Cruz v. Price

1

PETER CASEY CRUZ, Petitioner, v. BRANDON PRICE, Respondent.

No. 1:18-cv-01360-JLT-CDB (HC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 17, 2024

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO (1) DENY PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND (2) DISMISS PETITION 21-DAY DEADLINE (DOC. 51)

Pending before the Court is the motion of Petitioner Peter Casey Cruz (“Petitioner”), represented by counsel Eric Hans Schweitzer, to amend his petition for writ of habeas corpus the opposition of Respondent Brandon Price (“Respondent”), and Petitioner's ancillary brief. (Docs. 51, 53, 55). On July 13, 2023, the Undersigned heard oral arguments on Petitioner's motion. (Doc. 54). For the reasons that follow, the Undersigned will recommend Petitioner's motion to amend the petition be denied and this case be dismissed.

Background

A. Procedural Posture

Petitioner is a pretrial detainee in state custody at Coalinga State Hospital (“Coalinga”) pending ongoing proceedings pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”) in California state court. (Doc. 1 at 2).

In 1998, Petitioner pleaded guilty to kidnapping and molesting a five-year-old girl. (Doc. 21 at 2) (citing Cruz v Ahlin, Case No. 5:10-cv-01345-JLS-AJW (C.D. Cal. 2011)) (hereinafter, “Cruz Habeas I”). The court sentenced him to state prison for a term of ten years and eight months. Id. Petitioner's release date was set for November 16, 2006. Id. On November 14, 2006 the Board of Parole Hearings imposed a three-day hold on his release. Id. On November 21, 2006, the Board imposed an additional 45-day hold. Id.

On November 29 and December 1, 2006, Drs. Wesley B. Maram and Harry Goldberg conducted civil commitment evaluations of Petitioner pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 6600. (Doc. 51-6 at 5-19, 63-86). Drs. Maram and Goldberg disagreed as to whether Petitioner met the statutory criteria for filing a commitment petition, with Dr. Goldberg declining to conclude that Petitioner met the commitment criteria. Id. On December 11 and 15, 2006, Drs. Christopher North and Dennis R. Sheppard provided separate civil commitment evaluations of Petitioner pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 6600 and determined Petitioner met the commitment criteria. Id. at 2062.

On January 3, 2007, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a petition for the civil commitment of Petitioner pursuant to the SVPA. (Doc. 19-1 at 2). On March 16, 2007, the Riverside County Superior Court held a hearing, found probable cause for commitment, and ordered Petitioner be detained in the custody of the California Department of State Hospitals pending trial. Id. at 4-5. Thereafter, Petitioner pursued a motion to dismiss the SVPA proceedings based upon untimeliness. (Doc. 21 at 2). The California Court of Appeals ruled that the SVPA petition was timely filed under state law. Id.

On September 7, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California challenging the legality of his detention. Id. On March 18, 2011, the assigned district judge adopted the findings and recommendation of a magistrate judge that Petitioner's claims premised on violations of state law were not cognizable and otherwise were barred by the doctrine of preemption under Younger v. Harris and, accordingly, dismissed the petition. See Cruz Habeas I, Doc. 13 pp. 3-4 & Doc. 18. On April 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Central District of California raising similar claims. See Cruz v. Ahlin, Case No. 5:11-cv-00658-JLS-AJW (C.D. Cal. 2011)). On November 1, 2011, the assigned district judge once again adopted the findings and recommendation of a magistrate judge that Petitioner's claims were not cognizable in habeas and otherwise were barred by the doctrine of preemption under Younger v. Harris and, accordingly, dismissed the petition. See id., Doc. 10 pp. 3-6 & Doc. 15.

According to the allegations in his petition, at some point during the SVPA proceedings before the Riverside County Superior Court, Petitioner filed a “motion to abate” pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti). (Doc. 1-2 at 5-14). Petitioner asserted “the State evaluator reports naming [him], as a potential SVP are infected with ‘Material Legal Error'.. .[and] is not supported by the statutory criteria necessary to meet a legal finding of Probable Cause.” Id. at 5. In November or December 2016, Petitioner additionally asserts he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Riverside County Superior Court alleging: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and denied replacement counsel; (2) he was denied a speedy trial after a delay of more than 11 years; (3) he was entitled to dismissal of SVPA proceedings because of material legal error; and (4) he was denied due process because of the court's refusal to hear his motion. (Doc. 1 at 4-5).

