (quoting Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lexington Ins. Co. , 2012-1686, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 118 So.3d 1203, 1212 ). Likewise, when summary judgment is granted in the context of statutory interpretation, a reviewing court is presented with a question of law which is subject to de novo review. Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. , 2016-0846, pp. 9-10 (La. 10/19/16), 218 So.3d 513, 520.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Crowley argues the exclusion of UM coverage in a personal automobile insurance policy issued to an owner or operator of a vehicle, when that individual is engaged in ride-sharing activity, is against established public policy. In support of this position, Mr. Crowley relies on this Court's decision in Jean v. James River Ins. Co. , 2019-0041, p.5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/19), 274 So.3d 43, 46 ; wherein this Court held that a transportation network company (hereinafter "TNC") is permitted to reject UM coverage when all of the formalities are satisfied. Mr. Crowley submits that the trial court's ruling in this case, coupled with the holding of Jean , places drivers in an untenable situation potentially leaving drivers without UM coverage. Mr. Crowley also argues that since a TNC is required to reject UM coverage and adhere to the formal requirements of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii), the same formalities should likewise apply when an insurer, under a personal insurance policy, seeks to exclude UM coverage for ride-sharing activity. See Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co. , 2006-0363, pp. 11-13 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 551 (setting out the six requirements for a valid rejection of UM coverage).

This case presents two issues for our determination. While we must ultimately determine whether the trial court erred in granting Progressive's motion for summary judgment finding that coverage was excluded under the insurance policy, we do so while also considering Mr. Crowley's argument that the exclusion violates public policy.

In analyzing insurance policies, certain legal principles apply. First and foremost is the rule that an insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Civil Code. Edwards v. Daugherty , 2003-2103, p. 11 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So.2d 932, 940 (citing Cadwallader v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 2002-1637, p. 3 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 577, 580 ). According to those rules, the responsibility of the judiciary in interpreting insurance contracts is to determine the parties' common intent. Id. (citing La. C.C. art. 2045 ). Courts begin their analysis of the parties' common intent by examining the words of the insurance contract itself. See La. C.C. art. 2046 ; Blackburn v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh , 2000-2668, p. 6 (La. 4/3/01), 784 So.2d 637, 641 ("[T]he initial determination of the parties' intent is found in the insurance policy itself."). In ascertaining the common intent, words and phrases in an insurance policy are to be construed using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning, in which case the words must be ascribed their technical meaning. See La. C.C. art. 2047.

The relevant portion of the Progressive policy provides, in pertinent part:

EXCLUSIONS – READ THE FOLLOWING EXCLUSIONS CAREFULLY. IF AN EXCLUSION APPLIES, COVERAGE WILL NOT BE AFFORDED UNDER THIS PART III.

Coverage under this Part III will not apply:

* * *

6. [t]o bodily injury sustained by any person while using or occupying a covered auto , a rental auto , or a temporary substitute auto while being used for ride-sharing activity .¹

A clear reading of the policy language reveals that any bodily injury sustained while using or occupying a covered auto while engaging in ride-sharing activities are excluded. No further interpretation of the clear and unambiguous language is required. The policy constitutes the law between Mr. Crowley and Progressive as well as the nature of their relationship and what obligations are owed is governed by that agreement.

An insured is deemed to know the contents of their insurance policy. See Chapital , 2013-1606, p. 8, 144 So.3d at 83. This includes any exclusions limiting potential coverage. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in finding Progressive's policy did not afford coverage for the UM claims asserted by Mr. Crowley. However, it is significant to note that Mr. Crowley does not rest his argument solely on the fact that the policy language is ambiguous, rather he contends that the inclusion of the ride-sharing use exclusion in the policy, without adherence to the formal requirements of La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii), violates public policy.

In 2015, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Section 1 of Acts 2015, No. 266 effective January 1, 2016, adding Part C, and designated it as the "Transportation Network Company Motor Vehicle Responsibility" act. Contained within this new provision is La. R.S. 45:201.7 which expressly allow insurers to exclude UM coverage in policies issued to an owner or operator of a personal vehicle when a driver is engaged in ride-sharing activity. La. R.S. 45:201.7 provides:

(A)(1) Insurers that write automobile insurance in this state may exclude any or all coverage afforded under the policy issued to an owner or operator of a personal vehicle for any loss or injury that occurs while a driver is logged on to a transportation network company's digital network during the pre-trip acceptance period or while a driver is engaged in a prearranged ride. This right to exclude coverage shall apply to any or all coverage in an automobile insurance policy including but not limited to:

(a) Liability coverage for bodily injury.

(b) Liability coverage for property damage.

(c) Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

(d) Medical payments coverage.

(e) Comprehensive physical damage coverage.

(f) Collision physical damage coverage.

(2) The exclusions permitted in this Subsection shall apply notwithstanding any requirement under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, R.S. 32:851 et seq. or other laws. Nothing in this Section implies or requires that a personal automobile insurance policy provide coverage while the driver is logged on to the transportation network company's digital network during the pre-trip

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