Cruz v. Abbott

177 F.Supp.3d 992

David Cruz, Valentin Reyes, Johnathon Ryan, Bishop Enrique San Pedro Ozanam Center, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.Greg Abbott, In his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas, Steven C. McCraw, In his Official Capacity as Director of Public Safety, Cynthia Leon, In her Official Capacity as Member of the Texas Public Safety Commission, Faith Johnson, In her Official Capacity as Member of the Texas Public Safety Commission, Manny Flores, In his Official Capacity as Member of the Texas Public Safety Commission, Steven P. Mach, In his Official Capacity as Member of the Texas Public Safety Commission, Randy Watson, In his Official Capacity as Member of the Texas Public Safety Commission, Defendants.

NO. 5:16–CV–067–DAE

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

Signed April 14, 2016

John Paul Salmon, Marisa Bono, Nina Perales, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund., San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Adam N. Bitter, Angela V. Colmenero, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

David Alan Ezra, Senior United States District Judge

Before the Court is (1) Plaintiffs David Cruz, Valentin Reyes, Johnathon Ryan, and Bishop Enrique San Pedro Ozanam Center, Inc.'s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. # 3), and (2) Defendants Greg Abbott (“Governor Abbott”), Steven C. McCraw, Cynthia Leon, Faith Johnson, Manny Flores, Steven P. Mach, and Randy Watson's (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 16). The Court held a hearing on these motions on March 31, 2016. At the hearing, Nina Perales, Esq., and Jack Salmon, Esq., represented Plaintiffs, and Adam Bitter, Esq., Angela Colmenero, Esq., and John Duke, Esq., represented Defendants.

Upon careful consideration of the arguments asserted in the supporting and opposing memoranda, as well as the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. # 3), and (2) GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 16).

BACKGROUND

I. House Bill 11

In March 2015, the Texas Committee on Homeland Security took up the matter of “the smuggling of humans and illegal contraband by transnational gangs and perpetrators of organized crime throughout” Texas's border and throughout the State. (Dkt. # 17–13 at 4.) House Bill 11 (“H.B.11”) was introduced in an effort to “increase the presence and opportunity of law enforcement” and give “them various tools to help them do a more effective job of fighting ... transnational gangs and smugglers.” (Id. ) Formally, H.B. 11 relates “to the powers and duties of the Texas Department of Public Safety [ (“DPS”) ], military and law enforcement training, and the investigation, prosecution, punishment, and prevention of certain offenses; creating an offense and increasing a criminal penalty; [and] authorizing fees.” “H.B. 11,” 2015 Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex.2015). Several hearings regarding H.B. 11 were held in March and April of 2015. (Dkts.## 17–13, 17–14, 17–17, 17–18.)

Among other provisions, section 14 of H.B. 11 proposed a revision to the State's human smuggling statute—section 20.05 of the Texas Penal Code.¹ See H.B. 11, § 14 (codified as amended as Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20.05 (West 2015) ). The proposed amendments to the penal code included the creation of a new criminal offense—harboring an undocumented alien,² as well as narrowing the existing offense of concealing a person from law enforcement. (Id. ) In the course of legislative debate regarding section 14 of H.B. 11, several witnesses acknowledged at the hearings that the proposed legislation might be subject to challenge. For instance, Pastor Sammy Garcia testified that his ministry along the border would be negatively affected because he would be subject to prosecution for picking up a person in need and taking him “to service” because he did not know whether the person was an undocumented alien. (Dkt. # 17–13 at 71.) Additionally, Eugene Hildebrandt, a pastor in Austin, Texas, testified that he was concerned about the statute's language relating to “knowingly” harboring an undocumented alien because his ministry to the poor did not involve inquiry into a person's citizenship status. (Dkt. # 17–14 at 4.) Another pastor, Lynn Godsey, testified about her concern that law enforcement officers might target churches where they know undocumented aliens attend and “sit outside” to arrest violators of the statute, including those church personnel who “harbor” these undocumented aliens. (Id. at 14–15.)

