D.D. ex rel. S.R. v. Camden City Bd. of Educ.

D.D., on behalf of S.R. and A.R. Plaintiff, v. CAMDEN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,and GLORIA MARTINEZ-VEGA, DEBRA GAETA, DENISE MARTINEZ,and MINTERVA CASTRO, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

Civil Action DOCKET NO. CAM-L-1919-18

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION / CAMDEN COUNTY

November 14, 2018

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS

OPINION

Franklin Rooks, Esquire, The Law Firm of Jacobson & Rooks LLC, Counsel for Plaintiffs, D.D. on behalf of S.R. and A.R.

Benjamin Zieman, Esquire, Capehart Scatchard, Counsel for Defendants, Camden City Board of Education, Gloria Martiniez-Vega, Debra Gaeta, Denise Martinez, and Minerva Castro

STEVEN J. POLANSKY, P.J.Cv.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, D.D., is the parent and natural guardian of S.R., minor female, and A.R., minor male.¹ A.R. and S.R. were second-grade students in a Camden City school in 2016-2017. Both have been diagnosed with learning disabilities and other medical issues.

Defendants, Camden City Board of Education ("Camden BOE"), Gloria Martinez-Vega, Debra Gaeta, Denise Martinez, and Minerva Castro have filed the present motion seeking to have the court dismiss with prejudice Counts II through IX of Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to statea claim pursuant to N.J.R. 4:6-2(e). Defendants further seek an Order dismissing all claims against Defendants in Counts I through IX for failure to name an indispensable party pursuant to R. 4:6-2(f).

BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of alleged student on student bullying that took place at the Thomas H. Dudley Family School in Camden, New Jersey on multiple occasions during the 2016-2017 school year. Plaintiffs have asserted constitutional, statutory, and common law claims against Defendants, four school officials and the Board of Education, for allegedly failing to protect them from a classmate, R.M., who bullied them on the basis of their disabilities. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs enumerate over a dozen instances of bullying by R.M. Plaintiffs assert that as a proximate cause of the Defendants' actions and inactions they have suffered damages, and they demand compensatory and equitable relief, punitive damages, interest, attorney's fees and costs.

Plaintiffs' Complaint consists of seven (7) separate Counts.

1. Count I alleges discrimination based on Plaintiffs' disability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Camden BOE, through the acts and omissions of the other Defendants, were deliberately indifferent, reckless, negligent, and/or tacitly approved a hostile classroom environment based on Plaintiffs' disabilities. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants:

a. Despite having knowledge of the conduct of R.M., failed to take any actions to prevent the ongoing disability discrimination;

b. Failed to follow Camden Board of Education policy and state law resulting in a hostile classroom environment as a result of Plaintiffs' disabilities;c. Failed to report incidents of harassment, intimidation, bullying, and physical assaults as required by the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (N.J.S.A. §18A:37-13 et seq.); and

d. Failed to institute any remedial measures that were reasonably calculated to end the harassment, intimidation, bullying, and physical assaults perpetrated by R.M.

2. Count II alleges an equal rights violation under the New Jersey State Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege a violation of the "thorough and efficient" clause of the State Constitution under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA) (N.J.S.A. 10:6-2). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants:

a. Denied Plaintiffs protection from harassment, intimidation, bullying, and physical assault; and

b. Interfered with Plaintiffs' ability to receive a thorough and efficient education at the school through their failure to perform their duties.

3. Count III alleges the state-created-danger doctrine as a basis for a substantive due process violation. Plaintiffs assert that:

a. The harm was foreseeable because of the numerous instances of R.M.'s physical assaults on Plaintiffs;

b. Defendants acted in willful disregard for Plaintiffs' safety;

c. Despite numerous reports of intimidation, bullying, and physical assaults, Defendants ignored Plaintiffs' complaints, which created a continuing opportunity for R.M. to victimize Plaintiffs; and

d. New Jersey law requires children to attend school, which created additional and continuous opportunities for R.M. to physically assault Plaintiffs.

4. Count IV asserts an "aiding and abetting" claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD") against the individual Defendants.

5. Count V alleges negligence against all Defendants. Plaintiffs assert that the School District had a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of students entrusted to them based upon Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 268 (2003). They also assert that Defendants had a duty to use reasonable care to supervise the conduct of the students under their care. It is asserted that Defendants were negligent in:

a. Failing to treat the R.M.'s offenses as progressive or to treat him as required under the school's Code of Conduct;

b. Failing to report incidents of harassment, intimidation, bullying, and physical assaults as required by the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (N.J.S.A. §18A:37-13 et seq.); and

c. Failing to institute any remedial measures that were reasonably calculated to end the harassment, intimidation, bullying, and physical assaults perpetrated by R.M.

6. Count VI alleges negligent supervision of R.M. by all Defendants.

7. Count VII alleges Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that:

a. Defendants intentionally or recklessly committed acts or omissions resulting in an unsafe school environment, which created severe emotional distress for Plaintiffs;

b. Defendants' conduct (failing to treat the bully's offenses as progressive, failing to report incidents, and failing to institute any remedial measure to end the bullying) is extreme and outrageous in that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society;c. Plaintiffs have suffered extreme emotional distress that is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

8. Count VIII alleges assault against Defendants as a result of the conduct of R.M.

9. Count IX alleges battery against Defendants as a result of the conduct of R.M.

Defendants move to dismiss Counts II through IX of the Complaint for failure to state a claim, and Counts I through IX for failure to join an indispensable party.

Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts IV, VIII, and IX.

Failure to State a Claim

New Jersey is a notice-pleading state, requiring only that a general statement of the claim need be pleaded. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989). It is still necessary for the pleadings to include a statement of facts that will "fairly apprise the adverse party of the claims and issues to be raised at trial." Jardine Estates, Inc. v. Koppel, 24 N.J. 536, 542 (1957). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court will accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, 140 N.J. 623, 625-26 (1995). The test for determining the adequacy of the pleading is whether a cause of action is suggested by the facts. Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Corp., 109 N.J. 189 (1998). The court must search in depth and with liberality to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned even from an obscure statement, particularly if further discovery is conducted. Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 772. The court in Printing Mart cautioned that a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss "should be granted in only the rarest of instances." Id. at 772; see also Lieberman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 132 N.J. 76, 79 (1993).

Counts IV, VIII and IX - Aiding and Abetting, Assault and Battery

Defendants move to dismiss Count IV, for aiding and abetting, Count VIII, for assault, and Count IX, for battery, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs acknowledge these Counts fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and should be dismissed. Accordingly, the court will dismiss Counts IV, VIII and IX of Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Count III - Substantive Due Process

Count III of Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts a substantive due process violation, arguing that "[s]tate and local officials may be held liable for an injury suffered as a result of a 'state created danger.'" Gonzales v. City of Camden, 357 N.J. Super. 339, 493 (App. Div. 2003). Defendants move to dismiss this count asserting that Plaintiffs' claim is barred by qualified immunity, and further argue Plaintiffs fail to satisfy either of the two exceptions under Due Process—a special relationship or a state-created danger.

The New Jersey Civil Rights Act authorizes a private right of action for civil rights claims against "a person acting under color of law." N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). In relevant part, the Act provides:

Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this States, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.

N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2(c).

The New Jersey Civil Rights Act is modeled after § 1983. See Am. Humanist Ass'n v. Matawan-Aberdeen Reg'l Sch. Dist., 440 N.J. Super. 582, 590 (Law Div. 2015). Courts, therefore, apply the same "elements of a substantive due process claim ...