Dahlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

LILLIAN L. DAHLIN, an individual, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-cv-00554-PAB-GPG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

March 29, 2021

Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 85] and plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 86]. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff began working for plaintiff's predecessor bank in 1986. See Docket No. 86 at 3, ¶ 1. That bank became a part of Wells Fargo in 1986. See Docket No. 85 at 3, ¶ 1. For a short time, plaintiff worked as a teller before moving to the consumer lending side and then to the business lending side of the company. See Docket No. 86 at 3, ¶ 2. She was in this role until her termination on April 29, 2016. Id. At the time of her termination, she was a Senior Business Relationship Manager. Id. The duties of a relationship manager are to "bring in deposits and loans and then cross-sell other bank products, such as treasury management [and] credit cards." See Docket No. 85 at 3,¶ 2. Relationship managers' performance was measured by "new loan production, deposit production, partner proxy revenue, solutions as a percentage of target, and loan/deposit growth as a percentage of target." Id., ¶ 3. Sales goals were set nationally based on title, not based on the market in which a particular relationship manager was working. Id. at 4, ¶ 4. Defendant admits that product sales goals were eventually eliminated. See Docket No. 91 at 7, ¶ 16.

Beginning in 2008, one of plaintiff's markets, oil and gas, began to decline as a result of the global recession. See Docket No. 86 at 4, ¶ 5. Defendant was aware that oil and gas production had begun to decline, and at least one supervisor noted that 2009 was a difficult year. See id., ¶¶ 5-7; Docket No. 87 at 4-5, ¶¶ 5-7. In 2013, plaintiff's performance began to suffer. See Docket No. 85 at 5, ¶¶ 11-12. She did not meet "any of her sales goals in 2013" and received a two out of five rating, with five being the highest. Id., ¶ 12. In her 2014 performance review, plaintiff only met her partner proxy goal. See id. at 5-6, ¶ 13. She again received a two out of five performance rating in 2015. Id. at 6, ¶ 14. On July 27, 2015, defendant placed plaintiff on a performance improvement plan. Id., ¶ 15. Plaintiff admits that she did not the meet performance standards required by the plan. Id. Plaintiff continued to fail to meet standards and was given an informal performance warning on December 15, 2015 due to a "continued lack of sales performance production." Id., ¶ 16. Plaintiff, however, was not the only relationship manager who failed to meet his or her goals; relationship managers in the Resort Market, Grand Junction, and Durango all failed to meet their goals. See Docket No. 86 at 6, ¶¶ 14-17. While plaintiff was failing to meet her goalsin 2015, two of plaintiff's clients were transferred to another relationship manager due to "regulatory issues and compliance concerns." See Docket No. 85 at 5, ¶ 10. This was part of a broader strategic restructuring of defendant's business. See Docket No. 86 at 6-7, ¶ 19.

By mid-December 2015, plaintiff was aware that she was likely going to be terminated. See Docket No. 85 at 6-7, ¶ 18. She began exploring unemployment insurance in November or December of 2015. Id. at 7, ¶ 19. On March 2, 2016, defendant gave plaintiff a formal performance warning for failing to meet her goals for loans, proxy goals, and deposits, of which she had met 0% of her target goals. See id., ¶ 20. Between 2014 and 2015, plaintiff only met one sales goal, that for "[p]artner [p]roxy" in 2014. Id., ¶ 21. In April 2016, Sam Inman and John Hostetter, two of plaintiff's managers, in conjunction with human resources, decided to terminate plaintiff's employment. See id. at 4-5, 7, ¶¶ 8, 23. Plaintiff was terminated on April 29, 2016. See Docket No. 86 at 3, ¶ 2.

On February 12, 2018, plaintiff filed suit in the District Court for Garfield County, Colorado. See Docket No. 1-1 at 1. Defendant removed the case to this Court on March 8, 2018. See Docket No. 1. On March 25, 2019, the Court dismissed plaintiff's second cause of action for denial of benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") § 502(a), as well as dismissed Wells Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo & Company Salary Continuation Pay Plan from the case. See Docket No. 68 at 13. Therefore, plaintiff has one remaining claim, that for interference with an employee's rights to benefits under ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. See id. at 5-8; seealso Docket No. 31 at 6. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, each arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Docket Nos. 85-86.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if, under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Faustin v. City & Cty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).

Where "the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). "Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter." Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.1994). The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quotations omitted). "To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case." Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Cross-motions for summary judgment must be viewed separately, and the denial of one does not necessitate the granting of the other. United States v. Supreme Court of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906-07 (10th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Section 510 makes it "unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140. "To establish a prima facie case under ERISA § 510, [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to which the [plaintiff] may become entitled." See Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 1184, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Once a prima facie case is made, defendant "must produce admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its] challenged actions." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Then, plaintiff is required "to demonstrate that this reason was pretextual." Id. (citation omitted). Although anemployee's termination is coded as "for cause," if the termination was characterized as such simply for the purpose of unlawfully denying severance benefits, an employer has violated § 510. See Dahlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 18-cv-00554-PAB-GPG, 2019 WL 1358845, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2019) (collecting cases).

A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the only reason for plaintiff's termination was her "poor performance over a multi-year period." See Docket No. 85 at 14. Plaintiff argues that, while it is undisputed that defendant's stated reason was her poor performance, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant's real reason to terminate her, namely, "to eliminate business bankers in the Western Slope and Resort market region,' and to avoid paying her severance benefits. See Docket No. 88 at 16. The Court agrees with plaintiff that there are genuine issues of material fact and a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant intended to deprive plaintiff of her severance benefits.

The undisputed evidence in the record is: (1) plaintiff failed to meet performance goals from 2013 to 2016; (2) plaintiff would have been entitled to sixteen months of severance pay had her position been eliminated; (3) other relationship managers failed to meet their goals; and (4) plaintiff was fired, rather than severed as a result of her position being eliminated. Standing alone, this evidence might support summary judgment in favor of defendant. The critical issue, however, is that plaintiff has put material evidence in dispute regarding defendant's intent.

Plaintiff may rely on "indirect proof that an adverse employment action was motivated by an intent to interfere with employee benefits protected by ERISA." See Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff relies on the following...