The petition was denied on December 21, 2016. Id. at 5. At some point, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Court of Appeals raising the same claims. Id. at 4. In that court, Petitioner asserted his “Plea in Abatement (Ghilotti motion) still has not been heard in respondent court.” (Doc. 1-1 at 37). On August 1, 2017, the state appellate court denied the petition. (Doc. 1 at 4). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court raising the same claims. Id. at 3-4. On June 27, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. Id.

B. Petitioner's Habeas Corpus Action in this Court

On September 21, 2018, Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Central District of California, challenging the legality of his detention. (Doc. 1). On October 1, 2018, the Central District court transferred the action to this Court. (Doc. 4). This Court directed Respondent to file a response to the petition on October 3, 2018. (Doc. 7).

On January 30, 2019, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's habeas corpus claims under the doctrine of Younger abstention. (Doc. 19). Petitioner filed an opposition on February 21, 2019. (Doc. 20). On March 5. 2019, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations to grant Respondent's motion to dismiss and to dismiss the petition without prejudice. (Doc. 21). The assigned magistrate judge found there was no applicable exception to Younger abstention and that the Court should abstain from interfering in the state's SVPA proceedings. Id. On March 20, 2019, Petitioner filed objections to the findings and recommendations. (Doc. 22). The Honorable District Judge Anthony W. Ishii adopted the findings and recommendations on May 3, 2019. (Doc. 23). That same day, the Court entered judgment against Petitioner and closed the case. (Doc. 24).

On May 10, 2019, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal of this Court's order granting Respondent's motion to dismiss to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 25). On July 17, 2019, the Court of Appeals remanded the action to this Court for the limited purpose of granting or denying a certificate of appealability. (Doc. 28). This Court issued an order declining to issue a certificate of appealability on October 3, 2019. (Doc. 29).

C. The Court of Appeals' Limited Remand

On April 1, 2022, the Court of Appeals issued a memorandum affirming in part and remanding in part the decision of this Court to dismiss the petition. (Doc. 32). The Court of Appeals determined the district court correctly abstained from resolving Petitioner's petition to the extent Petitioner sought to enjoin his ongoing SVPA civil commitment proceedings in state court based on an alleged unconstitutional delay in bringing him to trial. Id. at 2-3. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's argument that extraordinary circumstances precluded Younger abstention. Id. at 3.

The Court of Appeals also considered Petitioner's argument that he had been detained without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 3-4. The Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he district court did not address this theory, and the state argues that [Petitioner] did not raise it below.” Id. at 4. The Court of Appeals acknowledged Petitioner was proceeding pro se, and pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally. Id. The Court of Appeals also explained that while it did “not fault the district court for not appreciating [Petitioner's] Fourth Amendment theory, judicial economy would not be served by inviting [Petitioner] to file a new § 2241 petition, as opposed to allowing him to amend his existing one in order more fully to develop this claim.” Id. The Court of Appeals determined because Petitioner fairly argued that his Fourth Amendment claim would not be barred under Younger, remand was warranted to consider the Fourth Amendment theory in the first instance. Id. Further, the Court of Appeals noted, “Considering the amount of time that [Petitioner] has been detained pending trial, the district court should consider whether it is appropriate to appoint counsel.” Id.

On December 5, 2022, the Undersigned issued an order appointing counsel for Petitioner. (Doc. 36). The Undersigned directed appointed counsel to file a supplemental traverse addressing Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim and briefing the Court as to whether Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim is exhausted. Id. at 3.

D. Petitioner's Pending Motion to Amend Habeas Corpus Petition

On May 18, 2023, Petitioner filed the instant motion to amend the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 51).^[1] In his notice of motion, Petitioner asserts amendment is not futile or sought in bad faith and will not result in either undue delay or unwarranted prejudice to any opposing party. Id. at 12. Petitioner contends he should be allowed to amend his...