CSAA Affinity Ins. Co. v. Dagit

270 A.3d 1159 (Table)

CSAA AFFINITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

v.Charles DAGIT, Ma Rosario Hildawa, and Christopher Casey

No. 1937 EDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed December 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:

CSAA Affinity Insurance Company ("CSAA") appeals from the trial court's September 15, 2020 order denying its petition for judgment on the pleadings, in which CSAA sought the court's declaration that CSAA had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Charles Dagit, in an underlying action filed against him. CSAA also appeals from the trial court's October 6, 2020 order denying CSAA's motion for reconsideration of the September 15, 2020 order and motion to amend the September 15, 2020 order for purposes of taking an interlocutory appeal. Dagit argues, as a threshold matter, that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the September 15, 2020 order is interlocutory and not appealable. We disagree and instead, conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. However, we also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying CSAA's petition for judgment on the pleadings. We do so on the basis of the trial court's opinion, adopting its well-reasoned analysis as our own, and we therefore affirm.

CSAA issued a homeowner's policy to Dagit for the home he owns in Gladwyne, Pennsylvania. Christopher Casey and Ma Rosario Hildawa filed a personal injury complaint against Dagit seeking damages for injuries they sustained during a dispute with Dagit over the removal of firewood from his property. Specifically, Casey and Hildawa alleged that on January 12, 2019, they were driving by Dagit's property when they saw what they thought to be free firewood at the end of Dagit's driveway. As they were loading the firewood into their car, Dagit approached them and, according to the complaint, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. An argument ensued, and Dagit punched both Casey and Hildawa. In their complaint, Casey and Hildawa asserted that Dagit had acted willfully, recklessly or negligently by punching Casey and Hildawa. The complaint further averred that Dagit had pleaded guilty to simple assault as a result of the incident. Following the filing of their complaint against Dagit, Dagit sought coverage from CSAA to defend and indemnify him in the lawsuit.

CSAA denied Dagit's request, claiming that Dagit's homeowner's policy did not cover the incident on January 12, 2019, because Dagit's actions were intentional and therefore did not constitute an "occurrence" as required for the policy to cover personal liability claims. As such, CSAA determined that it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Dagit in the matter filed by Casey and Hildawa. CSAA then filed a complaint for declaratory relief under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532, seeking a declaration from the trial court that CSAA had no duty to defend or indemnify Dagit in the personal injury suit filed against him. Both Dagit and Casey and Hildawa filed an answer with new matter, and CSAA filed a reply. Following the close of pleadings, CSAA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In its motion, CSAA once again sought the court's declaration that it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Dagit in the personal injury lawsuit.

On September 15, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying CSAA's petition. It also ordered CSAA to defend Dagit in the personal injury lawsuit. CSAA filed a motion for reconsideration and, in the alternative, a motion for the court to amend the September 15, 2020 order to allow for an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b) (" Section 702(b)").

The trial court denied the motion on October 6, 2020. CSAA filed a timely notice of appeal, seeking to appeal both the September 15, 2020 order and the October 6, 2020 order. The trial court directed CSAA to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. CSAA filed a statement, essentially alleging two issues. The first, which spanned three pages and had four subsections and three sub-subsections, alleged that the trial court had improperly denied CSAA's petition for judgment on the pleadings. See Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 10/22/2020, at 1-3. The second issue alleged that the trial court had abused its discretion when it "failed to certify its September 15, 2020 Order for immediate appeal to" this Court. Id. at 4.

In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. The court first found that it had not erred by concluding that CSAA had a duty to defend Dagit, emphasizing that a duty to defend arises "whenever an underlying complaint may potentially come within the insurance coverage of the policy." Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/20, at 5 (citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 449 Pa.Super. 142, 673 A.2d 348, 355 (Pa. Super. 1996) ). The trial court found, in essence, that because the complaint alleged that Dagit acted negligently and recklessly in addition to its allegation that Dagit acted intentionally, Casey and Hildawa's claims may potentially come within the coverage of Dagit's homeowner's policy. As such, the court concluded that CSAA had a duty to defend Dagit against those claims. The court also concluded that it had not abused its discretion by declining to certify the September 15, 2020 order for immediate appeal pursuant to Section 702(b).

In its initial brief to this Court, CSAA's argument section is dedicated to challenging the court's denial of its petition for judgment on the pleadings. Before we can reach this substantive claim, however, we must first determine whether the court's September 15, 2020 order is appealable as that implicates our jurisdiction. See Schmitt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 245 A.3d 678, 681 (Pa. Super. 2021). Although CSAA has abandoned its claim that the trial court erred by failing to certify the September 15, 2020 order for appeal pursuant to Section 702(b),¹ CSAA now summarily asserts in its brief's statement of jurisdiction section that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the September 15, 2020 order was actually a final order and therefore appealable. CSAA maintains that the finality of the order stems from Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), which provides that an order that disposes of all claims or parties is a final order, and Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, which provides:

Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed ... The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532.

Dagit counters in the statement of jurisdiction section in his brief that this Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) because CSAA's declaratory judgment action sought a declaration on two issues: that CSAA did not have a duty to defend and that it did not owe Dagit indemnification. Dagit maintains that because the court only ruled on CSAA's duty to defend, and did not rule on its duty to indemnify Dagit, the September 15, 2020 order did not dispose of all of the claims and therefore was an interlocutory appeal.

In its reply brief, CSAA responds in its argument section that under our case law, "an order entered in an action filed for declaratory relief is a final, appealable order, if, as in this case, it addresses all claims and effectively declares the rights and duties of the parties." Appellant's Reply Brief at 7. To that end, CSAA argues that the claims raised in its petition for judgment on the pleadings sought nothing more than declaratory relief, and because the trial court ruled on that, the court's September 15, 2020 order is a "final order thereby entitling CSAA to immediately appeal that decision." See id. at 7-8. We agree.

As a general rule, this Court only has jurisdiction over appeals taken from a final order. See Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 681. A final order is one that disposes of all the parties and all the claims or is entered as a final order pursuant to the trial court's determination under Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). See id.; Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1),(3). However, an appeal may also be taken from interlocutory orders by permission pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311 and Section 702(b) as well as from certain interlocutory orders as of right, including "an order that is made final or appealable by statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of all claims and all parties." Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8) ; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a).

CSAA points to several cases to support its assertion that the September 15, 2020 order is final and appealable, leading with our Supreme Court's decision in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett. 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (Pa. 2000). There, a trial court order declared the rights of the plaintiffs relative to some, but not all, of the defendants. Even though claims against some of the defendants remained outstanding, this Court held that the order was final and appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2) (rescinded), which was the predecessor to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).² In so holding, the Supreme Court explained that under Section 7532, "an order in a declaratory judgment action that either affirmatively or negatively declares the rights and duties of the parties constitutes a final order." Id. at 818.

Our Supreme Court also examined the appealability of an order issued in a declaratory judgment action in General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 692 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 1997), which had circumstances similar to those before us now. In Allen , the grandchildren of Eugene Allen filed personal injury claims against him for sexual abuse that occurred in his home. Allen had a homeowner's policy with General Accident, and General Accident eventually sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or...