Cudjo v. Ayers

698 F.3d 752

2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,564

Armenia Levi CUDJO, Jr., Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Robert L. AYERS, Jr., Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 08–99028.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 7, 2012.

Filed Sept. 28, 2012.

John Lewis Littrell, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Katherine Froyen Black, and Mark R. Drozdowski, Office of the Federal Public Defender for California, Los Angeles, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.

James W. Bilderback, II, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for California, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:99–cv–08089–JFW.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. SMITH; Dissent by Judge O'SCANNLAIN.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), the United States Supreme Court clearly established that the exclusion of trustworthy and necessary exculpatory testimony at trial violates a defendant's due process right to present a defense. This clearly established federal law applied at the time the California Supreme Court decided People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal.4th 585, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 (1993) (en banc) (per curiam), the subject of this habeas appeal. The facts in Chambers are materially indistinguishable from the facts in this appeal. Therefore, the California Supreme Court's decision was “contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition is REVERSED, and we REMAND this case to the district court with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus as to Petitioner's conviction. ¹

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Investigation and State Court Trial of Petitioner²

Amelia Prokuda was found dead in her apartment in March of 1986. A pathologist determined the cause of death to be multiple blows to the back and sides of the head. Investigating officers found semen present on the victim's right inner thigh and genital area, but there was no indication of traumatic sexual assault. Tests of Prokuda's blood found no drugs or alcohol.

Officers followed footprints from the victim's house to a camper within sight of the victim's house. Petitioner and his brother, Gregory Cudjo (“Gregory”), were found in the camper and were arrested. Analysis of the semen found on the victim revealed that it could have come from the Petitioner, but not from Gregory or the victim's husband. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner was charged with, among other things, first degree murder while engaged in a robbery and a burglary. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all charges.

Investigating officers interviewed Gregory Cudjo (“Gregory”) the day after the victim's murder and tape-recorded the interview. In these interviews, Gregory maintained that he had remained in the camper throughout the morning, but that Petitioner had been gone for about two hours. Gregory also said that, when he and Petitioner saw officers following shoe tracks from the victim's home to Petitioner's camper, Petitioner confessed to Gregory that he had murdered the victim. According to Gregory, during the short amount of time that it took the police to walk the third of a mile to the camper, Petitioner was able to relay extensive details about the crime and the house. These details included what the victim was wearing, that there was a pet snake in an aquarium, that there was a little boy in the house, that there was a jacket with medals in the closet, and how the Petitioner hogtied the woman with neckties. Gregory mentioned nothing of Petitioner raping or having sex with the victim. At the preliminary hearing, Gregory largely repeated this story.

At trial, the prosecution called Prokuda's five-year-old son, Kevin, who was at home during the murder. Kevin testified that a man came into the house, put a knife to his mother's neck and demanded money. The man took Kevin's mother into the room and tied her up, and Kevin went into his own bedroom and stayed there for a long time. Kevin could not identify the Petitioner as the perpetrator. However, Kevin testified that, on the day of the murder, the man who threatened his mother had no tattoos on his arms and no facial hair. A photograph in evidence taken on the day of the murder showed that Petitioner had a goatee or mustache as well as tattoos on his biceps, his right shoulder, and his lower left arm. Gregory had no facial hair on the day of the murder.

The prosecution intended to call Gregory as a witness at trial, but Gregory refused to testify for the prosecution and invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. However, Gregory's preliminary hearing testimony and statements to the police inculpating Petitioner were read into evidence.

The defense's theory at trial was that Petitioner was innocent, and that his brother Gregory had killed Prokuda. This theory was partially predicated on the testimony of John Culver, a witness who “was prepared to testify that Gregory Cudjo had admitted responsibility for the murder of [Prokuda] while Culver and Gregory were incarcerated together at the Antelope Valley sheriff's substation.” Cudjo, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d at 646. The prosecutor objected to the admissibility of the evidence.

Out of the jury's presence, Culver testified that he had known the Petitioner and his brother Gregory for about 15 to 20 years. When Gregory and the Petitioner were arrested and brought to the Antelope Valley sheriff's station (shortly after the murder of the victim), Culver was also incarcerated there. At that time, Gregory was locked in a cell with Culver. Culver testified that, while in the cell, Gregory was pacing restlessly. Culver asked him what was wrong. Gregory answered, “Man, they got me in here for a murder” and “I need [to] talk to somebody.” Id., 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d at 647 (alteration in original). Gregory then “started talking about why he'd done it and what he'd done....” Id. According to Culver, Gregory said: “I went over to rob, burglarize this lady's house and she seen me and then that's when all the stuff went down and that's what happened.” Id. Gregory then described how he “went in the house and this woman supposed to have been washing clothes, and she caught him coming in the house.” Id. “When the woman seen him he just started beating the woman up and then she started screaming, so he knocked her out and went and done it again, kept hitting her, kept hitting her.... He kept banging her around in the head.” Id. He “knocked her out,” and when she “came back to” he “started hitting her and hitting her with a hammer or whatever he hit her with.” Id.

According to Culver, Gregory said that he found guns and jewelry in the house. Gregory explained that he knew the victim, because they had “smoked dope together.” Id. As the California Supreme Court also noted, “Gregory did not mention raping the woman.” Id.

The prosecutor then cross-examined Culver and asked “if Gregory had mentioned anyone besides the woman being present in the house.” Id. Culver responded that Gregory had not mentioned it at the time. However, “Culver had talked to Gregory shortly before Culver's testimony,” and, through this conversation, Culver had learned that there “probably was a little boy or somebody in the house.” Id. Culver also testified that, thereafter, Gregory had been removed from the cell he shared with Culver. When Gregory returned, he told Culver that detectives had interviewed him about the murder. The prosecutor asked whether Gregory told Culver that he had blamed his brother for the murder. Id. Culver at first said that Gregory had done so, but then immediately explained that he merely supposed that Gregory had blamed Petitioner. That supposition was based on the fact that (1) Gregory was released shortly thereafter, and (2) Culver knew Petitioner's criminal history was worse than Gregory's. On further cross, Culver explained that he first spoke about Gregory's confession when a defense investigator contacted and interviewed him three months before this testimony.

After Culver's testimony, the trial court heard argument outside the presence of the jury on whether to admit Culver's testimony. The prosecutor argued that the testimony should be excluded, because “Culver's demeanor, background, and relationship to the defendant, as well as the content of his testimony,” made him a “liar” that was “unworthy of belief.” Id., 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d at 647–48. The trial court asked whether it would be “making a judgment as a trier of fact, and taking it away from the jury,” if it made such a determination. Id., 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d at 648. The prosecutor answered that the California rules of evidence required that determination on some occasions.

In contrast, defense counsel argued that the testimony should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, because it was a declaration against penal interest under California Evidence Code Section 1230. The trial court agreed that this statement met the hearsay exception for a statement against penal interest. However, the court found that “to allow this testimony would be a travesty of justice,” as the evidence lacked the necessary “indicia of reliability.” Id. Thus, the court ruled that it was not admissible as a declaration against interest. The trial court also later explained that it found Culver's testimony “unreliable and untrustworthy,” and that the court made this interpretation when it “intepret[ed] section 1230 of the Evidence Code.” Id. It buttressed this conclusion with a finding that the probative...