D.C. v. Bibbs, 7:20-cv-01105-LSC

D.C., a minor child, by and through his mother, B.C., Plaintiff, v. Coretta Bibbs and Sumter County Board of Education, Defendants.

7:20-cv-01105-LSC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

May 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

Two motions to dismiss are before the Court, one filed by Coretta Bibbs, another filed by the Sumter County Board of Education (SCBE). Bibbs's motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part, and SCBE's motion is due to be granted. The Court will, however, allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to replead their § 1983 claim against SCBE. See Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the court dismisses the action with prejudice.").

I. ALLEGATIONS¹

In May 2018 D.C. was a fifth-grade student at Livingston Junior High School in Sumter County, Alabama. He stood five feet, two inches tall, he weighed ninety-two pounds, and he suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Bibbs was an employee of SCBE. She worked as an aide at D.C.'s school.

On May 7, 2018, Bibbs allegedly assaulted D.C. on school grounds and during school hours. He recounts the assault with the following allegations:

20. On or about May 7, 2018, [D.C.] was physically and emotionally assaulted by the Defendant, CORETTA BIBBS, during a physical education ("P.E.") class while at [Livingston Junior High School].

21. The Defendant, CORETTA BIBBS, instructed the P.E. class of children, including [D.C.], to "line up."

22. [D.C.] and several other children questioned Defendant BIBBS whether there was [sic] five (5) more minutes left of class and resumed their P.E. activities.

23. Defendant BIBBS suddenly and without warning became enraged, began cursing at [D.C.], including racial epithets and negative comments about his mother, B.C., repeatedly slapped D.C. and then slammed D.C. against a brick wall.

26. Defendant BIBBS continued to assault D.C. until another teacher, Coach James, was able to separate [her] from D.C.27. Subsequently, D.C. was transported to Whatley Health Services for treatment of the physical injuries he sustained.

Acting through his mother and next friend, D.C. sued Bibbs and SCBE in the Circuit Court of Sumter County, Alabama. The defendants removed the case to this Court and then moved, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss portions of D.C.'s complaint.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim becomes plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations," its factual content must be sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

Gauging plausibility is a two-step process. The Court "begin[s] by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to theassumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Then the Court assumes the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id.

The Court will address Bibbs's motion first and SCBE's motion second.

III. BIBBS'S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. State-Law Claims Against Bibbs in Her Official Capacity.

D.C. brings four state-law claims against Bibbs: one for assault and battery, one for negligence/wantonness, one for negligent, wanton and/or willful failure to perform ministerial acts, and one for intentional infliction of emotional distress—also known as the tort of outrage. Cf. Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., 56 So. 3d 615, 621 (Ala. 2010). Each claim names Bibbs in both her individual and official capacities. Each seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and "appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief."

This Court's authority to hear D.C.'s state-law claims arises under its supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. And when, like here, a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over state-law causes of action, it must apply the substantive law of the forum state. Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, 781 F.3d 1245, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2015). Here the forum state is Alabama. Alabama'ssubstantive law will therefore determine the success or failure of D.C.'s state-law claims.

Section 14 of Alabama's constitution provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." Ala. Const. art. I, § 14. This provision extends "absolute immunity from suit—and thus liability—for monetary damages based on state-law claims, not only for the State but also for State officials acting in their official capacities." Ala. State Univ. v. Danley, 212 So. 3d 112, 124 (Ala. 2016) (citing Ex Parte Trawick, 959 So. 2d 51, 55 (Ala. 2006)).

Under well-established Alabama case law, Bibbs is cloaked with sovereign immunity to the extent D.C. seeks money damages against her in her official capacity. Alabama's county school boards, after all, "are local agencies of the State and partake of the State's sovereign immunity." L.S.B. v. Howard, 659 So. 2d 43, 44 (Ala. 1995); see Carroll ex rel. Slaught v. Hammett, 744 So. 2d 906, 910 (Ala. 1999) ("County boards of education are deemed to be local agencies of the State for purposes of applying the State's sovereign immunity under Art. I, § 14, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901."). On May 7, 2018—when she allegedly assaulted D.C.—Bibbs was on-duty employee of an Alabama county school board. D.C.'s state-law claims for monetary damages against Bibbs in her official capacity are therefore, in effect, claims against the state itself and are barred by sovereignimmunity. Ex Parte Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 815 So. 2d 527, 530 (Ala. 2001). Those claims are due to be dismissed. Ex Parte Dangerfield, 49 So. 3d 675, 681 (Ala. 2010) ("It is settled beyond cavil that State officials cannot be sued for damages in their official capacities.").

Alabama's sovereign immunity, however, does not necessarily bar D.C.'s state-law claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Bibbs in her official capacity. See Danley, 212 So. 3d at 124. In Ex Parte Moulton, the Alabama Supreme Court enumerated six "exceptions" or "general categories of actions which . . . do not come within the prohibition of § 14." 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131, 1141-42 (Ala. 2016). Those exceptions are

"(1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform their legal duties";

"(2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law";

"(3) actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial acts";

"(4) actions brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . seeking construction of a statute and its application in a given situation";

"(5) valid inverse condemnation actious brought against State officials in their representative [or official] capacity"; and

"(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State officials in their representative capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, and (b) actions for damages brought against stateofficials in their individual capacity where it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, subject to the limitation that the action not be, in effect, one against the State."

Here, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages, D.C. seeks "appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief" from Bibbs. Because the parties never briefed whether this request falls within one of Section 14's six exceptions, Bibbs's motion is due to be denied without prejudice to the extent D.C. seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. Bibbs, in her official capacity, has leave to seek immunity from these claims at the summary-judgment stage, assuming such a request complies with obligations imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

B. Federal Claim Against Bibbs in Her Official Capacity.

Along with her state-law claims, D.C. brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Bibbs in her individual and official capacities; Bibbs moved to dismiss only the official-capacity component. She believes that D.C.'s § 1983 claim against her in her official capacity is "merely duplicative of" his claim against SCBE and "is, therefore, unnecessary." The Court agrees.

"When an [official] is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply 'another way of pleading an action against an entity of which [the official] is an agent." Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Suits against municipalofficers in their official capacities "are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the [entity] that the officer represents." Id. And redundant § 1983 suits—suits against local government officials and the local government itself—are properly dismissed at the 12(b)(6) stage. See, e.g., Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1302 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (where a plaintiff named a county and a county fire marshal in his official capacity, only the fire marshal's employer—the county—was a proper party); Duncan v. Bibb Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 471 F.Supp. 3d 1243, 1255-56 (N.D. Ala. 2020) ...