Cty. of Jefferson v. Stickle

542 P.3d 688

2024 CO 7

2024 CO 7

COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, Petitioner,

v.Beverly STICKLE, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SC632

Supreme Court of Colorado.

February 5, 2024

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA439

Attorneys for Petitioner: Jefferson County Attorney’s Office, Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Eric T. Butler, Deputy County Attorney, Rebecca P. Klymkowsky, Assistant Deputy County Attorney, Golden, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Silvern & Bulger, P.C., Thomas A. Bulger, Lakewood, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Counties, Inc., Colorado Municipal League, and Special District Association of Colorado: Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Andrew D. Ringel, Denver, Colorado, Rachel Bender, Robert Sheesley, Denver, Colorado, Dianne Criswell, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association: Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh & Jardine, P.C., D. Dean Batchelder, Alyssa C.E. Hill, Englewood, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State Office of Risk Management: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Shannon Wells Stevenson, Solicitor General, Friedrick C. Haines, Senior Litigation Counsel and Assistant Solicitor General, Lauren Davison, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Beverly Stickle lost her balance and fell when she stepped down from a walkway to the parking lot surface at a parking structure adjacent to the Jefferson County Courts and Administration Building. She broke her arm and subsequently sued Jefferson County ("the County") for damages sustained from the accident. The County moved to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA") because (1) the parking structure is not a "building" and (2) the condition that Stickle alleges caused her injury was solely the consequence of the parking lot’s "design." If either of these arguments were successful, the County would indeed be immune from suit. However, we conclude that the parking structure at issue is a building as that word is used in the CGIA and that the dangerous condition that Stickle alleges caused her fall is not attributable solely to the design of the parking structure. Accordingly, the County is not immune from suit, and Stickle’s claim may proceed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2 In February 2018, Stickle parked her car on the upper level of the North Parking Structure at the Jefferson County Courts and Administration Building and entered the building to conduct business with a County agency. As she returned to her car, Stickle fell while stepping down from a walkway onto the surface of the parking area and suffered a compound fracture of her arm. She sued the County under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, § 13-21-115, C.R.S. (2023), claiming that the curb was poorly marked and thus constituted a dangerous condition that caused her injury. In bringing her suit, Stickle asserted that the County was not immune from her claim because the parking structure is a "public building" under section 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. (2023), and the CGIA waives immunity for dangerous conditions of public buildings when caused by construction or maintenance rather than solely by the design of the building. § 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. (2023). The County moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that (1) the parking structure is not a building, and (2) the lot surface’s coloring was a "design" choice rather than a feature of construction or maintenance and therefore did not constitute a "dangerous condition" within the meaning of the CGIA.

¶3 The district court held a hearing pursuant to Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 923-24 (Colo. 1993), to determine whether the County waived its immunity. Following that hearing, the court denied the County’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the parking structure was a "building," reasoning that (1) the structure "is made of concrete or masonry materials and is permanent"; (2) the lower level "is surrounded by walls and appears to consist of permanent support columns"; and (3) the structure has electricity, lighting, and a fire suppression system. The court further found that "the surface of the walkway and the driving surface" created an optical illusion because they were "finished with the same color." This mirage, according to the court, constituted a dangerous condition. Thus, the trial court found that the County had waived its immunity under the CGIA.

¶4 The County filed an interlocutory appeal, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed. Stickle v. Cnty. of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, ¶ 42, 519 P.3d 751, 762. First, the division agreed with the district court that the parking structure was a building. Id. at ¶ 28, 519 P.3d at 760. Additionally, the division rejected the County’s argument that the curb illusion was solely a design choice. Id. at ¶ 39, 519 P.3d at 761–62. Instead, the division concluded that the illusion of uniformity between the walkway and the parking surface "resulted from maintenance, at least in part." Id. Accordingly, the division concluded that the County was not immune from suit. Id. at ¶ 41, 519 P.3d at 762.

¶5 The County petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted the petition.¹

II. Analysis

¶6 We begin by setting out the relevant provisions of the CGIA, as well as the standards of review that apply to an appellate court’s review of an immunity claim. We then proceed to consider whether the County parking structure is a building within the meaning of the CGIA and conclude that it is. Next, we evaluate whether the condition that allegedly led to Stickle’s fall—coloring of the parking lot surface in a manner that created an optical illusion of a flat surface—was attributable solely to the design of the facility. Here, we conclude that the parking lot surfacing was not solely a design decision but was at least, in part, an aspect of the maintenance of the facility. For these reasons, we affirm the division and remand the case to permit Stickle’s claim to proceed.

III. The CGIA and Standards of Review

¶7 The CGIA immunizes public entities from "liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant." § 24-10-106(1). This immunity may, however, be waived under specific circumstances, including in "an action for injuries resulting from … [a] dangerous condition of any public building." § 24-10-106(1) to (1)(c).

¶8 The statute in turn defines a "[d]angerous condition" to include:

a physical condition of a facility … that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the [negligence] … of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility.

§ 24-10-103(1.3).

¶9 However, "[a] dangerous condition shall not exist solely because the design of any facility is inadequate." Id.

[1–4] ¶10 Whether the CGIA applies to shield the government from suit is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and is governed by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)’s standard for dismissal. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13, 504 P.3d 287, 291. Pursuant to this standard, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to show that the government waived its immunity. City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d 489, 494. In the CGIA context, however, this burden is relatively lenient "as the plaintiff is afforded the reasonable inferences from [their] undisputed evidence." Id. Because the CGIA derogates from the common law, the court must "strictly construe the statute’s immunity provisions." Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000). At the same time, we "broadly construe" the statute’s waiver provisions. Id.

[5–7] ¶11 In so doing, we apply our standard rules of statutory interpretation. We aim to effectuate the legislature’s intent, looking first to the language of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Arvada Vill. Gardens LP v. Garate, 2023 CO 24, ¶ 9, 529 P.3d 105, 107. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Scholle, 2021 CO 20, ¶ 13, 484 P.3d 695, 699. When statutory language is ambiguous—that is, reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations—we may look to other interpretive aids to discern the legislature’s intent. See, e.g., Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 22, 28.

A. Jefferson County’s Parking Structure Is a Building

¶12 The parking structure where Stickle was injured is a permanent two-level structure made of concrete and masonry materials. The lower level is not entirely enclosed but has a knee-high wall surrounding it with support columns at regular intervals. It does not have heating, ventilation, or air conditioning ("HVAC"), but it does have electricity, lighting, and a fire suppression system.

¶13 The County argues that the parking structure is not a "building" as that term is used in the CGIA. In particular, the County argues that the structure cannot be a building because it has no HVAC or other features that many buildings have; it is not fully enclosed; and it is, in essence, one parking lot stacked on top of another. While each of these descriptors is accurate, they are not enough to counter the aspects of the structure that fit the definition of a building.

¶14 The CGIA does not itself define "building," so we must look to other sources for assistance. Merriam-Webster defines "build- ing" as "a usually roofed and walled...