DaCosta v. DaCosta

2021 VI 11

DANIEL DaCOSTA, Appellant/Plaintiff, v. SELMA DaCOSTA, Appellee/Defendant.

S. Ct. Civ. No. 2019-0061

SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

Considered: March 9, 2021

June 15, 2021

For Publication

Re: Super. Ct. Di. No. 146/2012 (STX)

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Croix

Superior Court Judge: Hon. Jessica Gallivan

BEFORE: RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice.

APPEARANCES:

Martial A. Webster, Sr., Esq.

Law Office of Martial A. Webster, Sr.

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

Attorney for Appellant,

Kye Walker, Esq.

The Walker Legal Group

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HODGE, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 Appellant Daniel DaCosta appeals from the Superior Court's July 17, 2019 order, which awarded $3,098.70 in costs and attorney's fees to Appellee Selma DaCosta. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On August 20, 2012, Selma¹ filed a petition for divorce from her then-husband, Daniel. In her petition, Selma represented that Daniel did not contest the divorce, and that they had jointly executed a marital settlement agreement addressing all aspects of the dissolution of their marriage. The agreement provided for the Superior Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement by way of contempt proceedings. The Superior Court, in an August 24, 2012, order, accepted the marital settlement agreement and issued a decree of divorce.

¶ 3 Nearly seven years later, on February 1, 2019, the Superior Court received a letter from Selma dated January 30, 2019, in which she alleged that Daniel had violated the marital settlement agreement by failing to make monthly mortgage payments on their jointly owned real property located at 219 Estate Judith's Fancy, make timely tuition payments to their children's school, and pay property taxes. Selma further requested that the Superior Court order Daniel to comply with the agreement and hold him in contempt of court. On February 12, 2019, the Superior Court received a letter from Daniel, which requested that the court revise the settlement agreement to order the sale of the real property, with direction that the proceeds be used to satisfy the mortgage and outstanding property taxes. In his letter, Daniel further requested that Selma be ordered to reimburse him for doors he purchased for the property, certain repairs made to the property, and for certain charges made on their joint credit card.

¶ 4 The next day, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Daniel, and counsel appeared for Selma on April 8, 2019. The Superior Court construed the two letters as motions to respectively enforce and revise the settlement agreement, and ultimately held a hearing on May 29, 2019. Atthe hearing, Selma consented to reimbursement of Daniel for the cost of the doors and for the credit card charges. However, all other issues remained disputed, and the Superior Court took the matter under advisement after hearing evidence and arguments from both parties. Moreover, at the hearing, Selma requested that she receive an award of certain litigation costs² and attorney's fees if she were to prevail on her claim.

¶ 5 The Superior Court issued its decision in a June 5, 2019, order. In its decision, the Superior Court ruled in Selma's favor on all disputed issues and stated that it was granting Selma's motion for enforcement and denying Daniel's motion for modification. However, the Superior Court nevertheless included in the order a directive that Selma pay Daniel the monies that she had consented to reimburse him at the May 29, 2019, hearing.

¶ 6 In its order, the Superior Court also directed that Selma file an affidavit regarding costs and attorney's fees. Selma filed this affirmation on June 20, 2019, which requested an award of $3,098.70. Daniel filed an opposition to this request on June 25, 2019; however, in that filing, Daniel did not challenge the reasonableness of the requested $3,098.70 award for fees and costs. Rather, Daniel solely argued that Selma was not entitled to an award because she was purportedly not the prevailing party in the litigation, in that the June 5, 2019, order had ordered her to pay certain monies to Daniel.

¶ 7 The Superior Court, in a July 17, 2019, order, awarded Selma the full $3,098.70 she had requested. In doing so, the Superior Court expressly rejected Daniel's argument that Selma was not the prevailing party, emphasizing that the June 5, 2019, order had expressly granted Selma's motion and denied Daniel's motion, and that it only directed Selma to make those payments because she had consented to do so at the May 29, 2019 hearing. Daniel timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court on August 14, 2019. See V.I. R. APP. P. 5(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

¶ 8 Pursuant to the Revised Organic Act of 1954, this Court has appellate jurisdiction over "all appeals from the decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law[.]" 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code vests this Court with jurisdiction over "all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees, [and] final orders of the Superior Court." Because the Superior Court's July 17, 2019, order resolved all of the claims between the parties, it is a final judgment within the meaning of section 32(a), thereby conferring jurisdiction on this Court. Joseph v. Daily News Publishing Co., Inc., 57 V.I. 566, 578 (V.I. 2012).

