Curtis v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

987 N.E.2d 407

369 Ill.Dec. 780

Tony L. CURTIS, Appellant,

v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.(The Village of Lansing, Appellee).

No. 1–12–0976 WC.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District,

Workers' Compensation Commission Division.

March 11, 2013.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 2013.

Amylee Hogan Simonovich, James M. Ridge & Associates, P.C., Chicago, for appellant.

Gregory E. Ahern, Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, Chicago, for appellees.

OPINION

Justice HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[369 Ill.Dec. 781]¶ 1 Claimant, Tony L. Curtis, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County confirming a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission denied claimant's request under section 8(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)) for additional temporary total disability (TTD) benefits related to the “destabilization” of his work-related injury. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed. Claimant is employed by respondent, the Village of Lansing, as a police officer/paramedic. On February 4, 2002, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim, alleging that he sustained an accidental injury to his right hand on September 1, 2000, when he tripped and fell while chasing a suspect. The matter proceeded to arbitration pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2000)). The arbitrator concluded that claimant sustained a compensable accident. As such, he awarded claimant TTD benefits of $634.13 per week for a period of 55 weeks (see 820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 2000)) and medical expenses in the amount of $14,383.92 (see 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2000)), subject to any credit pursuant to section 8(j) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(j) (West 2000)). The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision and remanded the case to the arbitrator for a determination of a further amount of TTD compensation or compensation for permanent disability, if any, pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ill.2d 327, 35 Ill.Dec. 794, 399 N.E.2d 1322 (1980). No appeals were taken from the decision of the Commission.

¶ 4 Upon remand, an arbitration hearing was held. In a decision dated January 25, 2005, the arbitrator noted that respondent agreed that there were outstanding medical expenses totaling $8,349.04. As such, he ordered respondent to pay this amount pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2000)), subject to any credit due under section 8(j). In addition, the arbitrator awarded claimant $516.15 per week for 76 weeks as permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, representing 40% loss of use of the right hand (see 820 ILCS 305/8(e)(9) (West 2000)). Neither party filed for review before the Commission.

¶ 5 On January 21, 2010, claimant filed a “Petition for Hearing Pursuant to Section 8(a).” In his petition, claimant alleged that as a result of the prior proceedings before the Commission, he was entitled to “open medical rights.” Claimant asserted that pursuant to these rights, he underwent a causally connected surgery on October 5, 2009, after which he was authorized to remain off work by his treating physician. Claimant acknowledged that respondent paid for the cost of this medical treatment. However, he complained that respondent refused to pay TTD benefits for the period of temporary disability that resulted from the October 2009 surgery. In conjunction with his section 8(a) petition, claimant filed a petition for the assessment of penalties pursuant to sections 19(k) and 19( l ) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(k), ( l ) (West 2010)) and attorney fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16 (West 2010)) based on respondent's failure to pay TTD benefits.

[369 Ill.Dec. 782]¶ 6 A hearing on claimant's petitions was held before Commissioner Sherman on February 11, 2010. At the hearing, claimant urged the Commission to award him TTD benefits for the period from October 5, 2009, through February 8, 2010, due to lost time from work resulting from the October 5, 2009, surgery. Respondent denied liability for additional TTD, asserting that any request for such benefits must be sought under section 19(h) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2010)). Respondent contended, however, that the 30–month statutory time limit in which to seek benefits under section 19(h) had long ago expired. Respondent acknowledged that medical rights were left open pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)), but maintained that there is no right to TTD under that provision.

¶ 7 The Commission denied claimant's petition for additional TTD benefits as well as his request for penalties and attorney fees, explaining, in pertinent part, as follows:

“All the cases cited by [claimant's] attorney * * * involve § 19(h) petitions. Here, no § 19(h) petition was filed, presumably because the 30 month period from the last Decision dated January 25, 2005 had expired. In essence, [claimant] is requesting TTD and penalties and attorneys' fees on claimed unpaid TTD under § 8(a) of the Act. Section 8(a) deals with medical, not TTD. Maintenance under a vocational rehabilitation situation is provided under § 8(a), but that is not the same as TTD, although the amount of the benefit rate for TTD and maintenance is the same. There is no provision in § 8(a) that provides [for] the relief sought by [claimant].”

