Dalton v. Dalton

551 S.W.3d 126

Bart DALTON, Petitioner,

v.Carol DALTON, Respondent

No. 17–0155

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 27, 2018

Opinion delivered: June 29, 2018

Ms. Kaye M. Alderman, and Mr. Robert T. Cain, Jr., for respondent.

Ms. Michelle May O'Neil, and Ms. Ashley Bowline Russell, for petitioner.

Justice Boyd delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, Justice Devine, Justice Brown, and Justice Blacklock joined.

This appeal challenges trial-court orders enforcing an agreed spousal-support obligation. An Oklahoma court first entered an order approving and incorporating the parties' agreements. When the husband later filed for divorce in Texas, the wife filed the Oklahoma order in the Texas court. The Texas court granted the divorce, incorporating the parties' agreements as approved in the Oklahoma order, and later issued various post-divorce orders to enforce the former husband's obligations. The former husband argues that the court cannot enforce his spousal-support obligation by wage withholding or by an assignment of his retirement benefits to his former wife. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.

We agree with the former husband on both points. We reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment that the wage-withholding order and the order assigning retirement benefits to enforce unpaid spousal support are void.

I.Background

For 150 years, the State of Texas rejected post-divorce alimony as contrary to public policy. Francis v. Francis , 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967).¹ But Texas courts often approved voluntary spousal-support agreements and incorporated those agreements into divorce decrees. Id. at 33. Although courts could enforce those agreements if the paying spouse failed to perform as promised, the obligation remained an agreed duty enforceable as a private contract, rather than a court-ordered duty enforceable as a judgment. Id.²

In 1995, the Texas Legislature first authorized courts to award a form of involuntary post-divorce alimony referred to as "spousal maintenance." See TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.001(1) (defining maintenance as "an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other spouse."). But Chapter 8 of the Family Code allows spousal-maintenance awards only under "very narrow" and "very limited circumstances." McCollough v. McCollough , 212 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) ; Cardwell v. Sicola–Cardwell , 978 S.W.2d 722, 724 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied). The former spouse must be "eligible" to receive spousal maintenance;³ the "duration"⁴ and "amount"⁵ of the payments must not exceed specified limits; the obligation must automatically terminate upon certain events;⁶ and the court must consider a wide variety of factors to "determine the nature, amount, duration, and manner of periodic payments."⁷

Chapter 7 of the Family Code continues to encourage divorcing parties to amicably settle their disputes by agreeing to any spousal-support obligations. TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.006(a). But Texas law distinguishes between court-ordered spousal-maintenance awards under Chapter 8 and court-approved voluntary obligations under Chapter 7. See generally In re Green , 221 S.W.3d 645, 647–48 (Tex. 2007) ; Ex parte Hall , 854 S.W.2d 656, 656–57 (Tex. 1993). In particular, spousal-maintenance awards are enforceable as court judgments while agreed spousal-support obligations constitute debts enforceable only as a contract. Green , 221 S.W.3d at 647.⁸ Chapter 8's enforcement provisions apply only to spousal-maintenance orders that a court enters "on the authority" of Chapter 8 and that meet that chapter's "other requirements." Id. at 647–48.⁹

By contrast, the State of Oklahoma treats court-approved spousal-support agreements as judgments, not as mere contractual obligations. Dickason v. Dickason , 607 P.2d 674, 678 (Okla. 1980). When an Oklahoma court approves a voluntary support agreement and incorporates it into a court order, the agreement "merges into the decree" and is "extinguished by force of law." Id. at 677. As a result, the parties' rights and obligations "cease to be contractual" and instead are "governed and become enforceable as a judgment." Id. The obligation, although voluntarily created, no longer constitutes a debt and becomes enforceable by contempt and other judgment-enforcement methods. Potter v. Wilson , 609 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Okla. 1980).

In this case, an Oklahoma court entered an order approving and incorporating Bart and Carol Dalton's separation agreement. The Oklahoma order approved the Daltons' agreements regarding child custody and support, division of their marital property and debts, spousal support, attorney's fees, and costs. Regarding spousal support, the Oklahoma order required Bart to pay Carol "support alimony" of $6,060.25 per month until he had paid $1,309,014.00. Regarding property division, the order assigned "all right, title, and interest" in one-half of Bart's 401(k) and profit-sharing plans to Carol. After the Oklahoma court entered the agreed order, Bart and Carol separated, Carol moved to Texas, and Bart later followed. Bart filed for divorce in a Texas court. Carol filed a counterpetition for divorce and filed the Oklahoma order with the Texas court.

