Dalfio v. Cuatro Caballeros LLC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

[DOC. NO. 12]

HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

On July 1, 2021, Plaintiff Victor Dalfio (“Plaintiff”) filed a First Amended Complaint against Cuatro Caballeros LLC and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, “Defendant”) pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. (“ADA”) and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq. (“Unruh Act”). See Doc. No. 7 (“FAC”). Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Doc. No. 12. Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendant replied. See Doc. Nos. 13, 14. The Court found the matter suitable for disposition on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.

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I. Background

Plaintiff has had two hip replacements and as a result, has difficulty walking and standing, and requires a cane or walker for mobility. See FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff also “has gout that causes acute pain in his feet.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that he is a disabled person under the ADA and the Unruh Act. See id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant owns the real property located at 510 E. San Ysidro Blvd., San Diego, CA 92173 (the “Property”), which operates as “ABC Money Exchange” (the “Business”). Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff states that the Property is newly constructed or otherwise underwent remodeling or repairs after January 26, 1992, yet fails to comply with California access standards, which were in effect at the time of construction. See id. ¶ 12.

Plaintiff alleges that he visited the Property on two separate occasions in December 2020 and March 2021 with the intent to patronize the Business. See id. ¶ 13. However, Plaintiff claims he was unable to do so because Defendant “did not offer persons with disabilities with equivalent facilities, privileges, and advantages offered by Defendant[] to other patrons.” See Id. ¶ 14. Thus, Plaintiff alleges fifteen (15) separate violations of the ADA and the California Building Code. See Id. ¶ 20. For example, in the parking area, Plaintiff draws attention to the lack of designated disabled parking spaces, lack of signage, and pavement distresses. See id.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in LaSalle Nat'l Trust, NA v. Schaffner, 818 F.Supp. 1161, 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1993). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Cal. ex rel. Younger v. Andrus, 608 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1979)). Subject matter jurisdiction must exist when the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization,

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858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 538 (1824)). Further, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised “at any stage of the litigation.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).

A facial attack on jurisdiction asserts that the allegations in a complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In resolving a facial challenge to jurisdiction, a court accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)).

III. Discussion

Based on the fifteen alleged accommodation deficiencies, Plaintiff brings two causes of action: (1) violation of the ADA; and (2) violation of the Unruh Act. See FAC at 24-29. The parties appear to agree that the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. See FAC ¶ 8; Doc. No. 12 at 3. Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff alleges that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim because it arises from the same nucleus of operative facts and transactions as his ADA claim. See FAC ¶ 9.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Doc. No. 12 at 3. Specifically, Defendant asks the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). See id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

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state law claim if one of the following exceptions applies:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Courts also consider “judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants” when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties.” Id.

Defendant contends there are compelling reasons to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 12-1 at 5. Defendant argues “Plaintiff is a ‘high-frequency litigant'” as evidenced by the over thirty “access lawsuits” Plaintiff has filed in this year alone. See Id. at 2. Defendant also draws attention to the Court's previous order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a separate lawsuit filed by Plaintiff. Id. at 2 (citing Dalfio v. SECVD & I, Inc., No. 21-CV-929-MMA (AGS), 2021 WL 4197203 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2021)). Defendant suggests that Plaintiff is intentionally evading the heightened pleading standards for Unruh Act claims in state court by filing his lawsuit in federal district court. See Doc. No. 12-1 at 4. The Court agrees.

As the Court explained in SECVD & I, Inc., the California legislature codified heightened pleading requirements for Unruh Act claims, namely, mandating greater pleading specificity, as well as requiring verification of the complaint. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.50. In 2015, California imposed further requirements on “high frequency litigants, ” including a one thousand dollar ($1, 000) filing fee. Cal. Gov't Code § 70616.5. These unique pleading requirements were imposed in order to “deter baseless claims and vexatious litigation, ” an issue of particular importance in California because of the unique availability of statutory damages available under the Unruh Act. See Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F.Supp.3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017). California has a

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substantial interest in implementing statutory schemes aimed at deterring vexatious litigation and easing the financial burden the Unruh Act imposes on California businesses. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Mac, 411 F.Supp.3d 1108, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2019); see also Schutza, 262...