Dalrymple v. Dalrymple

Kevin Dalrymple v. Sandra Dalrymple

No. TTDFA094011134S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Rockville

November 17, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

John B. Farley, J.

The plaintiff, Kevin Dalrymple, has moved to enjoin the defendant, Sandra Dalrymple, from enforcing a judgment of dissolution entered in the state of Washington on August 13 2010, arguing that the Washington court's entry of judgment was improper because that court was required to give full faith and credit to the judgment of dissolution entered nearly one year earlier in this case. The defendant asserts that the Washington court's judgment entered properly because this court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment on August 20, 2009 and Washington was not required to give full faith and credit to an invalid judgment. The defendant also moves to open and vacate this court's 2009 judgment. As explained below, this court concludes that it lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment beyond the dissolution of the parties' marriage, whereas the Washington court had jurisdiction over the entire controversy. While it was required to respect this court's dissolution of the marriage, the Washington court had the authority to enter the financial orders included in its judgment. Consequently, the court denies the plaintiff's motion. The court also grants the defendant's motion to open the 2009 judgment and vacates those aspects of the judgment that exceeded the scope of the court's jurisdiction. The balance of the judgment, merely dissolving the marriage, is a valid and enforceable judgment.

FACTS

The plaintiff commenced an action for dissolution through service of process upon the defendant on April 25, 2009. The defendant, a resident of the state of Washington, was served in hand with a copy of the complaint and an order of notice by a registered process server in Washington. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff resided in the state of Connecticut for at least twelve months before filing for divorce, and that the marriage broke down irretrievably after he relocated to Connecticut. The defendant did not appear or contest the action.

On August 20, 2009, the court, Klaczak, J., rendered a default judgment during an uncontested dissolution proceeding after finding that the defendant had received notice of the action and was not actively serving in the military service. The " Plaintiff's Settlement, " ^[1] dated August 20, 2009, was incorporated into the judgment by reference ordering in relevant part that the parties shall be responsible for their own debts and liabilities, that neither party shall pay alimony to the other, that each of the parties is responsible for half of an IRS debt incurred during the marriage and that " [t]he [p]arties shall each retain any and all retirement accounts in their respective names, free and clear from any interest or claim from the other."

A Connecticut state marshal served the defendant with a copy of the dissolution judgment, certified mail, return-receipt requested, on September 4, 2009. Thereafter, the " green card" was signed and returned to the court, and is part of the court record.

More than six years later, on January 5, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for injunction (Entry #303) seeking to enjoin the defendant from enforcing a Washington dissolution judgment entered on August 13, 2010. The defendant, having knowledge of the Connecticut action commenced on April 25, 2009, had proceeded to commence her own dissolution proceeding in the state of Washington on May 7, 2009. Mr. Dalrymple hired a Washington attorney to contest the Washington action by way of a motion to dismiss. The Washington court denied that motion on June 12, 2009. The Washington action proceeded to trial and Mr. Dalrymple participated telephonically in that trial as a self-represented party. He again objected to the Washington court's refusal to recognize and yield to the first-filed Connecticut action, which had gone to judgment almost one year before the Washington case went to trial.^[2] The Washington court then entered judgment on August 13, 2010. The judgment entered in that court conflicts with the judgment entered in this court in one critical respect. The Washington judgment awards to the defendant in this case, Sandra Dalrymple, ^[3] fifty percent of the portion of Mr. Dalrymple's military retirement that accrued during the marriage. Under the Connecticut default judgment, Ms. Dalrymple received no share of Mr Dalrymple's military retirement benefit. In his January 5, 2016 motion, Mr. Dalrymple claimed that the Washington court, by entering judgment, had failed to fulfill its obligation to give full faith and credit to the prior Connecticut judgment. On that basis, the plaintiff asked this court to enjoin the defendant from seeking to enforce the Washington judgment.

On January 18, 2016, the defendant filed a " Declaration in Response to Motion for Injunction." ^[4] The sworn declaration asserts that the defendant did not actually receive service of process notifying her of the Connecticut dissolution action in 2009. This court has found, to the contrary, that Ms. Dalrymple was served in hand with the Connecticut action on April 25, 2009.

Nevertheless in her declaration, the defendant also maintained that the Connecticut Superior Court could not assert jurisdiction in this matter for any purpose beyond dissolving the marriage. In particular, she maintained that Connecticut did not have in personam jurisdiction over her because she had never resided in Connecticut and had continuously resided in the state of Washington throughout the marriage. Consequently, she maintained, Connecticut had no jurisdiction to render decisions on spousal maintenance and the division of the parties' assets and liabilities. She had taken the same position in opposing Mr. Dalrymple's motion to dismiss the Washington action. Ms. Dalrymple also made the point that the plaintiff had actively participated in the Washington proceeding and had failed to notify the Connecticut court of the pendency of that action.

On January 28, 2016, the plaintiff filed a " Verified Motion for Injunction, " (Entry #306) which appears identical in all material respects to the January 5, 2016 motion with the exception that it includes Mr Dalrymple's oath verifying the accuracy of the statements included in the motion. No action was taken on either of the plaintiff's motions, presumably because the plaintiff chose not to pursue them. On March 21, 2017, however, the plaintiff filed another verified motion for permanent injunction (Entry #307), again seeking to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the Washington judgment.

While the March 21, 2017 motion referenced Mr. Dalrymple's initial attempt to obtain a dismissal of the Washington action, that attempt had preceded the entry of judgment in Connecticut. There was no record of an attempt by Mr. Dalrymple to enforce the Connecticut judgment in Washington and, rather than enjoin the enforcement of another state court's judgment, this court ruled that the plaintiff should first present his claims to the court in Washington. On that basis, on April 6, 2017, this court denied the March 21, 2017 motion and did not reach the other issues raised by the motion. The plaintiff timely filed a motion to reargue (Entry #308) on April 25, 2017. In his motion to reargue, the plaintiff asserted that he had in fact filed the Connecticut judgment in the Washington court and had sought to enforce that judgment when the case in Washington was tried. On April 25, 2017, the court granted the motion to reargue, scheduled a hearing to permit the presentation of evidence on all matters at issue, and identified several issues the parties should be prepared to address.

In his March 21, 2017 motion, the plaintiff again maintains that this court had jurisdiction to enter a full dissolution judgment, including orders on spousal support and property distribution, against the defendant on August 20, 2009. First, the plaintiff maintains that the defendant was properly served in hand by an authorized process server on April 25, 2009 and, therefore, was obliged to appear and respond to the action. The plaintiff also claims to have satisfied the constitutional requirement that there exist minimum contacts between an individual and a state before a state court exercises jurisdiction over that person. He bases that contention on the fact that the defendant retained the services of a state marshal to serve process on the plaintiff to commence her Washington dissolution action. Moreover, on the date of dissolution, this court, Klaczak, J., made findings of actual notice, statutory compliance, and nonmilitary service, and the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to enter the proposed judgment. The plaintiff asserts further that the defendant consented to jurisdiction, notwithstanding her failure to appear, by filing papers in opposition to the plaintiff's postjudgment motions. For all these reasons, the plaintiff maintains that the Connecticut judgment is a valid judgment in all respects. Because the Connecticut judgment was a valid judgment that preceded the entry of judgment in Washington, according to the defendant, it was entitled to full faith and credit in Washington and the defendant should be enjoined from enforcing the Washington judgment.

On May 25, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to " dismiss/set aside/vacate the Decree of Dissolution" in this case accompanied by a. memorandum of law and a complete, certified copy of the Washington dissolution file. In her memorandum, the defendant claims that she was never served with process in the Connecticut action, that the individual identified in the marshal's return was...