Cruz v. City of Deming

687 F.Supp.3d 1155

Ernestina CRUZ, as personal representative of the Estate of Gilbert Valencia andG.R.V., a minor, through his next friend Marianna Wheeler, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DEMING; Deming Police Officers Lee Cook Jordan; Sergio Quezada;Cristobal Paz; Adam Aragon; Robert Chavez; Benjamin Sanchez;David Acosta; and Ashley Standridge; New Mexico Department of Public Safety;Luna County; Luna County Sheriff's Department Lieutenant Arturo Baeza; and John Does 1 through 9, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00957-MIS-GJF

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

Filed August 18, 2023

Adrian Gandara, Erlinda O. Johnson, Law Office of Erlinda Ocampo Johnson, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, Britany J. Schaffer, Richard J. Moran, Ahmad Assed, Ahmad Assed & Associates, Albuquerque, NM, Joel R. Meyers, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiffs.

Alan J. Dahl, Blaine T. Mynatt, Mynatt Martinez Springer P.C., Las Cruces, NM, for Defendants City of Deming, Lee Cook Jordan, Sergio Quezada, Cristobal Paz, Adam Aragon, Robert Chavez, Benjamin Sanchez, David Acosta, Ashley Standridge.

Luis E. Robles, Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant New Mexico Department of Public Safety.

Bradley A. Springer, Haley R. Grant, Damian L. Martinez, Mynatt Martinez Springer P.C., Las Cruces, NM, for Defendants Luna County, Arturo Baeza.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

MARGARET STRICKLAND, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on "Defendants Luna County and Lieutenant Arturo Baeza's Motion to Reconsider the Order [Doc. 52] on Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery [Doc. 25]" ("Motion") [ECF No. 53], filed June 23, 2023 by Defendants Luna County and Lieutenant Arturo Baeza (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiffs Ernestina Cruz and G.R.V. (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed their Response and Defendants filed their Reply. ECF Nos. 54, 55. Defendants request the Court reconsider its interlocutory order, ECF No. 53. ECF No. 53 at 1-2. Therein, the Court stayed discovery related to Defendant Baeza's alleged involvement in the events giving rise to Count VI of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint but permitted all other discovery to proceed. ECF No. 53 at 4. Upon due consideration of the parties' submissions, the record, and the relevant law, the Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the shooting death of twenty-nine-year-old Gilbert Valencia during an encounter with the Deming Police Department and the New Mexico State Police. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Specifically, Mr. Valencia was shot over 20 times by Defendants Deming Police Officers Robert Chavez, Cristobal Paz, Sergio Quezada, Benjamin Sanchez, and Adam Aragon. Id. at 3, ¶ 4; 16, ¶ 66-67.

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on December 15, 2022, in which they asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), one claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., one claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq., and three claims under New Mexico state law. Id. at 19-38. There is no Section 1983 claim alleged against Defendant Luna County. With respect to Defendant Baeza, Plaintiffs bring one Section 1983 claim (Count VI) against him in his individual capacity for failure to intervene. Id. at 33-34.

On April 10, 2023, Defendants Luna County and Baeza filed a motion requesting that the Court stay all discovery as to all defendants in this case. ECF No. 27 at 1-2. They cited to Defendant Baeza's invocation of qualified immunity against Count VI of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint—the only Section 1983 claim against Defendant Baeza—in a motion for summary judgment to support their argument. Id. (citing ECF No. 25).

On June 20, 2023, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Defendants Luna County and Baeza's request for a stay of discovery. ECF No. 52 at 1. Rather than stay the entire case, the Court implemented a tailored stay that corresponded precisely to Defendant Baeza's invocation of qualified immunity in response to Count VI of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Id. at 5. As such, the Court stayed discovery related to Defendant Baeza's alleged involvement in the events giving rise to Count VI of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint but permitted all other discovery to proceed. Id. at 4.

Thereafter, on June 23, 2023, Defendants Luna County and Baeza filed the underlying Motion requesting reconsideration of the Court's interlocutory order granting in part and denying in part their request for a stay of discovery. ECF No. 53 at 1.

PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Defendants Luna County and Baeza contend the Court committed clear error in not ordering a stay of all discovery as to all defendants in this matter once Defendant Baeza invoked qualified immunity and that, therefore, the Court should reconsider its interlocutory order. Id. at 3. Specifically, they argue that "[c]ontrolling case law dictates that entry of a stay on discovery during the pendency of qualified immunity is effective as to all defendants." Id. at 2. In support, Defendants Luna County and Baeza cite to: (1) Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); (2) Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); (3) Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410 (10th Cir. 2004); (4) Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1992); and (5) Wilkinson v. Maese, No. 1:20-CV-783 MIS/KRS, 2021 U.S. Dist. 14869 (D.N.M. Jan. 26, 2021). Id. at 3-4. In sum, their position is that Defendant Baeza's "entitlement to qualified immunity must be resolved before any discovery can occur." Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs assert that the lone Section 1983 claim against Defendant Baeza is based on his failure to intervene; hence, for there to be a failure to intervene, it logically follows that an underlying constitutional violation must exist. ECF No. 54 at 4. Thus, they argue, the Court properly exercised its discretion by concluding that it could not rule on Defendant Baeza's immunity defense without clarifying whether the underlying allegations of excessive force by the other officers were constitutional. Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants Luna County and Baeza have already participated in substantial discovery, making their concerns about disruption disingenuous. Id. at 5. To conclude, Plaintiffs state that the purpose of a discovery stay should not be to frustrate a plaintiff's efforts to determine whether a law enforcement's conduct is objectively reasonable. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly prescribe how a district court should reconsider an interlocutory order pertaining to discovery. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ("[A]ny order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claim or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment . . . .").

For reference, an interlocutory order is "[a]n order that relates to some intermediate matter in the case; any order other than a final order." Order, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A final order or judgment, on the other hand, is "[a] court's last action that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney's fees) and enforcement of the judgment." Judgment, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An interlocutory order is distinct from a final judgment in that an interlocutory order—with some exceptions—is not appealable until the case is fully resolved. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (defining "judgment" as "a decree and any order from which an appeal lies").

Notwithstanding the above, a district court has broad inherent discretion to reconsider an interlocutory order. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 538 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[E]very order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge."). Although Rules 59(e) and 60 pertain to relief from judgments and not interlocutory orders, district courts are typically guided by the standards that govern those rules in deciding whether to alter or vacate an interlocutory order. See, e.g., Ellis v. Hobbs Police Dep't, No. 217CV01011KWRGBW, 2021 WL 184460, at *1-2 (D.N.M. Jan. 19, 2021); Mantooth v. Bavaria Inn Rest., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1168-69 (D. Colo. 2019); Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 308 F.R.D. 410, 427-33 (D.N.M. 2015); Sump v. Fingerhut, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 324, 326-27 (D. Kan. 2002).

A motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle "to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion." Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Rather, the party moving for reconsideration typically must show "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, [or] (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Id. "Thus, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law." Id.

DISCUSSION

The Court holds that—contrary to Defendants Luna County and Baeza's contentions—binding precedent does not mandate that a district court stay all discovery as to all defendants merely because at least one defendant invokes qualified immunity in a dispositive motion. Rather, the issuance of a discovery stay remains within the sound discretion of the district court, as outlined below, and the Court did not commit clear error in exercising its discretion in issuing a tailored discovery stay in this case.

I. The History of Qualified Immunity and Accompanying Prophylactic Discovery Stays

In 1871, in response to an ongoing pattern of violence and intimidation against newly emancipated African Americans, Congress enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act, now...