Cummings v. Adams

1

ERIC ALLEN CUMMINGS, Petitioner, v. M. ADAMS, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-1062

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

April 26, 2023

MEMORANDUM^[1]

PATRICIA L. DODGE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 4) filed by state prisoner Eric Allen Cummings (“Petitioner”), deny a certificate of appealability and close this case.

I. Relevant Background and Facts

In the first part of 2018, Petitioner was on parole and under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”). Petitioner's maximum sentence date for the sentence he was serving at that time was set to expire on April 29, 2019. (ECF 4-1 at p. 14.)

In July 2018, the Commonwealth filed an Information in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County at criminal docket number CP-61-CR-470-2018 (“2018 Venango County case”) charging Petitioner with these crimes: Count 1-Persons not to Possess a Firearm, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(a)(1); Count 2-Firearms Ownership/Duty of Other Persons id. § 6111(c); Count 3-Marijuana, Small Amount Personal Use, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(31)(i); and Count 4-Possession with Intent to Use Drug Paraphernalia, id. § 780-113(a)(32). (ECF 4-1 at pp. 21-26.)

On December 17, 2018, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to Counts 1 and 2 “as amended.”^[2] Counts 3 and 4 were nol prossed. (Plea Agreement Form at pp. 1-2; docket sheet for 2018 Venango County case at p. 4.)^[3] On March 8, 2019, the trial court sentenced him to a total aggregate sentence of five years to be served “concurrent with any and all sentences previously imposed upon [Petitioner] whether in Venango County or elsewhere.” (ECF 15-1 at pp. 1-2.)

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. (ECF 4 at p. 2; docket sheet for the 2018 Venango County case at pp. 4-6.) Accordingly, his judgment of sentence became final under both state and federal law 30 days later on April 8, 2019, which is when the time for him to file an appeal expired. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(3); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-54 (2012) (a judgment becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review).

Petitioner became a convicted parole violator under state law as a result of his convictions in the 2018 Venango County case. Thus, on April 18, 2019, the Board issued a decision recommitting him “to a state correctional institution as a convicted parole violator to serve 18 months, concurrently, for a total of 18 months backtime.” (ECF 4-1 at p. 4.) In this same decision, the Board notified Petitioner that due to his status as a convicted parole violator, it had recalculated his maximum sentence date to be December 23, 2021 instead of April 29, 2019. (Id.; ECF 4-1 at pp. 14-15.)

At the end of the Board's April 18, 2019 decision, it expressly notified Petitioner of his appeal rights, explaining to him that:

[t]his decision involves an issue that is subject to the Board's administrative remedies process. See 37 Pa. Code. Sec. 73. Failure to administratively appeal the decision may affect your legal rights. If you wish to appeal this decision, you must file a request for administrative relief with the Board within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of this decision. This request shall set forth specifically the factual and legal bases for the allegations. You have the right to an attorney in this appeal and in any subsequent appeal to the Commonwealth Court. You may be entitled to counsel from the Public Defender's Office at no cost. Enclosed with this Board decision is an administrative remedies form and the names and addresses of all the chief public defenders in the Commonwealth. Any request for a public defender should be sent directly to the public defender's office in the county where you currently reside.

(Id. at p. 5.) Notwithstanding these clear instructions, Petitioner did not seek review of the Board's April 18, 2019 decision.

The next year, on June 1, 2020, Petitioner filed in his 2018 Venango County case a motion for collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. On November 9, 2020, the trial court, now the PCRA court, issued an order dismissing Petitioner's motion as untimely under the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations, which is jurisdictional. (See PCRA court's Nov. 9, 2020 and Aug. 25, 2020 orders.) Petitioner did not appeal the PCRA court's decision to the Superior Court. (Docket sheet for the 2018 Venango County case at pp. 5-6.)

On February 23, 2021, the Board denied Petitioner parole. (ECF 4-1 at pp. 6-8.) Petitioner filed an administrative appeal of this decision. In it, he challenged the Board's decision denying him parole and also argued for the first time that the elements for the crimes he pleaded guilty to in his 2018 Venango County case (which resulted in the Board recommitting him as a convicted parole violator) were “lacking in fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” (ECF 4-1 at p. 11.) Petitioner argued that the Board's April 18, 2019 decision recalculating his parole violation maximum sentence date was unlawful and therefore he was being imprisoned “beyond the termination date of the judicially maximum sentence.” (Id.) The Board denied this appeal on or around May 24, 2021, explaining that administrative appeals and requests for reconsideration are not permitted from parole denials. (ECF 4-1 at p. 13.)

On or around August 11, 2021, Petitioner submitted to this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the validity of his custody. He did not pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, however. Thus, the Court issued an order advising him that he must do one of those two things. (ECF 2.) In this same order, the Court explained to Petitioner that he must challenge the validity of his custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners like him. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which such relief may be granted to ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.'”); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (“It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that when two statutes cover the same situation, the more specific statute takes precedence over the more general one.... In the instant action, both Sections 2241 and 2254 authorize [the petitioner's] challenge to the legality of his continued state custody.. applying the ‘specific governs the general' canon of statutory construction to this action, we hold that [Petitioner] must rely on Section 2254 in challenging the execution of his sentence.”).

The Court provided Petitioner with the standard form to be used in § 2254 habeas cases and directed him to complete and submit it along with the statutory filing fee or a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 2.)

Petitioner subsequently submitted the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the standard form for a § 2254 habeas case (ECF 4) along with the $5.00 filing fee. He claims that he is being imprisoned beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence due to an alleged error made by the Board in calculating his parole violation maximum sentence date. (ECF 4 at pp. 5-8, 13; see also ECF 15 at pp. 2-6.) Petitioner also challenges the validity of his convictions in the 2018 Venango County case, claiming he pleaded guilty to “charge[s] that did not apply to [him].” (Id. at pp. 5-7.) He also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for “fail[ing] to recognize and convey legal defenses to [him]” and for allowing him “to get sentenced on charges that did not apply to [him].” (Id. at p. 8.) Petitioner asserts that because those convictions are allegedly invalid, the Board's subsequent action based on them (the April 19, 2018 decision recommitting him as a convicted parole violator and recalculating his parole violation maximum sentence) is also invalid. (Id. at p. 13; ECF 15.)

Respondents have filed the Answer (ECF 10) and Petitioner has filed the Reply (ECF 15.)

II. Discussion

A. Claims Challenging the Board's April 18, 2019 decision are procedurally defaulted

Respondents assert that the Court should deny Petitioner's claims challenging the Board's April 18, 2019 decision because he did not exhaust his available state court remedies. The “exhaustion doctrine” requires that a state prisoner raise his federal constitutional claims in state court through the proper procedures before he litigates them in a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). It is “grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). It “is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts[.]” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that a petitioner must have “invoke[d] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process[,]” in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id.

The related doctrine of procedural default, like the doctrine of exhaustion, is “grounded in concerns of comity and federalism,” Colem...