Czerner v. Smith

1

ANN ELIZABETH ALLEN CZERNER, Trustee of the Ann Allen Czerner Trust Dated February 5, 2018, Plaintiff, v. KRISTY A. SMITH, TROY ALLEN TUCKER, JOYCE SOWARDS BOGESS, STEVEN RAY HATFIELD, LISA LYNN HATFIELD, CHELSEA ROSE HATFIELD, and COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:23-0704

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Huntington Division

May 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) and a Motion for Amended Scheduling Order and Expedited Evidentiary Hearing (ECF No. 18) by Plaintiff Ann Elizabeth Allen Czerner, Trustee of the Ann Allen Czerner Trust Dated February 5, 2018. Also pending is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) and Motion for Leave to File a Surreply (ECF No. 32) by Defendant Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC (hereinafter Columbia Gas). Upon review and for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Amended Scheduling Order and Expedited Evidentiary Hearing and the Motion for Leave to File a Surreply, and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the Amended Verified Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Plaintiff alleges that, as Trustee, she owns a landlocked parcel of property in the Teays Valley District of Putnam County, West Virginia (hereinafter referred to as the “Subject Property”). Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he topography and terrain in the area limits the options for an easement for ingress and egress” and “[t]he best and only viable easement” is a gravel road over the adjoining properties owned by Defendants Kristy A. Smith Troy Allen Tucker, Joyce Sowards Boggess, Steven Ray Hatfield, Lisa Lynn Hatfield, and Chelsea Rose Hatfield. Am. Verified Pet. for Dec. J., at ¶¶17 18, ECF No. 1-1. The Plaintiff contends that, in 1987, there was “[a]n intermittent license to use this route granted to the Armstrong Heirs (of which [she descends]) for the limited purpose of ‘timber removal[.]'” Id. at ¶20.^[1] Additionally, although there is no “documented right of way or easement for ingress and egress” to the Subject Property, Plaintiff states that the road has been used as the only access point since “at least 1967.” Id. at ¶¶11, 23. Despite this historic use, Plaintiff claims she no longer can use the road as she once did because Columbia Gas now claims it has exclusive right to it.

Columbia Gas states that, on December 29, 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted it a certificate of public convenience and necessity to, inter alia, construct a natural gas pipeline from Marshall County, West Virginia, to Wayne County, West Virginia. Notice of Removal, ¶16, ECF No. 1. To construct the pipeline, it was necessary for Columbia Gas to obtain permanent and temporary easements across certain properties the pipeline traverses. Id. ¶17. As part of this process and in lieu of condemnation, Defendant Joyce Sowards Boggess (“Boggess”) and Connie Francis Sowards Henry, f/k/a Connie Sowards Tucker (“Sowards”), voluntarily executed a Right-of-Way Agreement on or about June 26, 2017, granting Columbia Gas a perpetual easement and right-of-way for a 36” high pressure natural gas transmission pipeline to cross their property. Id. ¶21; Easement and Right-of-Way Agreement, ECF No. 1-8.^[2] On the same day, they also entered into a Permanent Access Easement Agreement (the “Access Road Agreement”), which granted to Columbia Gas “exclusive right” to the access road that traverses the pipeline itself. Id. ¶¶23, 35 (emphasis original); Permanent Access Easement Agreement, ECF No. 1-9. Unfortunately, during the pendency of the state court action, Connie Francis Sowards Henry died. Therefore, her heirs Kristy A. Smith and Troy Allen Tucker were substituted as Defendants. Ord. of the Cir. Ct. of Putnam Cnty. (Sept. 6, 2023), ECF No. 1-4, at 23.

From the map, it appears the gravel road runs from the public road across the pipeline on the Boggess and Sowards' property, continues over the Hatfield property, and ends on Plaintiff's property. Plat of Survey, ECF No. 1-4, at 13. As a result of the easement and right-of-way granted to Columbia Gas, Plaintiff filed this action against the property owners on September 8, 2020, in the Circuit Court of Putnam County, West Virginia. Plaintiff maintains that she did not originally name Columbia Gas as a Defendant because representatives of the company indicated it would abide with whatever the state court decided in her action against the property owners.

On July 15, 2022, a bench trial/evidentiary hearing was held, but the state court judge indicated he would not issue a final ruling until Columbia Gas was notified and agreed to the resolution. At that point, Plaintiff states Columbia Gas voiced its opposition. Therefore, on September 27, 2023, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Verified Petition for Declaratory Judgment, naming Columbia Gas as an additional Defendant. In her Amended Petition, Plaintiff asserts state law claims for Easement by Necessity (Count One), Prescriptive Easement (Count Two), Easement by Implication (Count Three), and a declaration that the December 8, 1987 Agreement is invalid for violating the Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (Count Four).

On October 31, 2023, Columbia Gas removed the action to this Court based upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). Columbia Gas asserts that Plaintiff's action disregards its rights under the Access Agreement and ignores federal laws and safety standards, which include, inter alia, “49 CFR § 192.317(a)&(b) (requiring protection of transmission lines from erosion and from damages from vehicular traffic).” Notice of Removal, ¶38. As this action further “implicates issues under the Natural Gas Act (‘NGA'), 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq., and safety standards regulated by the Pipeline Hazardous Material Safety Administration (‘PHMSA') under the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act, 49 U.S.C. § [6010a] et seq.[,]” Columbia Gas asserts federal question jurisdiction exists. Id. ¶14. To the contrary, Plaintiff argues this action should be remanded because she only makes state law claims and removal was improper.

II. DISCUSSION

Addressing Plaintiff's Motion to Remand first, the Court is mindful that it has “limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing that district courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, an action “arises under” federal law “only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citation omitted). A defense based upon federal law or a complaint anticipating and rebutting a federal defense is insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 393.

When a plaintiff brings a declaratory judgment action, as here, “the federal right litigated may belong to the declaratory judgment defendant rather than the declaratory judgment plaintiff.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Drain, 237 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2001). Under what is referred to as the “coercive action doctrine,” federal question jurisdiction will exist, even if the complaint recites only state law claims, if there are allegations “arising under federal law that the declaratory judgment defendant could affirmatively bring against the declaratory judgment plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, although “the vast majority of cases brought under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause of action,' . . . a case may also arise under federal law ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.'” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (footnote omitted)).

In this case, Plaintiff's declaratory action only requests that she be granted an easement and that the 1987 agreement be declared invalid under West Virginia law. None of these causes of action are created by federal law, and Columbia Gas does not argue that it could have affirmatively brought a declaratory action against Plaintiff. Nevertheless, Columbia Gas insists removal was proper because an easement cannot be granted without determining if it conflicts with federal statutes and regulations.^[3]

When a state action turns on the construction of federal law, the Supreme Court held in Gunn that federal jurisdiction will exist “if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” 568 U.S at 258; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (holding that, even though federal law does not create the cause of action, federal question jurisdiction may exist if the “state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”). Often referred to as the Gunn-Grable framework, application of these factors only confirms federal jurisdiction in a “special and small...