D. Savage, LLC v. City of Detroit

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D. SAVAGE, LLC, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DETROIT, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 21-cv-11242

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

October 31, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING COUNT IV [ECF NO. 88]

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I. Introduction

On April 27, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (the “complaint”) [ECF No. 28]. It alleges eight counts. Counts I- IV allege various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983:

1. Count I: First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment retaliation (dismissed);

2. Count II: Fourth Amendment Excessive Force;

3. Count III: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement (dismissed);

4. Count IV: Fourth Amendment Unlawful Search and Seizure.

Counts V-VIII alleged claim and delivery, conversion, trespass, and nuisance under Michigan law and have been dismissed. The complaint names as Defendants the City of Detroit (dismissed), the Wayne County Sheriff's Office (dismissed) U.S. Department of Homeland Security Officer Sean Williford (dismissed), and 15 Detroit police officers.

Before the Court is Defendant's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Count IV [ECF No. 88]. Plaintiff responded on April 13, 2023 [ECF No. 90] and Defendant replied on April 19, 2023 [ECF No. 91]. Upon review of the parties' briefs and applicable authority, the Court concludes oral argument will not aid in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve this motion [ECF No. 88] on the briefs. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs in this case include D. Savage, LLC (the “Savage Facility”)-a marijuana facility that operated at 4473 W. Jefferson Ave. in Detroit-and various members of its staff: Cotea Jones, Jeanne Walsh, Jabari Currie, Curtis Williams, Travis Davison, and James Frazier. The factual background pertaining to this Motion is stated in the Court's previous Opinion and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I; and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II. See ECF No. 96. The Court incorporates it by reference. As a result of this Court's previous rulings, only Count II (as asserted by Plaintiffs Williams and Walsh against Defendants Anderson and Benavides) and Count IV remain. Count IV is the subject of Defendants' motion presently before the Court.

On May 29, 2018, Agent Wilford submitted an Affidavit for Search Warrant for the Savage facility. The same day, a Judge of the 36th District Court of Wayne County, Michigan authorized the search warrant. It stated: “[t]o be seized, secured, tabulated and recorded on a return according to law” the following: “Marijuana plants or other controlled substances, imitation controlled substances, narcotics proceeds, items in connection with the sale, manufacture, use, storage, distribution, transportation, delivery, or concealment of controlled substances.” [ECF No. 42-1, PageID.516]. Plaintiffs say, inter alia, that Defendant Officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant by allegedly confiscating and destroying millions of dollars of Savage's marijuana operations equipment and products. [ECF No. 28, PageID.388]. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced the present action.

Defendants previously filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Count IV [ECF No. 34], though its docket entry was labeled as a “Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.” On January 4, 2023, this Court denied Officer Defendants' motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the narrow question of whether they exceeded the scope of the search warrant in destroying marijuana products and equipment. See ECF No. 83, PageID.1042. Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration of January 4, 2023, Order and For Leave to File Amended Summary Judgment Motion. In that motion, Defendants stated, inter alia, “if the Court will not reconsider, Plaintiffs' Count IV for Fourth Amendment Unlawful Search and Seizure should be subject to a summary judgment motion.” ECF No. 85, PageID.1068. The Court granted Defendants' motion to file a supplemental summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied. See ECF No. 87.

Defendants' Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Count IV argues that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that they have a constitutionally protected interest in marijuana “product” to support an unlawful search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 88, PageID.1098. Furthermore, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs produced no admissible evidence to support their allegations and “speculation” that any remaining Defendant personally caused property destruction. Id. As such, Defendants insist that Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to overcome Defendants' qualified immunity. Id. The Court will discuss the applicable law and analysis below.

III. Discussion

Since the officers had a warrant and none of them participated in the formulation of probable cause, the legality of the search is not in question. Count IV, as far as it remains at issue, pertains only to the issue of whether the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by destroying marijuana products and equipment, and whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). No genuine dispute of material fact exists where the record “taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Ultimately, the court evaluates “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences and view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]”. Henschel v. Clare Cty. Rd. Comm'n, 737 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 2013).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A)-(B). “A party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.” See id. 2010 amendment notes to subdivision (C).

“It is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., No. CV 20-10177, 2021 WL 4901685, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2021) (quoting Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the court may, inter alia, “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed- show that the movant is entitled to it.”

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields state and local officials from personal liability when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551 (2017). In reviewing a qualified immunity defense, the Court considers: (1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the constitutional right was so clearly established at the time in question that a reasonable official in the defendant's position would have known that he was violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015). (Brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs to address first considering circumstances of the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he/she confronted” in the case. Brosseau v Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,...