In response to these and other concerns, an amendment to section 14 of H.B. 11 was offered, which focused “on an individual's intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit” in a human smuggling activity, such as “concealing, harboring, or shielding that person from detection.” (See Dkt. # 17–14 at 78–79.) When introducing the amendment, Representative Joe Moody commented that “I think that what we've done here is make sure that the folks we're targeting with this statute are the ones that we're going to get. I think that's everybody's goal. I think we don't want to have unintended consequences.” (Id. at 79.) The substitution to the proposed bill was adopted without objection. (Id. at 80.) Subsequently, the Committee unanimously approved sending the amended bill to the full House of Representatives. (Id. at 81.)

In May 2015, an amended version of H.B. 11, not significantly affecting the language proposed in section 14, was eventually adopted by both the House and the Senate. On June 9, 2015, Governor Greg Abbott signed H.B. 11 into law. In signing H.B. 11, Governor Abbott commented that Texas “cannot be naïve to the threat posed by drug cartels and transnational gangs. And Texas will not sit idly by while the federal government fails to do its job and secure the border.” (Dkt. # 4 at 136.) Governor Abbott further commented “[t]he issues exist in the first place because we have a failed federal government that has refused to address the issues to tackle those problems.... Those are national, federal-based issues that we demand the United States federal government address and solve. Texas is doing what it can do by passing this border security plan.” (Dkt. # 17–7 at 3.) H.B. 11 became effective on September 1, 2015. See H.B. 11. Since its enactment, DPS has enforced section 14's criminal provisions at least once. (See Dkt. # 4 at 145–46.)

II. Plaintiffs' Complaint

On January 24, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in this Court. (Dkt. # 1.) Plaintiffs' amended complaint challenges sections 14(a)(2), 15(a), and 16(a)(17) of H.B. 11 (“H.B. 11's harboring provisions”).³ (Dkt. # 9.) As discussed above, section 14(a)(2) states that “[a] person commits an offense if the person, with the intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit, knowingly ... encourages or induces a person to enter or remain in this country in violation of federal law by concealing, harboring, or shielding that person from detection.” H.B. 11, § 14(a)(2); Tex. Penal Code § 20.05. Section 15(a) addresses the “continuous smuggling of persons,” stating that “a person commits an offense if, during a period that is 10 or more days in duration, the person engages two or more times in conduct that constitutes an offense under” section 14. H.B. 11, § 15(a); Tex. Penal Code § 20.06. Section 16(a)(17) states that “[a] person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member of a criminal street gang, the person commits or conspires to commit ... any offense [under section 14 or 15].”

H.B. 11, § 16(a)(17); Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a).

Plaintiffs argue that H.B. 11's harboring provisions violate the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs contend the harboring provisions “attempt to regulate matters that are exclusively reserved to the federal government, because they operate in a field over which Congress has exercised exclusive authority, and because they conflict and interfere with the implementation and enforcement of federal laws and regulations.” (Dkt. # 9 at 15.) Plaintiffs also attack H.B. 11's harboring provisions on the grounds that they violate both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 15.)

On January 25, 2016, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. # 3.) Defendants filed a response to the motion on February 26, 2016 (Dkt. # 17); Plaintiffs filed a reply on March 11, 2016 (Dkt. # 20.) In responding to Plaintiff's motion on February 26, 2016, Defendants simultaneously moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint. (Dkt. # 16.) Plaintiffs filed a response on March 12, 2016 (Dkt. # 22); Defendants filed a reply on March 23, 2016 (Dkt. # 26.) The pending motions are addressed below.

III. Legal Standards

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

The grant of injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy which requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance. Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir.2012) ; Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.1997). A preliminary injunction should not be granted unless the movant demonstrates by a clear showing: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any harm that may result from the injunction to the non-movant; and (4) that the injunction will not undermine the public interest. Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir.1987) ; Valley, 118 F.3d at 1051. However, even when a movant establishes each of the four requirements described above, the decision...