D.C. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Sch.

D.C., a minor, by and through his mother, A.T.,and on behalf of all others similarly situated and A.T.,his mother, on her own behalf, Plaintiffs, v. PITTSBURGH PUBLIC SCHOOLS and NICHOLAS SIBLE, Defendants.

2:19-cv-00012

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 15, 2020

Judge Marilyn J. Horan

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, D.C., on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as well as D.C.'s mother, A.T., and D.C.'s grandfather, F.T., filed this civil action in January 2019. (ECF No. 1). The initial Complaint contained thirteen counts related to incidents in which school employees physically restrained or otherwise discriminated against D.C., an elementary school student. Plaintiffs brought claims against Defendant Pittsburgh Public Schools (the District), for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq.; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also brought claims against individual Defendants, school police officer Marion Parker, teacher Nicholas Sible, and principal Mark McClinchie, for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania common law.

Mr. Sible answered the Complaint, but the other three Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 21, 23, 24). In ruling on those Motions, this Court dismissed the majority of Plaintiffs' claims. (ECF No. 42); D.C. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Sch., 415 F. Supp. 3d 636 (W.D. Pa. 2019). Plaintiffs then filed the present Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiffs did not reallege F.T.'s claims or the claims against Officer Parker and Mr. McClinchie. (ECF No. 47). Accordingly, F.T., Officer Parker, and Mr. McClinchie are no longer parties to this matter.

The District again moves to dismiss almost all of the claims against it, as detailed below, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 54, 56). Mr. Sible likewise moves to dismiss the remaining claim against him,¹ under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 50). The parties have briefed the issues, (ECF Nos. 51, 55, 57, 61, 65, 67), and the Motions are now ripe for decision.

For the following reasons, the District's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Mr. Sible's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) both will be granted. The District's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be denied in part, as it relates to Count VII, and otherwise denied as moot. The Court will also dismiss, sua sponte, D.C.'s individual claim in Count II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. Background²

D.C. entered kindergarten in the fall of 2015. (ECF No. 47, at ¶ 41). Throughout the 2015-2016 school year, D.C. exhibited significant behavioral concerns. Id. at ¶¶ 43-48. The behavioral concerns continued into his first-grade year. Id. at ¶¶ 49-50. His behaviors included eloping from the classroom, screaming and crying in class, failing to follow directions, throwingobjects, kicking, shoving, using inappropriate language, and destroying property. Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 62, 63, 77. In October 2016, D.C. was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. Id. at ¶ 52.

Throughout D.C.'s kindergarten and first-grade years, the District made several phone calls to D.C.'s mother, A.T. (Mother), and had several in-person meetings with her about D.C.'s behavior. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 46-48, 56, 62, 65, 75. The District suspended D.C. multiple times for his behavior and recommended, or even demanded, on several occasions that Mother seek mental health services for D.C. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 45, 50, 57, 64. Over the course of the spring of D.C.'s kindergarten year and the fall of his first-grade year, the District agreed to provide D.C. with sensory breaks, referred him to the Student Assistance Program, referred him to the school counselor, and placed him in a social skills group. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 51, 54, 61. The District also "created a crisis intervention plan for D.C.," which, according to the Amended Complaint, "specifically relied upon the utilization of school police." Id. at ¶ 68. According to Plaintiffs' administrative due process complaint (attached as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint), however, the crisis intervention plan "permitted the utilization of school police if [D.C] was unsafe after two tiers of crisis interventions." (ECF No. 48, at 5).

During one behavioral incident in the fall of D.C.'s first-grade year, "D.C. engaged with a teacher during instruction, screamed and yelled during instruction, and threw a chair and desk." (ECF No. 47, at ¶ 54). His teacher, Nicholas Sible, "placed his knee on D.C.'s back while pushing D.C.'s face into the floor in an attempt to restrain him." Id. In a different incident, Mr. Sible "reportedly choked D.C." Id. at ¶ 72. In yet another incident, the District called school police officers, who drove D.C. home in a police patrol car. Id. at ¶ 59. The District also called school police officers on two other occasions. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 78. During one of those occasions,Officer Parker handcuffed D.C. and threatened to involuntarily commit him if Mother did not take him from the school. Id. at ¶¶ 78-83.

In January 2017, during D.C.'s first-grade year, the District initiated an evaluation to determine whether D.C. needed special education services. Id. at ¶¶ 44-46, 51, 57, 64, 89. As a result of the evaluation, the District "recommended a smaller classroom size and additional mental health services." Id. at ¶ 89. At the subsequent team meeting to develop D.C.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP), the team "determined that D.C. required a full-time emotional support setting." Id. at ¶ 92. D.C. was moved to an approved private school where he could receive the identified services. Id.

Mother subsequently filed a due process complaint with Pennsylvania's Office of Dispute Resolution, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id. at ¶ 36; (ECF No. 48). In April 2018, Mother and the District reached a settlement prior to the initial hearing, and they executed a Settlement Agreement in October 2018. (ECF No. 47, at ¶¶ 37-40; ECF No. 48-1). In January 2019, Plaintiffs filed the present civil action before this Court. (ECF No. 1).

The Amended Complaint contains the following claims: in Count I, D.C., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, brings a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the District. (ECF No. 47, at ¶¶ 93-117). In Count II, D.C. also brings, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the District. Id. In Counts III and IV, Mother brings a § 504 claim and an ADA claim, respectively, against the District for associational discrimination. Id. at ¶¶ 118-34. In Counts V and VI, D.C. brings nearly identical § 1983 claims against the District, alleging violations of "D.C.'s right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force." Id. at ¶¶ 135-72. In Count VII, D.C. alleges a claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act(PHRA) against the District for race and disability discrimination. Id. at ¶¶ 173-83. Next, in Count IX,³ D.C. brings a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Mr. Sible. Id. at ¶¶ 184-90. In Count XII, D.C. also alleges a § 1983 claim against the District under a Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger theory. Id. at ¶¶ 191-216. Lastly, in Count XIII, Mother brings a § 1983 claim, alleging a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. Id. at ¶¶ 217-33.

The District moves to dismiss the putative class claims in Counts I and II, as well as the individual claims in Counts III, IV, V, VI, XII, and XIII, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 56, 57). The District also moves to dismiss Counts III, IV, V, VI, XII, and XIII for failure to state a claim, and asks the Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over D.C.'s PHRA claim in Count VII. (ECF Nos. 54, 55). The District does not challenge the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over, or the merits of, D.C.'s individual claims in Counts I and II. Finally, Mr. Sible moves to dismiss Count IX, the only claim against him, for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 50, 51).

II. Subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

A. Legal standard

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff generally has the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625, 627 (3d Cir. 2009). The defendant can challenge whether theplaintiff has done so, through either a facial challenge or a factual challenge to the complaint. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017).

In a facial challenge, the court looks to the face of the complaint and accepts as true the facts alleged by the plaintiff. Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016). If the court cannot conclude, based on face of the complaint, that jurisdictional requirements are met, then the court must dismiss the complaint. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d at 633 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In other words, a facial challenge "calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Constitution Party v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, "'[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of [jurisdiction], supported by mere conclusory statements,...