Cunningham v. Reid

337 F.Supp.2d 1064

Tyrone CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff, v. John REID, et al., Defendants.

No. 03-1055-T-AN.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division.

July 13, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard Gossum, Gossum Law Firm, Trenton, TN, for Plaintiff.

John D. Burleson, Rainey, Kizer, Reviere & Bell, Jackson, TN, Milton Dale Conder, Rainey, Kizer, Reviere & Bell, Jackson, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING AND PARTIALLY DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TODD, District Judge.

Plaintiff Tyrone Cunningham filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of Humboldt and City Police Officers John Reid, Phillip McCoy, and Reynard Buchanan, in their individual capacities, alleging that his civil rights were violated during his arrest. Plaintiff has also alleged various state law claims against the individual defendants. The action was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Gibson County, Tennessee. Defendants removed the action to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED.

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing the "absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the nonmovant's case." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). The moving party may support the motion with affidavits or other proof or by exposing the lack of evidence on an issue for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party may not rest upon the pleadings but, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

"If the defendant ... moves for summary judgment ... based on the lack of proof of a material fact, ... [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or in any way determine the truth of the matter, however. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, "[t]he inquiry on a summary judgment motion ... is ... `whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Street, 886 F.2d at 1479 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial are resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

The complaint alleges that, on February 18, 2002, Plaintiff was at his residence with his girlfriend, Tina Hudson, and their child. Tina's mother called the Humboldt Police Department and reported that Plaintiff and Tina were fighting. Defendants Reid, McCoy, and Buchanan responded to the call. Tina met the officers at the door with the child in her arms and told the officers that she and Plaintiff were not fighting. When Plaintiff emerged from the shower, Defendant Officers forced him to the floor and injured his wrist and thumb. Defendant Officers then transported Plaintiff, shirtless and shoeless, to the City Hall.

The complaint further alleges that Defendants brought an assault charge against Plaintiff in the Gibson County Juvenile Court even though the charge was groundless. The charge was subsequently dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to false arrest and imprisonment and assault and battery by Defendant Officers. He also alleges that Defendant Officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to an unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City violated his civil rights by inadequately training and supervising its police officers and by inadequately investigating citizen complaints of misconduct.

STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff's state law claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and false arrest against Defendants Reid, McCoy, and Buchanan must be dismissed. Since Defendants are governmental employees, they are immune from suits based on state law except as provided by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. § 29-20-302, et seq. ("TGTLA"). This act provides that the circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over claims brought under the Act. T.C.A. § 29-20-307. See Beddingfield v. Pulaski, 666 F.Supp. 1064 (M.D.Tenn.1987), reversed on other grounds, 861 F.2d 968 (6th Cir.1988). Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Cf. Timberlake v. Benton, 786 F.Supp. 676 (M.D.Tenn.1992) (Granting the motion to dismiss of the City and the officers in their official capacities pursuant to Beddingfield but declining to apply the holding in Beddingfield to the officers in their individual capacities.)

Alternatively, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. See Maxwell v. Conn, 893 F.2d 1335, 1990 WL 2774 (6th Cir.) (While the federal claims would ordinarily confer jurisdiction over plaintiff's TGTLA claims because they arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact, the decision of the Tennessee legislature to grant original jurisdiction to state circuit courts belies plaintiff's claim that he could expect to try all his claims in the same judicial proceeding, and the district court properly declined to exercise its discretion by extending pendent jurisdiction over the state common law negligence claims because of concerns of jury confusion.) Accord Spurlock v. Whitley, 971 F.Supp. 1166 (M.D.Tenn.1997), aff'd 167 F.3d 995 (6th Cir.1999) (A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "in exceptional circumstances," there are "compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), and the exclusivity provision of the TGTLA provides a compelling reason for this court to decline supplemental jurisdiction of the TGTLA claim.) Accordingly, the state law claims brought against Defendants Reid, McCoy, and Buchanan are dismissed.

SECTION 1983 CLAIMS

Defendant Officers

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Officers violated his civil rights by using excessive force against him and by arresting him without probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Defendants have presented the affidavit of Defendant McCoy which states that he entered the house, saw that Plaintiff was handcuffed, and then went outside. Defendants' Exhibit 5, McCoy Affidavit. Defendant did not arrest Plaintiff, see him arrested, use any force against him, or see anyone else use any force against him. Id.

Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the record that Defendant McCoy took part in the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims. In fact, Tina Hudson testified in her deposition that she did not remember seeing Defendant McCoy during the fracas. Hudson Depo. at p. 20 ("I don't remember seeing [McCoy] at all.") Plaintiff testified that Defendants Reid and Buchanan arrested him but that he did not remember anyone else. Plaintiff's Depo. at p. 21. He further testified that "two officers" picked him up and threw him down. Id. at p. 37. Plaintiff identified these officers as Defendants Reid and Buchanan. Id. at p. 46.

Because Defendants have refuted Plaintiff's claim that Defendant McCoy subjected him to an unconstitutional seizure and/or used excessive force against him, Defendant McCoy is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The portion of the motion seeking summary judgment on the § 1983 excessive force claim against Defendants Reid and Buchanan, however, is denied.

Claims of excessive force by law enforcement officials are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).¹ The reasonableness of a seizure is judged from the perspective of the officer on the scene, rather than with hindsight. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary, violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. In evaluating a claim of excessive force, a court must determine reasonableness by considering the severity of the crime involved, the threat to the safety of the officer posed by the suspect, and any resistance to arrest. Id.

Here, Defendants deny forcing Plaintiff to the floor and injuring him and contend that any force used was reasonable because (1) it took approximately fifteen minutes to get someone to answer the door; (2) the officers had to order Plaintiff out of the bathroom two or three times; (3) the officers were responding to a domestic violence call; and (4) Plaintiff was a suspect in two violent assaults.² Defendants also assert that Plaintiff did not complain of being injured and that none of the officers saw anyone using excessive force against Plaintiff. According to Defendants, the officers told Plaintiff to "get on the floor," and Plaintiff complied with this request without any force being used. Buchanan Depo. at p. 37.

Plaintiff has responded with evidence that Defendants Reid and Buchanan "slammed" Plaintiff to the floor at gunpoint. Thomas Depo. at pp. 11-12, 16. Plaintiff cried out...