Culley v. Edwards Mfg. Co. of Albert Lea

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EDWARD CULLEY, Plaintiff, v. EDWARDS MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF ALBERT LEA, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-7346 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 12, 2024

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Edward Culley (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Edwards Manufacturing Company of Alberta Lea (“Defendant”). Plaintiff asserts claims sounding in products liability under multiple tort theories and breach of express and implied warranties. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-31).

Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, (ECF No. 5), in its entirety. For the reasons articulated below Defendant's motion is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts below are taken from Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def. 56.1”, ECF No. 57) Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. Resp. 56.1”, ECF No. 62, Ex. 1) Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl 56.1”, ECF No. 62, Ex. 2), and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def. Resp. 56.1”, ECF No. 59), affidavits, declarations, and exhibits,^[1] and are not in dispute except where so noted.

Plaintiff was injured on December 9, 2017 while working at Hudson River Truck and Trailer. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2).

As part of his duties, Plaintiff used an ironworker made by Defendant (the “Ironworker”) to fabricate metal pieces used in the construction of trailers. (Id. ¶ 3). The Ironworker had three workstations: (1) the punch station; (2) the shear station; and (3) the brake station. (Id. ¶ 5-8). Plaintiff was using the shear station when his injury occurred. (Id. ¶ 10).

The injury resulted from a piece of metal that was dislodged from the punch station, flying into Plaintiff's safety goggles, knocking those goggles to the top of Plaintiff's head, and lodging in Plaintiff's left eye. (Id. ¶ 11). The Ironworker was initially equipped with a front plexiglass shield, but that the shield was removed when Plaintiff was injured. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 7). This front shield was reinstalled following Plaintiff's accident. (Id. ¶ 14). A representative of Defendant testified that the front shield was designed to protect from flying debris given the machine creates a tremendous amount of force at the punch station. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 11).

On subsequent inspection, it was discovered that the die on the punch station was lifted out of its seat and set on an angle. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 4). Further investigation determined that the punch had broken. (Id. ¶ 6).

Defendant maintained little documentation on the Ironworker, limited to an owner's manual and sales invoice. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 10).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action on September 9, 2020. (ECF No. 1). Defendant answered on October 21, 2020. (ECF No. 11).

Discovery opened and progressed with numerous extensions, (see, e.g., ECF Nos. 28, 34, 36, & 50), after which Defendant requested leave of this Court to file a motion for summary judgment on March 15, 2023. (ECF No. 52). The Court granted Defendant's request (see ECF No. 53), and the parties submitted their motion papers on June 14, 2024. (ECF Nos. 55-60).

Those papers consist of, among others: (1) Defendant's (a) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 55); (b) Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def. Mem”, ECF No. 56); (c) Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def. Reply”, ECF No. 58); and (2) Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Opp.”, ECF No. 6).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of pointing to evidence in the record, “including depositions, documents . . . [and] affidavits or declarations,” see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may support an assertion that there is no genuine dispute of a particular fact by “showing . . . that [the] adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the moving party fulfills its preliminary burden, the onus shifts to the nonmoving party to raise the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Universal Fabricators, Inc., 585 F.3d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 2009); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008); Benn v. Kissane, 510 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). Courts must “draw all rational inferences in the non-movant's favor,” while reviewing the record. Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Importantly, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” nor is it to determine a witness's credibility. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010). Rather, “the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment should be granted when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

Critically, in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment “[s]tatements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions” will not suffice. Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”); FDIC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (nonmoving party “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation”) (quoting Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998)).

DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, (ECF No. 5), Plaintiff asserts claims under multiple products liability tort theories and breach of implied and express warranties. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-31). Before turning to the merits, the Court will initially address a procedural issue.

I. Abandoned Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has abandoned his products liability claim based on manufacturing defect, and his claims of breach of implied and express warranties. (Def. Reply p.1). Defendant raises arguments with respect to each of those claims in its initial memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment. (See Def. Mem. pp.5, 8-9). Plaintiff does not acknowledge or respond to any of these arguments in his opposition. (See generally Pl. Opp.).

“Federal courts may deem a claim abandoned when a party moves for summary judgment on one ground and the party opposing summary judgment fails to address the argument in any way.” Capak v. Epps, No. 18-CV-4325 (KHP), 2023 WL 2574879, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2023) (quoting Xu v. City of New York, 2020 WL 2088301, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)). Given Plaintiff has not responded in any fashion to Defendant's arguments with respect to his manufacturing defect and breach of implied and express warranties claims, the Court deems such claims abandoned.

Consequently, Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claims for products liability due to manufacturing defect, and breach of implied and express warranties is GRANTED, with those claims DISMISSED.

II. Products Liability Claims

Plaintiff's remaining claims sound in products liability by way of design defect and failure to warn. Plaintiff appears to assert these claims under both strict liability and negligence theories.

(See Compl. ¶¶ 3-19, 26-31). The Court will briefly address the difference, if any, with respect to claims brought under those respective theories before turning to the merits of each claim.

a. Negligence and Strict Liability

Despite operating as discrete theories of liability, courts often analyze negligence and strict liability claims concurrently on the basis that they are “functionally equivalent”. Nemes v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc., 521 F.Supp.3d 328, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Erazo v. SCM Grp. N. Am., No. 16-CV-2386 RRM RER, 2019 WL 1044365, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019)). Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals has expressly endorsed that failure-to-warn claims, regardless of whether asserted under a strict liability or negligence theory, are “functionally equivalent, as both forms of a failure-to-warn claim depend on the principles of reasonable and public policy at the heart of any negligence action.” Erazo, 2019 WL 1044365, at *19 (quoting In re New York Asbestos Litig., 17 N.Y.3d 765, 787 (N.Y. 2016)). Accordingly, the Court will assess Plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims simultaneously.

The case law is murkier, however, with respect to differences of analysis when a plaintiff brings design defect claims under strict liability and negligence theories. The Second Circuit has questioned whether such claims are also functionally equivalent, and the New York Court of Appeals has itself stated that “the strict liability concept of ‘defective design' [is] functionally...