Daniel v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Case No. 14-1270 (RJL/GMH)

174 F.Supp.3d 532

Laranda Daniel as Parent and Next Friend of M.H., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Case No. 14-1270 (RJL/GMH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 30, 2016

Filed March 31, 2016

Robert Wilson Jones, James E. Brown & Associates, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Aaron Josiah Finkhousen, Laura George, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

On February 17, 2016, Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey issued a Report and Recommendation [Dkt. # 18] with respect to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 12] and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 14]. Under Local Rule 72.3(b), the parties had fourteen days after being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation to file written objections to the proposed recommendations. To date, no written objections have been filed. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation, the lack of objections filed thereto, and the entire record herein, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Dkt. # 18] filed in this case on February 17, 2016 is ADOPTED in its entirety; it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion summary judgment [Dkt. # 12] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part ; it is further

ORDERED that defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 14] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part ; it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $11,762.43 and an additional $63.48 in costs; and it is further

ORDERED that this case is dismissed.

SO ORDERED .

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G. MICHAEL HARVEY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter was referred to the undersigned for full case management. Plaintiff Laranda Daniel is the parent of plaintiff M.H., a child protected by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Plaintiffs filed this action to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred while litigating claims under the IDEA at the administrative level. Before the undersigned are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. After reviewing the entire record,¹ the undersigned recommends that the Court grant in part and deny in part both parties' motions.

BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff M.H. is approximately 8 years old. Pl. Mot., Ex. 2 at 1. He attends school within the District of Columbia Public Schools system (“DCPS”). Pl. Mot., Ex. 1 at 2. Plaintiff Laranda Daniel is his mother. Id. at 1. This case primarily concerns the 2012–2013 school year, when M.H. was in kindergarten. Pl. Mot., Ex. 2 at 4. During that year, M.H. experienced numerous behavioral difficulties, including repeated tardiness and suspensions for inappropriate and disrespectful behavior. Id. at 5–6. These behavioral problems began impacting his academic progress as the school year continued. See id. at 9–10.

On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs filed an administrative due process complaint against DCPS pursuant to the IDEA. Pl. Mot., Ex. 1. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that DCPS denied M.H. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) when it failed to identify, locate, and evaluate him as a child with a disability despite declining behaviors and the fact that M.H. had demonstrated no academic progress during the 2012–2013 school year. Id. Plaintiffs requested the following relief in their administrative due process complaint:

(1) that DCPS provide independent comprehensive psychological, social history, speech-language, occupational therapy, and functional behavioral assessments of M.H. and any other assessments reasonably recommended by the independent assessments;

(2) alternatively, that DCPS convene a student evaluation plan meeting regarding M.H.;

(3) that DCPS fully comply with the “child find” provisions of the IDEA;

(4) that DCPS convene a meeting within ten days of receiving the last of the independent assessments identified above in order to review the assessments, determine M.H.'s eligibility for special education and related services, and, if needed, develop an individualized education plan (“IEP”) for M.H. as well as any compensatory education that may be due M.H.;

(5) that DCPS convene a manifestation determination meeting³ and make an appropriate determination or, alternatively, that the hearing officer order that the behaviors causing M.H.'s suspensions are manifestations of his suspected disability;

(6) that DCPS implement an appropriate behavioral intervention plan (“BIP”);

(7) that DCPS award reasonable compensatory education for the violations committed against M.H.; and

(8) that DCPS pay plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

Id. at 6–7. In her decision of November 13, 2013, the hearing officer stated that during the course of the administrative proceedings, plaintiffs also requested forty hours of independent counseling with a behavior therapist or social worker and thirty-six hours of academic tutoring. Pl. Mot., Ex. 2 at 14–15. The hearing officer also noted that in her testimony at the hearing, plaintiff Laranda Daniel explained that she wanted the assessments to be made independently because she distrusted DCPS. Id. at 15.

