Cunningham v. Hunt

ELVIS L. CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff, v. CHAD HUNT, PAM GODBERSON, Nurse; BUFFALO COUNTY JAIL/SHERIFS OFFICE; and ALL OTHER CORRECTIONAL STAFF INVOLVED, Defendants.

No. 8:21CV282

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

September 13, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Richard G. Kopf Senior United States District Judge.

Plaintiff a state prisoner currently being held at the Buffalo County Jail, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court will now conduct an initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint (Filing 1) to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the court to conduct an initial review of “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). On such initial review, the court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, ” it determines “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Comparable language is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applicable to IFP plaintiffs).

“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, ” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

“A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he did not receive adequate medical treatment after breaking a tooth on September 27, 2020, while eating a meal at the Buffalo County Jail. Plaintiff alleges he told the jail nurse, Defendant Pam Godberson, and a lieutenant, Defendant Chad Hunt, that he needed to see a dentist, but they refused his requests. Plaintiff alleges he was in great pain, could not eat or sleep, and the tooth became infected.

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute, and also must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

“[I]t is well settled that municipal police departments, sheriff's offices, and jails are not generally considered persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus not amenable to suit.” Ferrell v. Williams Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 4:14-CV-131, 2014 WL 6453601, at *2 (D.N.D. Nov. 4, 2014). See also De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, Corr. Inst., 18 Fed.Appx. 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (county jail and sheriff department not subject to suit under § 1983); Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (city police department and paramedic services “are not juridical entities suable as such.... [t]hey are simply departments or subdivisions of the City government”). While each county in Nebraska may sue and be sued in its own name, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-101, the same is not true of county offices or departments. See Holmstedt v. York County Jail Supervisor (Name Unknown), 739 N.W.2d 449, 461 (Neb.App. 2007) (York County Sheriff's Department was not proper defendant), rev'd on other grounds, 745 N.W.2d 317 (Neb. 2008); Winslow v. Smith, 672 F.Supp.2d 949, 964 (D. Neb. 2009) (Gage County Sheriff's Office was not proper defendant). Thus, Plaintiff's claims against the Buffalo County Jail or Sheriff's Office will be dismissed.

Also, Plaintiff's claims against “all other correctional staff involved” cannot proceed so long as these Defendants remain unknown and unidentified, or so long as Plaintiff fails to include in his complaint allegations specific enough to permit the identity of these Defendants after reasonable discovery. See Jones v. Nebraska Dep't of Correction Servs., No. 8:20CV365, 2021 WL 490388, at *6 (D. Neb. Feb. 10, 2021). “It is generally impermissible to name fictitious parties as defendants in federal court, but ‘an action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.'” Perez v. Does 1-10, 931 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)). The United States Marshal's Service cannot initiate service upon unknown defendants. Mixon v. Esch, No. 8:17CV325, 2021 WL 1192813, at *9 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2021).

Plaintiff indicates Defendants Hunt and Godberson are sued in their individual and official capacities. “A suit against a government officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” McKay v. City of St. Louis, 960 F.3d 1094, 1102 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010)). Thus, claims made against these Defendants in their official capacities are, in effect, claims made against Buffalo County.

In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. To prevail on a claim alleged against the Buffalo County, Plaintiff must show that the constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official “policy, ” (2) an unofficial “custom, ” or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016).

“Official policy involves ‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... made from among various alternatives' by an official who has the final authority to establish governmental policy.” Jane Doe A By & Through Jane Doe B v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cty., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability through an unofficial custom of the municipality by demonstrating “(1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity's employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity's policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity's custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Corwin, 829 F.3d at 699-700). A municipal-liability claim based on a theory of inadequate training or supervision is simply an extension of a claim based on a “policy” or “custom” theory of municipal liability. Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that the claimed violation of his constitutional rights was caused by a Buffalo County policy or custom, or by the County's failure to train or supervise jail staff. The official-capacity claims therefore will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

However the individual-capacity claims will proceed to service of process. “It is well established that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment extends to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “A medical need is objectively serious if it is supported by medical evidence, such as a physician's diagnosis, or is ‘so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'” Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 2009)). Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendant “had actual knowledge of that need but deliberately disregarded it.” Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 425 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bailey, 810 F.3d, at 594). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants Hunt and Godberson were deliberately indifferent to his need...