Dale v. Knopp

231 W.Va. 88

743 S.E.2d 899

Steven O. DALE, Acting Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent Below, Petitioner

v.Benjamin M. KNOPP, Petitioner Below, Respondent.

No. 12–0202.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 16, 2013.

Decided May 17, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “ ‘The standard of appellate review of a circuit court's order granting relief through the extraordinary writ of prohibition is de novo.’ Syl. Pt. 1, Martin v. West Virginia Division of Labor Contractor Licensing Board, 199 W.Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 (1997).” Syl. Pt. 1, Miller v. Hare, 227 W.Va. 337, 708 S.E.2d 531 (2011).

2. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

3. “ ‘In giving effect to the plain language contained within W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(e), a person pleading guilty or found guilty by a court or jury of driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs, shall be considered ‘convicted,’ and the [DMV] Commissioner has a mandatory duty to revoke the person's license to operate a motor vehicle in the State of West Virginia as provided by W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(a).' Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Stump v. Johnson, 217 W.Va. 733, 619 S.E.2d 246 (2005).” Syl. Pt. 2, Harrison v. Comm'r, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 226 W.Va. 23, 697 S.E.2d 59 (2010)

4. “ ‘In the absence of any definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used.’ Syllabus point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee–Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170 W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982).” Syl. Pt. 4, West Virginia Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Weaver, 222 W.Va. 668, 671 S.E.2d 673 (2008).

5. “Generally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).

6. “ ‘Where a statute is of doubtful meaning, the contemporaneous construction placed thereon by the officers of government charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, and will not be disregarded or overthrown unless it is clear that such construction is erroneous.’ Syllabus Point 7, Evans v. Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975).” Syl. Pt. 4, Hawkins v. West Virginia Dept. of Public Safety, 223 W.Va. 253, 672 S.E.2d 389 (2008).

7. “The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction, and we are obliged to reject administrative constructionsthat are contrary to the clear language of a statute.” Syl. Pt. 5, CNG Transmission Corp. v. Craig, 211 W.Va. 170, 564 S.E.2d 167 (2002).

8. West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d) (2010) operates to preclude a mandatory license revocation upon conviction pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a only if a driver has already completed a prior, actual period of revocation for the same offense.

Patrick Morrissey, Esq., Attorney General, Janet E. James, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

Richard D. Smith, Jr., Esq., Parkersburg, WV, for Respondent.

WORKMAN, Justice:

Petitioner/respondent below, Steven O. Dale, Acting Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter “the Commissioner,” or “DMV,” as appropriate),¹ appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County's January 3, 2012, order granting respondent/petitioner below, Benjamin Knopp's (hereinafter “Mr. Knopp”) petition for writ of prohibition and dissolving the DMV's previous revocation of his drivers' license. The Commissioner asserts that the circuit court erred in its application of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d) (2010) to reverse the license revocation; specifically, the Commissioner argues that this statute operates only to prohibit license revocation after a revocation for the same offense has previously been effectuated and the license subsequently reinstated. The Commissioner asserts that the circuit court erroneously applied the statute to prohibit a mandatory revocation where a previous order of revocation, stayed pending an administrative hearing, was rescinded due to lack of evidence at the administrative hearing.

Upon careful review of the briefs, the appendix record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable legal authority, we find that the circuit court erred in granting the writ of prohibition and, therefore, reverse the order of the circuit court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 2, 2007, Mr. Knopp was arrested and charged with first offense driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter “DUI”). Upon receipt of information from the arresting officer, on January 11, 2007, the DMV notified Mr. Knopp that his license would be revoked for six months pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1 (2004),² effective February 15, 2007, unless a timely, written request for an administrative hearing was made. Mr. Knopp timely requested an administrative hearing, which was subsequently scheduled for April 23, 2007; as a result of the request for a hearing, the impending revocation was stayed by operation of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–2(a) (2004).³ At the hearing, the arresting officer did not appear; as a result, the Commissioner entered an order on May 11, 2007, concluding that, as a result of the failure of the officer to appear, “[t]he evidence in this matter does not prove” that Mr. Knopp drove under the influence and “[a]ccordingly, the Order of Revocation heretofore entered in this matter must be rescinded.” The order then “reversed” the order of revocation and dismissed the case.

Eleven days later, on May 22, 2007, Mr. Knopp pled guilty to DUI. The magistrate clerk provided the DMV with notice of the guilty plea, whereupon the DMV again notified Mr. Knopp, this time pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a (2004), that his license would be revoked for six months, effective October 31, 2007. Mr. Knopp claims that he did not receive this order of revocation, but only learned of it nearly four years later during a traffic stop in the summer of 2011.⁴

On October 21, 2011, Mr. Knopp filed a petition for writ of prohibition, requesting that the circuit court prohibit the revocation on the basis of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d) (2010),⁵ which provides: “The provisions of this section shall not apply if an order reinstating the operator's license of the person has been entered by the commissioner prior to the receipt of the transcript of the judgment of conviction.” The circuit court found that the Commissioner's May 11, 2007, order “rescind[ing]” the previous administrative revocation served to “reinstate” Mr. Knopp's license and that subsequent revocation was prohibited by operation of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d). Accordingly, the circuit court effectively granted the writ of prohibition and entered an order dissolving the revocation order and reinstating Mr. Knopp's license. It is from this order that the Commissioner now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘The standard of appellate review of a circuit court's order granting relief through the extraordinary writ of prohibition is de novo.’ Syl. Pt. 1, Martin v. West Virginia Division of Labor Contractor Licensing Board, 199 W.Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 (1997).” Syl. Pt. 1, Miller v. Hare, 227 W.Va. 337, 708 S.E.2d 531 (2011). Moreover, “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

III. DISCUSSION

The Commissioner makes only one assignment of error. He asserts that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d) to the administrative revocation of Mr. Knopp's license upon notice of his guilty plea. The Commissioner asserts that West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d) serves only to prevent a driver from twice having his or her license revoked for the same offense; after a license has been revoked and reinstated, it cannot then be revoked again. The Commissioner contends that when the initial revocation order was “rescinded,” respondent's license was not then “reinstated” as that term is used in the statute; rather, the impending revocation was simply abrogated and, as a result of the stay, was never effectuated. He argues that “reinstatement” of a license contemplates an actual period of revocation, at the end of which certain conditions must be met, i.e. completion of classes, payment of fees and costs, etc., before the license is “reinstated.”

Mr. Knopp counters that “reinstatement” is defined as “to restore”; therefore, after the Commissioner rescinded the revocation, his license was “restored” or “reinstated.” As such, he argues that the plain language of West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(d) precludes the Commissioner's attempted revocation upon notice of conviction. He argues further that the Commissioner's May 11, 2007, order was “final” ⁶ and therefore not subject to a subsequent revocation.⁷

An administrative drivers' license revocation is triggered as the result of one of two occurrences: 1) a written statement to the DMV from an investigating officer that a DUI has been committed, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1; or 2) notice to the DMV that a person has pled to or been convicted of DUI, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a. After a DUI arrest, West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1 requires an officer to provide a “Statement of Arresting Officer,” to the DMV, which then triggers a license revocation pursuant to...