D'andrea v. Paragon Sys.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TIMOTHY J. KELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Janet D'Andrea sues her former employer Defendant Paragon Systems, Inc., for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She asserts that Paragon fired her from her position as a security guard because of her sex and because she filed a charge of discrimination. Paragon moves for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Factual Background

In May 2013, Paragon hired D'Andrea to work as a security guard, a position in which she served until her termination in June 2018. ECF No. 18-2 ¶ 1. The events that directly led to her termination began on May 7, 2018. At that time, D'Andrea worked at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on Paragon's contract for security services at its St. Elizabeth campus site. Id. ¶ 2. When she got to work that evening, she parked in an adjacent parking garage operated by the U.S. Coast Guard. Her supervisor, Lieutenant Phillips, told her she could not park there and had to park elsewhere. ECF No. 18-1 at 7. D'Andrea told him that Federal Protective Services Officer Kenny Wheeler had told her she could park in the garage and that she would ask Wheeler if there was an issue. Id. Wheeler told her to leave her car in the parking lot and that he

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would let Phillips know her parking there was not a problem. Id. When D'Andrea returned to Paragon's security office to receive her gear for her shift, Phillips told her he would not “gear her up” unless she moved her vehicle to another parking lot. Id. D'Andrea complied with this instruction and began her shift. Id.

During that shift, D'Andrea called another supervisor, Lieutenant Tyler Vickers. According to a memorandum Vickers submitted to Phillips, D'Andrea complained to him about her post assignment that night, used profanity while upset, and used a government-issued keyboard to strike a metal desk inside her post. ECF No. 17-6 ¶¶ 11-14. D'Andrea denies Vickers's version of events. ECF No. 18-1 at 8-9. Shortly before the end of her shift, D'Andrea noticed that the screen on her security monitor was malfunctioning. Even though Paragon's protocol required that she make an entry in the station's log book, she did not do so. ECF No. 18-2 ¶¶ 20-21. She did, however, inform the incoming security officer about the malfunction and then left her station. Id. ¶ 21.

On May 9, Paragon's Deputy Project Manager at St. Elizabeth's, Stacy Coombs, told D'Andrea that he and Major Michaelangelo Jenkins wanted to have a discussion with her. ECF No. 18-1 at 9. D'Andrea, who had just completed an eight-hour shift, told Coombs that she “had to use the restroom, ” “was not feeling well, ” and “had to go home, ” and suggested speaking the next day. Id. at 9-10. Coombs told D'Andrea to come back after using the restroom but D'Andrea excused herself and left the work site. Id. at 10. The next day, Lieutenant Brian Jones emailed Coombs and accused D'Andrea of causing the computer screen malfunctions at her post, based on the report of another security guard. ECF No. 18-23 at 2. About a week later, on May 16, Paragon suspended D'Andrea for failure to follow instructions when she did not return to speak to Coombs and Jenkins. ECF No. 17-4 at 60.

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On June 1, 2018, D'Andrea filed a charge of discrimination with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in which she alleged that Paragon had harassed and suspended her because of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 54. Five days later, D'Andrea received a letter from Paragon informing her that an investigation “revealed that on May 9, 2018 you were given a direct order to meet with the Deputy Program Manager and Major to discuss incidents that occurred during your prior shifts. You failed to follow the instruction given and departed the facility without notification, delaying an official investigation.” Id. at 60. Moreover, the “investigation revealed that throughout the course of your shifts you were unprofessional towards your supervisors on more than one occasion, used profanity while on duty, failed to follow proper reporting procedures and failed to document all incidents.” Id. Noting that she had been disciplined before for “incidents of this nature, ” the letter terminated D'Andrea's employment with Paragon. Id.

In November 2018, D'Andrea amended her EEOC complaint to allege that she was “retaliated against for my protected activities (filing a charge of discrimination)”. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8; ECF No. 5 ¶ 8; ECF No. 18-26 at 2.

II. Procedural Background

D'Andrea sued in September 2019. Her complaint alleges two counts: (1) sex discrimination and (2) retaliation, each in violation of Title VII. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31-44. In February 2021, Paragon moved for summary judgment on both counts. ECF No. 17 at 1. Paragon's reply included a request to exclude from the record three exhibits that D'Andrea had

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only recently produced to it. The Court allowed D'Andrea to file a surreply and Paragon to file a reply to the surreply about this evidentiary dispute.^[1]

III. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Courts “are not to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Lopez, 826 F.3d at 496 (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). But the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)) (emphasis in original). If the evidence “is merely colorable, or is

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not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

“The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Montgomery v. Risen, 875 F.3d 709, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “In response, the nonmovant must identify specific facts in the record to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue.” Id. And for claims where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, as here, she must make an evidentiary showing “sufficient to establish the existence of [each] essential element to [her] case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial” and therefore entitles the moving party to “judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 323. “Importantly, while summary judgment must be approached with specific caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics, 610 F.Supp.2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up).

IV. Analysis

A. Discrimination Claim

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Courts analyzing Title VII discrimination claims use the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Under that framework, “an employee must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation or discrimination. The employer must then come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the challenged action. If the employer meets this burden, the McDonnell Douglas framework falls away and the factfinder must decide the ultimate question: whether the employee has proven intentional discrimination or retaliation.”

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Id. (citations omitted). But when an employer has “asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, ” the Circuit has instructed courts to proceed to resolve the “central question”; has the plaintiff “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that [Paragon's] asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that [it] intentionally discriminated against [D'Andrea] on the basis of [sex]?” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Because Paragon asserts that it fired D'Andrea for the non-discriminatory reasons set forth in the termination letter, the Court will move on to resolve this central question.

D'Andrea argues that she was fired due to sex discrimination. ECF No. 18-26 at 2. And as more evidence of Paragon's animus, she cites Paragon's previous disciplinary actions toward her and alleged harassment by certain Paragon employees.^[2] ECF No. 18-1 at 12-13, 15-17. She also disputes some aspects of the events that led to her termination. Id. at 13-15

D'Andrea has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for her on her sex...