Cuaya v. Compere

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DEREK CUAYA p/p/a LAUDY PINEDA, and LAUDY PINEDA, Plaintiffs, v. HENRIQUE COMPERE a/k/a HENRIQUEZ COMPERE, ROBERT KIZER, and FIRST STUDENT, INC., Defendants

No. 3:23-cv-01214 (JAM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

November 28, 2023

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT

Jeffrey Alker Meyer, United States District Judge

The federal removal statute bars a defendant from relying on federal diversity jurisdiction to remove a state court action to federal court if any of the defendants are citizens of the State where the action has been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). This rule is known as the “forum defendant” rule.

The defendants in this personal injury case removed a Connecticut state court action to this Court, contending that this Court has diversity jurisdiction despite the fact that two of the three defendants are citizens of Connecticut. Relying on the forum defendant rule, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to Connecticut state court.

The defendants, however, object to remand, arguing that under the doctrine of “fraudulent joinder” the two Connecticut defendants have been improperly named and joined as defendants. They argue that the two Connecticut defendants cannot be personally liable to the plaintiffs because their alleged acts of negligence occurred within the scope of their corporate employment. But, as I explain at length below, this argument ignores controlling law as repeatedly stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court.

I

Accordingly I will grant the plaintiffs' motion to remand on the ground that the forum defendant rule applies and on the ground that the two Connecticut defendants have not been fraudulently joined as defendants in this action. I will also award fees and costs to the plaintiffs because it is clear that the defendants did not have objectively reasonable grounds to remove this action in the first place.

Background

This action arises from alleged injuries to a child-Derek Cuaya-while he was riding to school one morning in a school bus in Stamford, Connecticut.^[1] Derek was in the bus in a wheelchair, and he claims that during the bus ride he fell from his seat and fractured his femur among other injuries.^[2]

Derek and his mother-who are now citizens of New York-have filed this lawsuit against three defendants: the school bus company (First Student, Inc.), the bus driver (Henrique Compere), and the bus monitor (Robert Kizer) who was inside the bus when Derek was injured.^[3]The complaint alleges that the defendants were negligent because they drove the bus too fast and because Derek was not properly secured in his wheelchair within the bus.^[4] It further alleges that the defendants continued to act negligently after Derek fell from his seat by failing to ascertain the severity of Derek's injuries by placing him back in his wheelchair without proper medical training, by returning him to his mother at his home rather than seeking emergency medical assistance immediately, and by misrepresenting to his mother the severity of the incident and Derek's injuries.^[5]

The first two counts of the complaint allege individual negligence claims on behalf of Derek against both Compere and Kizer.^[6] The next two counts allege that First Student negligently failed to train, manage, and supervise Compere and Kizer and also that First Student is liable in respondeat superior for the negligence of Compere and Kizer.^[7] The remaining four counts of the complaint allege claims for emotional distress against the three defendants on behalf of Derek's mother.^[8]

The complaint was first filed in Connecticut state court.^[9] But then the defendants filed a notice of removal to remove the action to this Court.^[10] The plaintiffs in turn have timely filed a motion to remand, and the defendants have objected to the motion.^[11]

Discussion

Federal law generally allows a defendant who has been sued in state court to “remove” the action to a federal court if the federal court would have had “original jurisdiction” over the dispute if it had been filed in federal court in the first place. See 28 U.S.C § 1441(a). One of the grounds for “original jurisdiction” of a federal court is federal diversity jurisdiction-that is, if there is an amount in controversy of more than $75,000 and if the parties are completely “diverse” in terms of their States of citizenship (i.e., no plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005).

No one here disputes that the amount in controversy is more than $75,000 and that there is complete diversity between the parties.^[12] But, according to the plaintiffs' motion to remand, the defendants' removal was nonetheless improper because of what is known as the “forum defendant” rule. The forum defendant rule derives from the removal statute and expressly bars a defendant from removing a case on the basis of federal diversity jurisdiction if any of the defendants are from the same forum State where the action has been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 704-05 (2d Cir. 2019).^[13]

The defendants do not dispute the general validity of the forum defendant rule.^[14] Instead, they contend that Compere and Kizer were not “properly joined” as defendants as required under the forum defendant rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).^[15] In particular, they invoke the doctrine of “fraudulent joinder”-a doctrine that is meant to prevent a plaintiff from pretextually naming non-diverse parties as defendants in a state court complaint in order to defeat a defendant's right to remove the action to federal court. See Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 356 (2d Cir. 2011).

In order to protect the right of a defendant to properly remove a state court case to federal court, the doctrine of fraudulent joinder requires a federal court to evaluate whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff's state court complaint alleges plausible grounds for relief against a defendant like Compere or Kizer whose presence would otherwise destroy diversity. A defendant who claims fraudulent joinder must prove that “from the pleadings there is no possibility that the claims against that [non-diverse] defendant could be asserted in state court.” Ibid. (emphasis added). And “[t]he defendant bears the heavy burden of proving the circumstances by clear and convincing evidence, with all factual and legal ambiguities resolved in favor of plaintiff.” Ibid.

According to the defendants, the doctrine of fraudulent joinder applies here because “[t]he Plaintiffs do not seek personal liability on the part of the employee defendants [Compere and Kizer].”^[16] But that claim is a clear mischaracterization of the complaint. The first two counts of the complaint expressly allege individual negligence claims directly against both Compere and Kizer.^[17]

The defendants further argue that-as a matter of law-there is no possibility that Compere and Kizer could be held personally liable. According to the defendants, “the Plaintiffs have no cause of action against Defendants Kizer and Compere personally,” and “such personal liability is not even possible given their status as rank and file employees of First Student acting in the course and scope of that employment.”^[18] The defendants maintain that “[w]hile the Plaintiffs certainly have a valid vicarious liability claim against First Student for the alleged negligence of its employees, Compere and Kizer, there is no possibility that the Plaintiffs could succeed in a claim against Compere or Kizer personally under Connecticut law with facts as alleged in the Complaint,” and that “[t]o permit personal liability on the part of a rank and file employee such as Mr. Compere or Mr. Kizer would be anathema to current tort practice as well as public policy.”^[19] Thus, according to the defendants, “[t]here is simply nothing alleged in the Plaintiffs' complaint that would take this case out of the mainstream of tort cases in Connecticut, where an everyday, non-managerial employee is not personally liable for negligent acts or omissions that occur in the course and scope of that employee's job duties and responsibilities.”^[20]

The defendants, however, do not cite any case law or authority for the proposition that under Connecticut law an employee may not be individually liable in negligence for acts done in the course of the employee's duties for an employer. Indeed, they cannot do so because the Connecticut Supreme Court has conclusively rejected the defendants' argument.

Nearly fifty years ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the same argument by an individual defendant who was sued along with his construction company for negligence with respect to the construction of a new home and driveway. See Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc., 169 Conn. 389, 390-91 (1975). In response to the argument that “the trial court erred in finding the [individual] defendant O'Brien individually liable to the plaintiffs,” the Connecticut Supreme Court cited evidence “that O'Brien was present at the property on a daily basis, that he undertook to supervise the construction, and that he failed to act with reasonable care in that undertaking,” so that “[w]hether O'Brien was acting in his individual capacity or as an officer and agent of the named defendant, he is still liable to the plaintiffs for his participation in the negligence complained of.” Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added). The Connecticut Supreme Court stated the controlling legal rule as follows: where “an agent or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not he acts on behalf of his principal or corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby.” Id. at...