Culley v. Lincare Inc.

236 F.Supp.3d 1184

Christina CULLEY, Plaintiff,

v.LINCARE INC.; Alpha Respiratory Inc.; and Does 1 through 50, Defendants.

No. 2:15–cv–00081–MCE–CMK

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed February 21, 2017

Norman Blumenthal, Aparajit Bhowmik, Ruchira Piya Mukherjee, Victoria Bree Rivapalacio, Blumenthal Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, La Jolla, CA, for Plaintiff.

David Cheng, Alexandria M. Witte, Daniel Benjamin Chammas, Ford & Harrison LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Todd S. Aidman, PHV, Ford and Harrison LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR, UNITED STATES COURT JUDGE

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Christina Culley alleges various employment claims under California law against her former employers, Defendants Lincare Inc. and Alpha Respiratory Inc. Apart from her class action claims, Plaintiff also sets forth several claims under California's Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"). Defendants now move for partial summary judgment, seeking to dispose of some of the causes of action and to circumscribe the relief available to Plaintiff under the relevant statutes. ECF No. 67. As described below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.¹

BACKGROUND

Defendants employed Plaintiff as a Healthcare Specialist from September 2010 through September 2015. Plaintiff worked as a non-exempt employee and claims she was entitled to overtime pay and meal and rest breaks. Defendant Lincare Inc. paid her on an hourly basis, and she received a bonus as additional compensation. In addition to eight-hour shifts, she was also expected to be on-call certain evenings and weekends to handle customer issues that cropped up outside regular business hours.

Plaintiff originally initiated this action in state court on October 21, 2014, alleging various violations of the California Labor Code, and Defendants subsequently removed the case here. Two months later, on December 15, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to California's Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"), notifying the LWDA of Alpha's alleged labor violations. That letter set out the purported violations by attaching a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint. On January 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ECF No. 43, to include her PAGA claims.

On August 10, 2016, the Court certified Plaintiff's two proposed classes, defined as:

(1) all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendants as nonexempt employees during October 21, 2010, to the present (the "Class Period"), for (a) failure to pay overtime wages under the UCL and California Labor Code section 510 (the "overtime claim"), and (b) "failure to put in place a lawful meal period policy applicable up to the change in policy occurring in October 2014" under the UCL (the "meal period claim"), and (2) a subclass of Healthcare Specialist and Service Representative employees for failure to pay reporting time wages under the UCL (the "reporting time claim").

Mem. & Order, ECF No. 59, at 6. Defendants have now moved for partial summary judgment seeking to dispose of several issues, including the scope of the relevant California laws and the calculation of damages under those laws, prior to trial.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan , 889 F.Supp. 374, 378–79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell , 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying summary judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions in the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual dispute, the party must support its assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits[,] or declarations ... or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers , 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact "is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question before the evidence is left to the jury of "not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson , 81 U.S. 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871) ). As the Supreme Court explained, "[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule [56(a) ], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Therefore, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. 587.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines , 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd , 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment addresses a multitude of issues. The Court addresses each in turn.

A. Scope of Reporting Time Claim

Under California law, an employee is entitled to two hours' pay if she is "required to report to work for a second time in any one workday and is furnished less than two (2) hours of work on the second reporting." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11040(5)(B). Plaintiff alleges that, in the times when she was on-call and responded to a customer, she was only paid for the actual time she spent working on that customer's issue instead of receiving two hours' pay. FAC, ¶ 17.

Defendants contend that this reporting time claim is limited to times when she was required to leave her house to perform after-hours work. Defs.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("MPSJ"), at 4–5. That is, Defendants claim that she is not entitled to two hours' pay for working after her regular eight-hour shift if she could resolve the customer's issue over telephone. Because she did not "report to work," they argue, she is only entitled to pay for the time actually worked. Id.

The precise meaning of § 11040(5)(B) in the context of performing work via telephone is a novel question. Defendants argue its position is supported by the plain meaning of the regulation as well as the regulation's stated purpose: "The reporting time premium requirement is designed to discourage employers from having employees report unless there is work available at the time of the reporting and is further designed to reimburse employees for expenses incurred in such situations." Div. of Labor Standards Enf't, The 2002 Update of the DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual (Revised) § 45.1.2.1 (2014), http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSEManual/ dlse_enfcmanual.pdf.

Plaintiff, conversely, supports her position by arguing that regulations "are liberally construed to protect and benefit employees." Id. (citing Mendiola v. CPS Sec. Sols., Inc. , 60 Cal.4th 833, 840, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 340 P.3d 355 (2015) ). Plaintiff also relies on the dearth of authority on the matter to suggest that summary judgment is inappropriate: "There is no authority ... to suggest that a report to work requires any geographic displacement of the employee." Pl.'s Opp'n to MPSJ, ECF No. 68, at 8 (emphasis removed). She argues instead that it is a "triable issue of fact ......