Before the Texas court rendered a final divorce decree, it entered a summary-judgment order declaring that the Oklahoma order constitutes "a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit by the Texas Courts."¹⁰ It also found that Bart was in arrears on his support obligations and held him in contempt. The court issued a wage-withholding order requiring Bart's employer to withhold some of his earnings to satisfy his monthly child-support and support-alimony obligations. It later entered a "qualified domestic relations order" (commonly called a "QDRO") making up for some of Bart's arrearages by assigning Carol an additional interest in Bart's retirement accounts.

Bart and Carol's divorce was made final in 2011. Consistent with the earlier summary judgment, the Texas court's final divorce decree incorporated the Oklahoma order approving the parties' agreement. Neither Bart nor Carol challenged the final divorce decree.

Soon after the final decree, Carol alleged that Bart continued to fall short on his support-alimony obligations. In response to Carol's post-divorce motions, the Texas court entered an additional QDRO to enforce Bart's spousal-alimony obligations, assigning Carol additional interests in Bart's retirement accounts. The court also denied and dismissed Bart's motions to terminate and vacate the earlier wage-withholding order. Ultimately, the court again found Bart in contempt and entered a judgment awarding Carol $269,665.19.

Bart appealed, challenging (1) the order finding him in contempt, (2) the final QDRO, and (3) the order dismissing his motion to vacate the wage-withholding order. While his appeal was pending, the trial court conducted an additional hearing, ordered Bart to forty-five days' confinement if he did not pay the arrearages, and entered a first-amended QDRO increasing the amount awarded to Carol from Bart's retirement accounts. Bart supplemented his notice of appeal to include both of these orders. The court of appeals modified the judgment to reduce the amount of Bart's arrearages but otherwise affirmed. 2017 WL 104639, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017). Bart petitioned for our review, challenging the trial court's wage-withholding order and the amended QDRO,¹¹ and we granted his petition.

II.Wage Withholding

Bart argues that the trial court erred by ordering his employer to withhold a portion of his wages to satisfy his spousal-support obligations. We agree that the trial court erred because Texas law does not permit wage withholding in this case, and the fact that an Oklahoma court first entered the agreed support order does not change that result.

The Texas Constitution prohibits the garnishment of current wages for personal service, "except for the enforcement of court-ordered" child-support payments or "spousal maintenance." TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.¹² Chapter 8 of the Family Code expressly allows a court to order "that income be withheld from the disposable earnings" of a spouse in "a proceeding in which periodic payments of spousal maintenance are ordered, modified, or enforced." TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.101(a).¹³ The statute thus permits wage withholding, but—consistent with the constitutional prohibition—only to enforce a court-ordered obligation that qualifies as "spousal maintenance." See, e.g. , Kee v. Kee , 307 S.W.3d 812, 813 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (explaining that Chapter 8 allows wage withholding only "for spousal maintenance payments ordered thereunder"). Here, the Oklahoma order neither orders spousal maintenance nor approves an agreement to pay spousal maintenance.

Carol argues that Bart's support-alimony obligation constitutes spousal maintenance because section 8.001(1) defines "maintenance" as an award of payments by one spouse "for the support" of the other. TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.001(1). Bart agreed to pay alimony under Oklahoma law, and according to Carol, "there is no real difference between 'alimony,' as ordered here by the Oklahoma court, and 'spousal maintenance' within the meaning of the Texas constitution," because both involve a spouse's payments "for the support" of the other.

We have explained, however, that although Chapter 8 "broadly define[s]" the term maintenance, an order requiring spousal support does not award "spousal maintenance" under Chapter 8 unless it complies with the statute's eligibility, duration, termination, and other requirements. Green , 221 S.W.3d at 647. Here, neither the Texas trial court nor the Oklahoma court found—nor does the record reflect—that Carol was eligible for spousal maintenance under Chapter 8. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.051 (describing eligibility...