¶ 9 This Court exercises plenary review of the Superior Court's application of law. Allen v. HOVENSA, L.L.C., 59 V.I. 430, 436 (V.I. 2013) (citing St. Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.I. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007)).

B. Prevailing Party

¶ 10 In its July 17, 2019, order, the Superior Court stated that it awarded attorney's fees pursuant to title 5, section 541 of the Virgin Islands Code. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that in civil cases other than non-frivolous personal injury actions, "there shall be allowed to the prevailing party in the judgment such sums as the court in its discretion may fix by way of indemnity for his attorney's fees in maintaining the action or defenses thereto." 5 V.I.C. § 541(b). In his appellate brief, Daniel renews his argument that Selma is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs because she is purportedly not the "prevailing party in the judgment" as that phrase is used in section 541(b).

¶ 11 The issue of what constitutes a prevailing party for purposes of section 541 is one of first impression for this Court, and on which other courts in the Virgin Islands have not spoken with a consistent voice. In one line of cases, courts have interpreted the phrase "prevailing party" quite narrowly, as effectively requiring a complete victory by one party on all issues to qualify for an attorney's fees award under section 541. See, e.g., Newfound Management Corp., General Partner of Newfound Ltd. Partnership v. Sewer, 34 F. Supp. 2d 305, 318 (D.V.I. 1999); Anderson v. Bryan, 58 V.I. 181, 186 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2013). This narrow reading of the phrase is consistent with federal case law strictly construing fee-shifting statutes to preclude attorney's fees awards in many instances. See, e.g., Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 2010); Tunison v. Continental Airlines Corp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1187, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kropp v. Ziebarth, 601 F.2d 1348, 1358 n. 27 (8th Cir. 1979); Srybnik v. Epstein, 230 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 1956). However, in another line of cases, the definition of "prevailing party" is far broader and permits attorney's fee awards to one party even when it would be precluded under federal case law, such as situations where both sides prevailed but one "was more successful." See, e.g., Isaac v. Crichlow, Super. Ct. Civ. No. 065/2012 (STX), 2016 WL 5468371, at *1 (V.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2016) (unpublished); Melendez v. Rivera, 24 V.I. 63, 66 (V.I. Super. Ct. 1988); Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Charley's Trucking, Inc., 20 V.I. 286, 299 (V.I. Super. Ct. 1984).

¶ 12 As with all questions of statutory interpretation, our inquiry begins with an analysis of the plain text of the statute - and, if the statutory text is unambiguous, will also end there. Haynes v. Ottley, 61 V.I. 547, 561 (V.I. 2014). Here, the phrase "prevailing party" is not defined in section 541. The Legislature has instructed that "[t]echnical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to their peculiar and appropriate meanings." 1 V.I.C. § 42. As the above cases demonstrate, there is no clear consensus as to the meaning of "prevailing party" in the law. See also Merriweather Post Business Trust v. It's My Amphitheater, Inc., No. 2594, 2020 WL 4530659, at *25 & n.19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 20, 2020) (unpublished) (summarizing the different approaches jurisdictions have taken to determine who is the prevailing party in litigation). This is further reflected in the definition of "prevailing party" used in Black's Law Dictionary, which has not been consistent and has changed over the years. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "prevailing party" as "[t]he party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not necessarily to the extent of his original contention") with BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "prevailing party" as "[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded").

¶ 13 Since the term "prevailing party" is ambiguous, we next turn to legislative intent. "[I]t is axiomatic that where we can determine the intent of the Legislature in enacting a statute, we are required to read the statute to carry out that legislative intent." Duggins v. People, 56 V.I. 295,...