On October 10, 2013, the parties met to engage in settlement negotiations. Pl. Mot., Ex. 3 at 1. Prior to that meeting, plaintiffs' fee invoice submitted in connection with their motion for summary judgment in this case bears only one entry billed on that same day as the settlement negotiations, a charge of. 67 hours for preparation for the negotiations. Id. Plaintiffs, in their fee invoice, do not charge for the. 5 hours expended during the settlement meeting itself. Id.

Also on October 10, 2013, and presumably at the settlement meeting, DCPS made an offer of settlement to plaintiffs in an effort to resolve all their claims brought in the administrative due process complaint. Pl. Opp., Ex. 1. DCPS offered the following settlement terms: (1) DCPS would conduct a comprehensive psychological assessment of M.H., which would include cognitive and educational components as well as analysis of social history, a speech and language assessment, an occupational therapy assessment, and a functional behavioral assessment, all within forty-five school days from the date of the agreement; and (2) DCPS would convene, within thirty school days of the completion of the final evaluation report resulting from the assessments, an IEP meeting to review the assessments and determine whether M.H. is eligible for special education services and develop an IEP and BIP, if necessary. Id. at 2. The offer of settlement did not include any provision for payment of plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs. See id.

The hearing officer assigned to the case held an administrative hearing on October 29, 2013, to hear evidence and argument concerning plaintiffs' administrative due process complaint. Pl. Mot., Ex. 2 at 2–3. On November 13, 2013, the hearing officer issued her hearing officer's determination (“HOD”). Id. at 1. The HOD identified three issues raised in plaintiffs' administrative due process complaint: (1) whether DCPS failed to timely evaluate M.H. upon his parent's oral request for evaluation in October 2011; (2) whether DCPS failed to identify, locate, and evaluate M.H. during the 2012–2013 school year despite the suspicion that M.H. had emotional and behavioral disabilities which impacted his education; and (3) whether DCPS failed to conduct a manifestation determination meeting after M.H. was suspended for ten days during the 2012–2013 school year. Id. at 3.

The hearing officer found in plaintiffs' favor on only one of the three issues raised in the complaint. Id. at 7–14. The hearing officer denied relief as to the first issue. Id. at 7–8. While plaintiff Laranda Daniel testified at the hearing that she made an oral request for her son to be evaluated sometime during 2011, the principal testified that no such request was ever made. Id. at 8. In light of the squarely conflicting testimony, the hearing officer found that plaintiffs had failed to establish their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

As to the second issue, the hearing officer found that DCPS denied M.H. a FAPE when it failed to identify him as a student with disabilities impacting his education during the 2012–2013 school year. Id. at 12. The hearing officer observed that federal “child find” regulations obligate DCPS to identify, locate, and evaluate students with educational disabilities. Id. at 9. To trigger that duty, DCPS need only have a “suspicion of a disability rather than actual knowledge of a qualifying disability.” Id.(quotation marks and citations omitted). To succeed on a claimed violation of this duty, plaintiffs are required to show that “school officials overlooked clear signs of disability.” Id.

The hearing officer found that the District had violated its “child find” obligation with respect to M.H. as of May 14, 2013. Id. at 10. The hearing officer concluded that although DCPS had no reason to suspect M.H.'s disabilities earlier in the 2012–2013 academic year, by the end of that year DCPS had sufficient evidence to suspect that M.H. had disabilities which were negatively impacting his education. Id. at 11–12. Specifically, the hearing officer found that by May, M.H. had “not made measurable academic progress,” had “significantly declining work habits” and social skills, and had been sent to the principal's office for poor behavior three times. Id. at 12. Finding that M.H. was not “demonstrat[ing] progress” typical of a kindergartener, the hearing officer concluded that DCPS' “child find” obligation was triggered. Id. Because DCPS at no time initiated an evaluation of M.H.'s special education needs during that school year, the hearing officer found that DCPS denied M.H. a FAPE. Id.

On the third and final issue, the hearing officer concluded that plaintiffs had not met their...