Dale v. Jurdegan

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DAMETRI DALE, Plaintiff, v. FNU JURDEGAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23CV282

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

November 3, 2023

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOE L WEBSTER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on several motions: Plaintiff Dametri Dale's “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction Order” (Docket Entry 7); Plaintiff's “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, and to Serve on all Defendants the Amended Complaint, Affidavits of Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law, Proposed Order to Show Cause, and Notice of Duty to Preserve Evidences” (Docket Entry 8) Plaintiff's “Motion for Class Action Determination” (Docket Entry 12); and Plaintiff's “Motion for Copies of the Amended Complaint, Affidavits of Plaintiffs, Memorandum of Law, Notice of Duty to Preserve Video Footages and Evidences, Without the Prepayment of Fees” (Docket Entry 13). For the reasons below, the undersigned will deny Plaintiff's request for copies, and will recommend Plaintiff's remaining motions be denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner currently housed at Scotland Correctional Institution (“SCI”), filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations and state law claims against Defendants FNU Jurdegan, FNU Barnes, FNU Brit, FNU Broady, FNU Nelly, FNU Simmons, FNU Hafeez, and Warden Stephen Jacobs. (See generally Complaint, Docket Entry 2.)^[1] In his Complaint, Plaintiff essentially asserts that Defendants: (1) ignored his complaints regarding the condition of his prison cell which has caused Plaintiff serious physical injury; (2) improperly restricted Plaintiff and other inmates' access to clean clothing, clean linen, and other personal hygiene items (including shaving and haircuts) against prison policy; (3) improperly punished Plaintiff and others by restricting canteen, phone and visitation privileges; (4) denied Plaintiff access to “law materials” on the tablets provided by SCI, and limited Plaintiff's writing material; and (5) unlawfully engaged in the use of excessive force on Plaintiff by use of pepper spray. (See id. at 8-13.)^[2] It appears that most, if not all, of the alleged violations involve incidents while Plaintiff was housed in the restrictive housing unit for control purposes, which Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have confused with restrictive housing for “disciplinary purposes.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff lists claims for excessive force, denial of access to the courts, conditions of confinement, due process violations, cruel and unusual punishment, and assault. (Id. at 6, 15.)

The record reflects that shortly after Plaintiff proceeded beyond initial screening, he filed his first motion requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Docket Entry 7.) Approximately one month later, Plaintiff filed another motion seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and to serve Defendants with several documents including the Amended Complaint. (Docket Entry 8.) The latter motion was filed simultaneously with Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (and other documents) and appears to be based on said amended pleading. (See Docket Entries 9-11.) As noted in a recent Order, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was withdrawn prior to the Court's review, therefore this matter is proceeding on the original Complaint. (See Text Order dated 10/31/2023.) For that reason, Plaintiff's second motion for injunctive relief should be denied as moot. The Court will nevertheless address Plaintiff's original request for injunctive relief.

In his original motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, Plaintiff seeks an order: (1) prohibiting the restriction of writing materials and access to tablets necessary for litigation of his civil and criminal cases; (2) prohibiting Defendants from restricting Plaintiff's access to clean clothing and linen; (3) allowing Plaintiff to clean his cell weekly; and (4) prohibiting Defendants from restricting Plaintiff's canteen access. (See generally Docket Entry 7.)

DISCUSSION

1. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order^[3] must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), overruling Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).^[4] A party must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 345-46. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20-22; Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347. Only then does the Court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the favor of the party seeking the injunction. See Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346-47. Finally, the Court must pay particular regard to the impact of the extraordinary relief of an injunction upon the public interest. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 23-24). Injunctive relief, such as the issuance of a preliminary injunction, is an extraordinary remedy that may be awarded only upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); see also MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation omitted) (a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remed[y] involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances”).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing for preliminary injunctive relief. At this point in the proceedings Plaintiff has not made a “clear showing” that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Regarding any denial of written materials or access to legal research on a tablet, Plaintiff does not show actual injury to demonstrate the likely success on a claim for denial of access to the courts. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (denial of access to the courts requires prisoner to identify an actual injury resulting from official conduct). Indeed, any argument about hinderances in being able to move forward in his legal proceedings as a result of a lack of writing materials and access to a tablet is belied by Plaintiff's filings in this matter alone.^[5] Further, neither in his Complaint nor his motion does Plaintiff point to an unfavorable decision in any pending actions that resulted from the alleged conduct here.^[6] See McGurgan v. Harman, No. 2:20-CV-00173, 2021 WL 772728, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 29, 2021) (“[T]he Complaint and motion do not provide factual allegations that indicate any actual hindrance with Plaintiff's filings in this . . . court, much less any ‘actual injury' such as the loss of a motion, dismissal of an action, or entry of sanctions against Plaintiff in any of his pending actions.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-00173, 2021 WL 770595 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 26, 2021). Ultimately, Plaintiff has not shown preliminary injunctive relief is warranted considering that courts should only grant such relief “involving the management of correctional facilities only under exceptional and compelling circumstances,” id., and that “sweeping intervention in the management of state prisons is rarely appropriate when exercising the equitable powers of the federal courts,” Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 1994).

As to Plaintiff's remaining concerns regarding prison conditions in which he seeks injunctive relief, he also fails to demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits of a conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff contends that the lack of access to clean clothing and linen, the cell conditions, and the canteen restrictions on ordering hygiene products all require immediate attention. (Docket Entry 7 at 6-10.) “The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,' applies to claims by prisoners against corrections officials challenging conditions of confinement.” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (2019) (citations omitted). This “imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement . . . [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). However, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and as often may be the case, some conditions that are “restrictive and even harsh . . . are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Thus, “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Eighth Amendment condition of confinement claims are evaluated by a two-part test that has both an objective and subjective component. Porter, 923 F.3d at 355. “First the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). To be “sufficiently serious,” “a prison official's...