D.B. v. Sullivan

1

D.B., Plaintiff, v. ANN MARIE T. SULLIVAN, MD, Commissioner, Office of Mental Health, in her Individual and Official Capacity, ROSSANA ROSADO, Commissioner, Criminal Justice Services, in her Official Capacity, "JOHN DOES 1-5," and "JANE DOES 1-5," Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-282 (MAD/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

March 9, 2023

THE BELLANTONI LAW FIRM, PLLC AMY L. BELLANTONI, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiff

OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL - ALBANY MELISSA A LATINO, AAG Attorneys for Defendants

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 23, 2022, Plaintiff D.B. commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants for violating his Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Dkt. No. 1. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as punitive, economic, and compensatory damages, Plaintiff claims that, despite his efforts to recover his rights through state remedies such as an application for a Certificate of Relief from Civil Disabilities Related to Firearms and subsequent Article 78 proceedings, Defendants denied--and continue to deny--him his constitutional right to purchase a firearm by improperly reporting him to the SAFE Act Database and National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS"). See id.

Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting res judicata, collateral estoppel, expiration of the statute of limitations, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and lack of personal involvement as defenses. See Dkt. No. 12. Plaintiff has opposed Defendants' motion, arguing that the motion should be denied in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 15.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Event In Question

In 2014, Plaintiff was subjected to an emergency psychiatric evaluation and observation at Samaritan Hospital. See Dkt. No. 1 at | 53. Plaintiff was released from Samaritan Hospital within 72 hours, and his emergency evaluation was never converted to an "involuntary commitment." See id. at ¶¶ 55-56.

B. Plaintiff Obtains a Gun License in Commonwealth of Massachusetts

In May 2015, Plaintiff sought out his former psychiatrist, Dr. Brian J. Mazmanian, because "a hospitalization . . . in New York for a temper outburst that created a red flag when he was applying for a gun permit" in his home state of Massachusetts. See Dkt. No. 12-4 at 28. Dr. Mazmanian's 2015 letter opined that Plaintiff was "not disabled by such present mental illness in any manner that should prevent him from possessing a firearm" and that "[h]is medications are seen as being stable and safe." Id. at 29. According to the Article 78 record, Plaintiff was issued a License to Carry Firearms in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See id. at 38.

C. Plaintiff Attempts to Purchase a Firearm

In 2019, Plaintiff attempted to purchase a .22 caliber hunting rifle in Massachusetts. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 64. NICS issued a "Deny" when the Federal firearm licensee ("FFL") conducted the requisite background check before transferring the rifle to Plaintiff. Id. at | 67. Plaintiff came to know that NICS denied his purchase because of him being "involuntarily committed" to a mental health facility, in reference to Plaintiff's 2014 time at Samaritan Hospital. Id. at ¶ 69.

D. Certificate of Relief from Civil Disabilities Related to Firearms

On April 3, 2020, Plaintiff submitted his application for a certificate of relief from civil disabilities related to firearms for purposes of removing his name from the NICS database and restoring his right to own a firearm. See Dkt. No. 12-4 at 18. On December 2, 2020, Plaintiff's application was denied because the panel was unable to conclude that Plaintiff would not be a danger to public safety. See id. at 97-99. Specifically, the panel could not establish that Plaintiff "ha[d] sufficiently resolved the problems that contributed to his involuntary commitment, nor . . . gained the skills and understanding to manage symptoms appropriately and safely on an ongoing basis." Id. at 99.

E. Article 78 Proceedings to present

On March 31, 2021, Plaintiff filed a petition for an Article 78 proceeding to review the denial of his application for a certificate of relief from disabilities related to firearms. See Dkt. No. 12-2. Plaintiff named as respondents Defendant Sullivan, the New York State Office of Mental Health, and the Office of NICS Appeals and SAFE Act ("Respondents"), asserting that their determination was "arbitrary, capricious, and without foundation in fact." Id. at 4. On June 4, 2021, Respondents answered, seeking dismissal of the action, and reaffirming that "[h]is [August 2014] admission to Samaritan Medical Center constituted an involuntary commitment...." See Dkt. No. 12-4 at 8. On November 10, 2021, the Supreme Court of New York in Albany County issued its Article 78 decision, finding that Respondents "did not err in their determination denying the petitioner's application[.]" Dkt. No. 12-3 at 5.^[1]

On March 23, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action asserting that Defendants' actions have violated his rights under the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Dkt. No. 1. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 12.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSICommc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim," see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," see id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 557. Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed[,]" id. at 570.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court may consider "documents attached to, or incorporated by reference in the Complaint, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken[.]" Thomas v. Westchester Cty. Health Care Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999)) (other citation omitted). "Documents that are integral to plaintiff's claims may also be considered, despite plaintiff's failure to attach them to the complaint." Id. (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 46-48 (2d Cir. 1991)).

Given the arguments before it, the Court has taken judicial notice of all materials related to Plaintiff's application for his Certificate of Relief of Civil Disabilities Related to a Firearm and the Article 78 proceedings.

B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of authority[.]" Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). The doctrine is grounded in the principle that 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests jurisdiction to hear appeals from the highest court of each state exclusively in the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. District courts may not, therefore, adjudicate what are in essence de facto appeals from state court judgments. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291-92. The doctrine is jurisdictional, and not grounded in the same considerations as preclusion law. See Id. at 292-93. The application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is confined to cases ... brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those arguments." Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284).

The Second Circuit has set forth a...