Curry v. Valentin

Marqueta S. Curry and Shaheedah Ellis, Plaintiffs, v. Anthony Valentin and VIP Freight, Inc., Defendants.

No. 4:21-cv-02800

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

July 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Yvonne Y. Ho United States Magistrate Judge

In this personal injury action, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment that dispute whether the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Marqueta S. Curry and Shaheedah Ellis (“Plaintiffs”) are time-barred as a matter of law. Dkts. 4 & 8. After carefully considering the parties' motions, id., response, Dkt. 8 supplement, Dkt. 15, reply, Dkt. 20, and the applicable law the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' suit is barred by the statute of limitations. It is therefore recommended that the Court deny Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, grant the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Anthony Valentin and VIP Freight, Inc. (“Defendants”), and enter a take nothing judgment on Plaintiffs' claims.

Background

On July 10, 2019, Plaintiffs were involved in a car accident while driving on I-10 in Harris County. Dkt. 1-1 at 4. According to their allegations, Defendant Anthony Valentin, a driver for Defendant VIP Freight, improperly merged into Plaintiffs' lane, collided with their car, and injured Plaintiffs. Id.

In March of 2020, the United States was struck by the COVID-19 Pandemic. On March 13, 2020, the same day that Governor Greg Abbot issued a disaster declaration, the Texas Supreme Court issued its first emergency order. See Misc. Docket No. 20-9042, 596 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. 2020) (hereinafter “Emergency Order One”).^[1] In that order, the Court declared that “[a]ll courts in Texas may extend the statute of limitations in any civil case for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor's state of disaster has been lifted.” Id. Since then the Court has issued more than fifty Emergency Orders modifying procedures and extending deadlines, most recently on June 20, 2022. See, e.g., Emergency Order Fifty-Three, Misc. Docket No. 22-9049 (Tex. June 20, 2022).

In the interim, Plaintiffs filed this suit on July 30, 2021, two years and twenty days after their alleged injury occurred. Dkt. 1-1 at 1. Before removing the suit to this Court, Defendants raised the affirmative defense of limitations. See Dkt. 4-6 at 3; Dkt. 1 at 1.

Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on Defendants' limitations defense, asserting that their petition was timely as a matter of law. See Dkt. 4 at 1. Defendants have responded and cross-moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, requested dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Dkt. 8.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is warranted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is material if the issue that it tends to resolve “could affect the outcome of the action.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010)).

When resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts and any reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” See Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cross-motions must be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 10a Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 2720 (3d ed. 1998)).

Analysis

I. Texas's COVID-19 Emergency Orders Did Not Categorically Suspend the Running of Limitations for Plaintiffs' Claims.

Plaintiffs agree that their claim accrued on the date of the accident- July 10, 2019. Dkt. 4 ¶ 2. The relevant statute of limitations thus expired two years later, on July 10, 2021. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003. But Plaintiffs waited twenty days beyond that date to file this suit. Dkt. 1-1 at 1.

Instead, Plaintiffs maintain that the Texas Supreme Court's intervening Emergency Orders-particularly Emergency Order Eight-halted the running of all statutes of limitations for an interim, eighty-day period from March 13, 2020 to June 1, 2020. Dkt. 4 ¶¶ 32-37. Defendants, however, respond that the Emergency Orders merely extended filing deadlines that fall within a specified window, rather than tolling all limitations periods no matter when those periods expire. Dkt. 8 ¶¶ 2-7. After analyzing the Emergency Orders, including by applying canons of statutory interpretation, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' suit is time-barred, as a matter of law.

