Daly v. Westchester Cnty. Bd. of Legislators

DANTE EDOARDO DALY, Plaintiff, v. WESTCHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF LEGISLATORS, Defendant.

19-CV-04642 (PMH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Dante Edoardo Daly ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action against his former employer, the Westchester County Board of Legislators ("BOL"), pressing various claims associated with his termination in March 2018.

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on May 20, 2019. (Doc. 2, "Compl.").¹ On February 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") with leave of the Court. (Doc. 33, "FAC"). Days later, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), the operative pleading at this juncture. (Doc. 35, "SAC").² The SAC alleges that the BOL discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (2) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; (3) the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; (4) the NewYork State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.; (5) the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), New York City Admin. Code § 8-101, et seq.; and (6) "All Applicable New York State Laws." (Id. at 4). The specific disability (or perceived disability) underlying Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are "Severe Musculoskeletal Disorder[,] lumbar disc disease, coronary artery disease, [and] osteoarthritis of the bilateral hips." (Id.).

The BOL filed its motion to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on April 3, 2020. (Doc. 42; Doc. 45, "Def. Br."). Plaintiff opposed the motion by an e-mail dated on May 2, 2020 (Doc. 55, "Opp. Br."), and the motion was briefed fully with the filing of the BOL's reply on May 26, 2020 (Doc. 53, "Reply Br.").³

For the reasons set forth below, the BOL's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's tenure as the BOL's employee began on September 29, 2014. (SAC at 9). Plaintiff was hired by Michael B. Kaplowitz ("Kaplowitz"), then Chairman of the BOL, to serve as the BOL's Director of Fiscal Affairs. (Id. at 9, 23). Plaintiff alleges that he was hired as an "at will" employee and served "at the pleasure of the BOL Chairman . . . ." (Id. at 9; but see id. at 23 (noting that Plaintiff served "at the pleasure of the Legislature," not the Chairman)). In this capacity, Plaintiff recounts that he had two supervisors: (1) Kaplowitz; and (2) Kaplowitz's Chief of Staff, Gary Friedman ("Friedman"). (Id. at 9; but see id. at 23 (advising that Plaintiff "report[ed] directly to the Chairman")). The appointment was intended to last ten years. (Id. at 9).

As Director of Fiscal Affairs, Plaintiff "serv[ed] as a direct conduit of information to the Chairman and the full Board from any relevant institutional entity, resident[,] and communityadvocate that would [i]mpact the fiscal condition of Westchester County." (Id.). Plaintiff maintains that he prepared financial analyses for the BOL, took "initiative" in reviewing the municipality's contracts, "work[ed] collaboratively on . . . a bipartisan budget coalition," recommended ways to "trim[] . . . budgets and increase revenue," and raised "sharp questions during weekly" meetings. (Id. at 9-11). Throughout his employment, Plaintiff "was never criticized for . . . lack of financial analysis skill[s] . . . by any County employee." (Id. at 9). Furthermore, while Plaintiff never received "a formal evaluation" regarding his performance, he insists that "Kaplowitz reviewed [his] performance on an ongoing basis and" that both Kaplowitz and the BOL's senior staff celebrated his professional contributions. (Id. at 9-10). In fact, Plaintiff maintains that Kaplowitz "had nothing but praise for [his] weekly . . . questions, financial performance analysis, County financial condition analysis, financial statement analysis, and financial analytics on behalf of [the] BOL." (Id. at 10). Plaintiff was "cheered" and "hugged" by coworkers, and there was speculation he would be named the Westchester County Budget Director. (Id. at 12-13).

Despite Plaintiff's stellar performance, he alleges that he reckoned with myriad health issues. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that—while in the BOL's employ—he was "diagnosed with a herniated disc and stenosis" in 2015 and with "Severe Musculoskeletal Disorder" in 2017. (SAC at 11; see also Compl. at 11).⁴ Plaintiff's health conditions caused him to experience "10+ cylinder of pain wrapping around [his] lower back, both hips, buttocks, anus, anal canal, and scrotum," and would manifest physically at the office as "heavily drenched shirts at work, paleness, [and]irregular breathing . . . ." (SAC at 12). As a result of these conditions, Plaintiff received "steroid injections from March 2017 through February 2018." (SAC at 12; see also Compl. at 12). Notwithstanding these obstacles, Plaintiff "had outstanding attendance and . . . productivity" for over three years and saved taxpayers "millions of dollars." (SAC at 12).

Nevertheless, faced "[w]ith increasing pain" and anticipating spinal fusion surgery in August 2018, Plaintiff requested "a closed[-]door meeting" with Friedman during "[t]he third week of December 2017" to inform his employer about his medical issues. (Id.; see also Compl. at 12). At that meeting, Plaintiff provided Friedman with the "exact information . . . regarding [his] 10+ pain and need for Spinal Fusion Surgery" and explained that he intended to "us[e] all of [his] . . . leave for upcoming steroid injections, doctor's appointments, and . . . surgery in August 2018 . . . ." (Compl. at 12; see also SAC at 12; Opp. Br. at 3). During this conversation, Friedman told Plaintiff that he would "inform the new Chief of Staff," Dennis Power ("Power"), about Plaintiff's medical issues and leave requests. (SAC at 12; Def. Br. at 4 (acknowledging that Power was the "new Chief of Staff")). Sometime thereafter, Benjamin Boykin ("Boykin") replaced Kaplowitz as the BOL Chairman and Power replaced Friedman as Chief of Staff. (See SAC at 13; Def. Br. at 4).

On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff met with Boykin and Power to discuss the duties associated with Plaintiff's position. (SAC at 14). According to Plaintiff, Boykin and Power tried to "pressure" Plaintiff into admitting that he was unable to "perform job duties requiring additional transportation and additional transportation physical strain." (Id.). Those duties, specifically, were "attending two 8 am monthly meetings as a guest with instructions not to speak, and [two] meetings requiring travel as a guest with instructions not to speak . . . ." (Id.). Under Kaplowitz's leadership, Plaintiff was able to perform these duties successfully not by attending the meetings physically but by "reviewing meeting minutes[] and having senior staff discussions . . . ." (Id.). Although theadditional travel associated with attending those meetings would cause "physical strain," given Plaintiff's ability to comply with his obligations through the modified approach permitted under Kaplowitz, Plaintiff refused to concede that he was unable to perform the duties of his position. (Id.). At some point that same day, Power tried to punch Plaintiff in the face, but Plaintiff blocked the blow. (Id. at 13). Sometime in February 2018, Plaintiff took eight days' leave as a result of contracting the flu. (Id. at 16; Opp. Br. at 4). Upon his return, Plaintiff avers that he faced unspecified "hostility" from Boykin. (SAC at 16).

On March 1, 2018, less than one month after Plaintiff refused to admit that he could not perform certain duties required of the Director of Fiscal Affairs, he was terminated. (Id. at 14). While Boykin acknowledged that Plaintiff had been with the BOL "a long time," he concluded that Plaintiff "lack[ed] the financial analysis skills" necessary for the position. (Id. at 14). Power, for his part, stated that the BOL was "going in a different direction" and that they would "see the reaction of [Plaintiff's] termination." (Id. at 15). During that same meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Power made a comment to the effect that Plaintiff's continued health insurance after termination "was critical." (Id.). The termination was effective as of 5:00 p.m. that day. (Id.).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion enables a court to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard isnot akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations pled "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the Court must "take all well-ple[d] factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff[]." Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). The presumption of truth, however, "'is inapplicable to legal conclusions,' and '[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of...