Dalessandro v. Quinn-Dalessandro

225 N.E.3d 643

2023 IL App (1st) 211119

William P. DALESSANDRO, Anthony Dalessandro, and Michelle C. Dalessandro, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Judith QUINN-DALESSANDRO and Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., Defendants

(Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., Defendant-Appellee).

No. 1-21-1119

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, SIXTH DIVISION.

Filed January 13, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 2017 CH 14705, Honorable Caroline Kate Moreland, Judge Presiding.

Kevin M. Lyons and Stephanie E. Kopalski, of Lyons Law Group, LLC, of Downers Grove, for appellants.

Michael J. Flaherty and Christopher L. Gallinari, of Flaherty & Youngerman, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs William P., Anthony, and Michelle Dalessandro are the adult children of the decedent, Dr. William Dalessandro (William). Following their father’s death and them discovery that they no longer stood to inherit a substantial portion of his assets, plaintiffs sued their stepmother, defendant Judith Quinn-Dalessandro, individually and as the trustee of them father’s trust. Plaintiffs alleged that in the final years of his life, Judith exerted undue influence over William, who suffered from dementia, to alter his trust and make her the beneficiary of substantially all of his considerable assets. Plaintiffs alleged that them father’s signature on the amended and restated trust document was a forgery and sought as their sole remedy the invalidation of that instrument. Their complaint was filed one week before the deadline established by the probate court for the filing of claims against William’s estate.

¶ 2 Over a year later, plaintiffs amended them complaint to add claims against the law firm that assisted William and Judith in preparing them estate documents, defendant Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. (Chuhak), for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, aiding and abetting Judith’s wrongful conduct, and civil conspiracy. The circuit court granted the firm’s motion to dismiss the claims against it as untimely under section 13-214.3(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13- 214.3(d) (West 2016)). The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the amended complaint related back to the filing of their initial complaint on the basis that it would not have been objectively evident to Chuhak from plaintiffs’ initial allegations that, but for a mistake of identity, it should have been named as a defendant. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider that dismissal, concluding both that plaintiffs’ new arguments based on fraudulent concealment and equitable tolling were forfeited and that plaintiffs hud failed to establish that the court incorrectly applied the law regarding the relation-back doctrine.

¶ 3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court’s dismissal of these claims as untimely.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Plaintiffs are the three children of the decedent, William, who retired in 2005 after a career as a successful cardiologist. Following his divorce in 1983 from plaintiffs' mother, William hired Judith as a live-in nanny for plaintiffs, who at the time were seven, five, and two years old. Until approximately 2003, one or more of the children still lived with William in the family home. Judith stayed on after their departure as a caregiver to William, who was then 79 years old, and in 2008 William and Judith married. William died on December 24, 2016, at the age of 92.

¶ 6 A. Plaintiffs’ Initial Communications With Chuhak

¶ 7 On January 19, 2017, Mitchell Weinstein, a lawyer at Chuhak, sent a letter to plaintiffs stating, "I am one of the attorneys that worked with your father on his estate plan documents, since 2010." Mr. Weinstein explained that his firm represented Judith—as the executor of William’s estate and as his successor trustee—and enclosed a copy of the "Second Amendment and Restatement of Trust," executed by William on May 27, 2012 (the 2012 Amended Trust). Mr. Weinstein assured plaintiffs that, as the sole trustee and beneficiary, William was, "during his lifetime, in total control over all trust assets." He explained to them that the trust was comprised of two separate trusts, a marital trust and a family trust, and that Judith had "an unlimited right of withdrawal as to any assets in the marital trust" and could also withdraw from the family trust during her lifetime "for her education, health, maintenance and support."

¶ 8 Although "all of the trusts created by virtue of [William’s] death [were] set up for the benefit of Judy," Mr. Weinstein went on, she was willing to allow $4 million to pass to plaintiffs if they agreed not to challenge their father’s estate documents. Mr. Weinstein also pointed out that Judith could, at her sole discretion, provide them with annual gifts of up to $14,000 without incurring gift taxes. Mr. Weinstein explained that trust assets did not pass through probate and told plaintiffs he did not believe that a probate of William’s will would be necessary, though he noted that this could change if assets were found in William’s name. He encouraged them to be patient, noting that estate tax returns would need to be filed and that "these things take time *** 1-2 years, and sometimes longer than that."