A. The Emergency Orders, by their terms, did not suspend the limitations period for Plaintiffs' claims.

The analysis turns on the Emergency Orders themselves, beginning with Emergency Order One, issued on March 13, 2020. 596 S.W.3d at 265. That initial Emergency Order did not extend the statute of limitations for any civil action. Instead, it stated that “[a]ll courts in Texas may extend the statute of limitations in any civil case for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor's state of disaster has been lifted.” Id. This pronouncement reflects the Court's view that its authority under Texas Government Code § 22.0035(b) permitted it to modify substantive time periods-like statutes of limitations-established by the Texas Legislature. Because Defendants do not question the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 22.035(b), the Court does not do so either.^[2] Not until April 1, 2020 did the Texas Supreme Court undertake to alter filing deadlines-by issuing Emergency Order Eight. Misc. Docket No. 209051, 597 S.W.3d 844, 844 (Tex. 2020). Emergency Order Eight expressly amended paragraph 3 of Emergency Order One to state that “[a]ny deadline for the filing or service of any civil case is tolled from March 13, 2020, until June 1, 2020, unless extended by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.” Id.

Plaintiffs fixate on the word “tolled” to assert that Emergency Order Eight categorically stopped the running of all limitations periods from March 13 to June 1, 2020. Dkt. 4 ¶¶ 35-37. In their view, the word “tolled” is a term of art that applies almost exclusively to statutes of limitations. See Black's Law Dictionary, Toll (11th ed. 2019) (“(Of a time period, esp. a statutory one) to stop the running of; to abate ”).

But as Defendants note, Dkt. 8 ¶¶ 30-32, the Texas Supreme Court chose not to use the term “statute of limitations” in Emergency Order Eight-despite explicitly referencing statutes of limitations in Emergency Order One. Compare Emergency Order Eight, 597 S.W.3d at 844 (para. 3), with Emergency Order One, 596 S.W.3d at 265 (para. 3). Moreover, paragraph 3 of Emergency Order Eight addresses deadlines for “service of any civil case”-not just the deadlines for filing such a case. 597 S.W.3d at 844 (emphasis added). Thus, the use of the word “tolled” in Emergency Order Eight does not explicitly and unambiguously reflect an intent to stop all limitations periods from running between March 13 and June 1, 2020.

Regardless, Plaintiffs' position that all limitations periods were suspended for the prescribed 80-day period cannot be squared with subsequent Emergency Orders issued before this suit was filed. Less than a month after issuing Emergency Order Eight, the Texas Supreme Court “clarified and amended” it on April 26, 2020, by issuing Emergency Order Twelve. See Misc. Docket No. 20-9059, 629 S.W.3d 144, 144 (Tex. 2020). Emergency Order Twelve included new language authorizing-but not requiring-courts to “[m]odify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order ... for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor's state of disaster has been lifted ....” Id. (paragraph 3(a)).

Most pertinent here, Emergency Order Twelve also modified the third paragraph of Emergency Order Eight, replacing it to state, in key part:

Any deadline for filing or service of any civil case that falls on a day between March 13, 2020 and June 1, 2020, is extended until July 15, 2020.

Id. (para. 5). On its face, Emergency Order Twelve makes clear which deadlines are mandatorily extended, and how. Only those deadlines falling within the specified dates-March 13 to June 1, 2020-are affected. And those specific deadlines, alone, are extended until July 15, 2020. The Court conspicuously omitted any reference to “toll[ing]” any deadline. Compare id., with Emergency Order Eight, 597 S.W.3d at 844 (para. 3).

Indeed the remaining Emergency Orders renewed this clarification from Emergency Order Twelve. Emergency Order Seventeen extended filing deadlines falling between March 13, 2020 and July 1, 2020 to August 15, 2020. Misc. Dkt. No. 20-9071, 609 S.W.3d 119, 120-22 (Tex. 2020) (paras. 2 & 11). Emergency Order Eighteen added a month to that window, specifying that deadlines between March 13, 2020 and August 1, 2020 are pushed until September 15, 2020. Misc. Dkt. No. 20-9080, 609 S.W.3d 122, 124 (Tex. June 29, 2020) (para. 11). That window was further expanded in Emergency Order Twenty-One, which extended deadlines falling between March 13, 2020 and September 1, 2020, to September 15, 2020. Misc. Dkt....