On judicial review, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the decision of the Commission. Thereafter, claimant filed a timely appeal.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, claimant argues that the Commission erred in denying his request for additional TTD benefits for the interval of temporary disability that followed his causally-connected surgery. According to claimant, section 19(h) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2010)) does not apply to TTD benefits. He maintains that section 8 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8 (West 2010)) authorizes the payment of additional TTD benefits for the “destabilization” of a work-related injury beyond the 30–month statutory time limit set forth in section 19(h) where medical rights remain open.

¶ 10 We begin our analysis with a review of section 19(h). Section 19(h) of the Act allows either the employee or the employer to petition the Commission to reopen an installment award for a limited period of time. Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill.2d 519, 527, 300 Ill.Dec. 416, 844 N.E.2d 414 (2006). Section 19(h) provides in relevant part:

“[A]s to accidents occurring subsequent to July 1, 1955, which are covered by any agreement or award under this Act providing for compensation in installments made as a result of such accident, such agreement or award may at any time within 30 months, or 60 months in the case of an award under Section 8(d)1 [820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2010) ], after such agreement or award be reviewed by the Commission at the request of either the employer or the employee on the ground that the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, increased, diminished, or ended.

On such review, compensation payments may be re-established, increased, diminished, or ended.” 820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2010).The purpose of section 19(h) is to set a period of time in which the Commission may consider whether an injury has recurred, increased, decreased, or ended. Hardin Sign Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 Ill.App.3d 386, 393, 107 Ill.Dec. 175, 506 N.E.2d 1066 (1987). The time limit set forth in section 19(h) is jurisdictional. Eschbaugh v. Industrial Comm'n, 286 Ill.App.3d 963, 967, 222 Ill.Dec. 235, 677 N.E.2d 438 (1996). The limitations period begins to run from the date of the Commission's decision. Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ill.2d 548, 549, 283 N.E.2d 880 (1972); City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 363 Ill. 298, 301–02, 2 N.E.2d 87 (1936). However, when no review of the arbitrator's decision is sought, the decision of the arbitrator becomes the decision of the Commission for purposes of calculating the limitations period in section 19(h). Greenway v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ill.2d 273, 275–76, 22 Ill.Dec. 725, 383 N.E.2d 201 (1978); City of Chicago, 363 Ill. at 301, 2 N.E.2d 87;Behe v. Industrial Comm'n, 365 Ill.App.3d 463, 466, 302 Ill.Dec. 312, 848 N.E.2d 611 (2006).

¶ 11 In light of the foregoing, we find that claimant's petition is untimely under section 19(h). With an exception not relevant here, section 19(h) clearly provides that either party may petition the Commission to reopen an agreement or award under the Act for compensation paid in installments for a period of only 30 months after the date of the Commission's decision. In this case, claimant sustained an industrial accident occurring subsequent to July 1, 1955. Pursuant to the Act, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim arising from the accident and was awarded compensation in installments, i.e., TTD and PPD benefits. The decision on remand was issued by the arbitrator on January 25, 2005, and neither party sought review before the Commission. Therefore, pursuant to section 19(h), claimant had 30 months from January 25, 2005, to request the Commission to reopen the installment award. Claimant did not file the petition at issue until January 21, 2010, almost 60 months after the arbitrator filed his decision. As such, we find that claimant's request for additional TTD benefits was untimely and the Commission did not err in denying claimant's petition.

¶ 12 Despite the foregoing, claimant insists that section 19(h) “is silent on temporary total disability benefits.” Specifically, he contends that the term “disability” as used in section 19(h) was intended to refer only to permanency.

¶ 13 To address claimant's argument, we must engage in statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of ...