¶ 9 Plaintiffs retained counsel and, three months later, on April 11, 2017, wrote Mr. Weinstein back asking him to immediately provide them with "the original William Dales[s]andro Trust dated September 1984, the First Restatement and Second Restatement." Enclosed with Mr. Weinstein’s response two days later was another copy of the 2012 Amended Trust, which Mr. Weinstein maintained was "the only pertinent document," as well as certain pages from the original William Dalessan- dro Declaration of Revocable Trust Dated September 12, 1984 (the 1984 Trust) and the first restatement, which he explained were included merely to demonstrate that "those documents exist[ed], and that [William] had the right to amend, restate, and revoke the trust" under both documents.

¶ 10 Plaintiffs have alleged that their counsel thereafter "made an appointment with Chuhak to obtain a complete copy of the documents" and, on April 18, 2017, were briefly seen at Chuhak’s offices before being sent away. They maintain that during this brief meeting Chuhak refused to provide complete copies of William’s estate planning documents or describe William’s assets.

¶ 11 B. Probate Proceedings

¶ 12 Judith, represented by Chuhak, initiated probate proceedings on April 18, 2017. In re Estate of Dalessandro, No. 2017-P-2542 (Cir. Ct. Cook County). William’s last will and testament was admitted to probate on May 5, 2017, and pursuant to section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/8-1(a) (West 2016)), the deadline to contest the will was six months later, on November 5, 2017. Letters of office appointing Judith as the representative of William’s estate were also issued on May 5, 2017, and on May 25, 2017, a statutory notice of publication was filed announcing November 11, 2017, as the deadline for bringing claims against the estate.

¶ 13 C. Plaintiffs’ Initial Complaint

¶ 14 Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in this matter on November 3, 2017. They asked the circuit court to set aside the 2012 Amended Trust as the product of forgery, undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud and named Judith, as trustee and a beneficiary of the trust, as the sole defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that beginning in approximately 2008, Judith began limiting William’s contact with them and persuaded him to stop seeing medical providers or taking prescribed medications, something plaintiffs insisted their father, as a former cardiologist, would not have done absent her undue influence. They alleged that Judith also informed Anthony in 2014 or 2015 that William had decided to sell the condominium Anthony was living in, something William had told plaintiffs he never intended to do.

¶ 15 Plaintiffs further alleged that at the time the 2012 Amended Trust was executed, William suffered from Alzheimer’s disease and Judith was his nurse and caregiver. They alleged "on information and belief," that Judith "transported [William] to [his] attorneys’ office for purposes of changing his trust documents to her advantage" and that the resulting amendment to the trust gave "all or substantially all of [William’s] assets to [Judith]." They alleged that William’s signature on the 2012 Amended Trust was "not his signature" and that the document was "forged." Later in the complaint, however, they alleged that William’s signature was "either (a) obtained at a time when [he] did not have the capacity to sign said document; (b) was executed by a third party ***; [or] (c) was obtained in order to leave all or substantially all of the deceased’s assets to [Judith]." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs asserted that, "with the intent to defraud [them] of their share of the Trust," Judith "used her influence over [William] to change his Trust at a time when [she] knew [he] did not have the mental capacity" to do so.

¶ 16 D. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

¶ 17 Plaintiffs retained new counsel and on March 6, 2018, were granted leave to file a "Verified Amended Complaint" asserting additional causes of action arising from their allegations but naming no additional defendants. In that amended com- plaint, filed on April 20, 2018, plaintiffs sought damages from Judith individually and not just the invalidation of the trust; reframed their fraud claims as ones for declaratory relief; and added claims for lack of capacity, tortious interference with an expected inheritance, unjust enrichment, a constructive trust, an accounting, and punitive damages. Plaintiffs also added a significant number of new substantive allegations detailing them relationships with them father, Judith’s history with the family, and Judith’s role as William’s caretaker and eventual spouse. They...