Daniel v. Nat'l Cas. Ins. Co.

135 F.Supp.3d 355

Kara Daniel, Plaintiff

v.National Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG–13–1519

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed September 23, 2015

Filed September 25, 2015

Amy M. Orsi, Stephen Allen Markey, III, John B. Bratt, Towson, MD, for Plaintiff

Stacey Ann Moffet, Lauren Elizabeth Marini, Hanover, MD, for Defendant

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Marvin J. Garbis, United States District Judge

The Court has before it Defendant National Casualty Company's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 62], Plaintiff's Second Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 63], and the materials submitted relating thereto. The Court has held a hearing and had the benefit of the arguments of counsel.

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 2007, the husband of Plaintiff Kara Daniel ("Daniel") was killed in a truck-automobile collision in Queen Anne's County, Maryland. Daniel filed suit against the driver and others in this Court, seeking $10,000,000 in damages.

Daniel v. Hotchkiss Trucking, Inc. , No. 10–cv–2757–JKB (D.Md.).

The situation regarding insurance coverage for the defendants was complicated. Northland Insurance Company ("Northland") acknowledged that it had issued a $1,000,000 commercial trucking liability insurance policy that insured certain of the defendants and tendered its policy limits. National Casualty Insurance Company ("National Casualty") had issued a $750,000 policy to some of the defendants but claimed that the policy was not in effect at the time of the accident and refused to provide a defense or coverage for any defendant.

Daniel settled the underlying case, receiving the $1,000,000 policy limits of the Northland policy and also an assignment of any rights that Northland and any defendant she released may have had against National Casualty. Northland paid the settlement "on behalf of" these defendants. As part of the settlement, Northland and the settling defendants assigned to Daniel:

all of [their] rights, title and interest that [they] may have, whether in tort or contract for indemnification and/or contribution, for damages arising out of the accident that occurred on October 26, 2007 which is the subject of said lawsuit, including all claims against National Casualty Insurance Company [for] any failure on the part of National Casualty Insurance Company to defend or indemnify Derrick Hines, Aaron Hines, R & H Trucking, H & F Bros LLC, and/or BDH Trucking, Inc. in said Lawsuit.

[ECF No. 1–3].

On May 23, 2013, Daniel, as the assignee of Northland and others, filed the instant lawsuit against National Casualty for indemnification. Daniel filed an Amended Complaint on July 26, 2013 as the assignee of Northland, BDH, and three others—Aaron Hines, Derrick Hines and R & H Trucking, Inc.—who are collectively referred to herein as the Driver Group members. [ECF No. 22].

National Casualty filed a Motion to Dismiss. [ECF No. 30]. After a hearing on November 27, 2013, the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint. The Court stated at the hearing: "There is nothing in the [Amended] complaint that shows any basis to believe that any assignor of rights, other than Northland, was out of pocket or had any loss, or anything that they could claim against National Casualty." Hr'g Tr., Nov. 27, 2013, [ECF No. 47–2] at 3. The Court allowed Daniel to file a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") and instructed Daniel that she should explain "whatever the relationship is ... that puts National Casualty on the hook to pay indemnity or some kind of contribution." Id.

Daniel filed the SAC on January 3, 2014, alleging claims, as assignee, against National Casualty in two Counts:

• Count I—Indemnification for $1,000,000

• Count II—Contribution for $650,000

See [ECF No. 46].

National Casualty filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 47], and Daniel filed a Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 55].

In the Memorandum and Order issued September 29, 2014, [ECF No. 61] at 4–6, the Court stated:

The Court finds the parties' respective briefings inadequate. Both sides have submitted voluminous briefings that "incorporate by reference as if fully stated herein," all arguments made in previous filings....

Moreover, while Daniel contends that she is entitled to partial summary judgment, she does not specify which issue or issues on which she seeks summary judgment and those on which she does not.

Under the circumstances, the Court will deny the pending motions without prejudice and provide an opportunity for the parties to file new motions for summary judgment. However, the Court will require the parties, should they refile motions for summary judgment, to comply with the following:

....

• The parties shall address ...:

• The legal standards applicable to any common law indemnification and contribution claims;

• The relationship between R & H and H & F/BDH at the time of the October 26, 2007 accident;

• The intrastate or interstate nature of the National Casualty policy, with evidentiary support for their contentions; ...

• The parties shall clearly explain their respective positions as to the effect of the Notice of Cancellation that Prime Rate mailed to R & H (336A Cottonfield Court, Ayden, NC 28513) on 09/13/2007.

National Casualty filed the instant Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 62], and Daniel filed the instant Second Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 63].

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and supporting documents "show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The well-established principles pertinent to summary judgment motions can be distilled to a simple statement: The Court may look at the evidence presented in regard to a motion for summary judgment through the non-movant's rose-colored glasses, but must view it realistically. After so doing, the essential question is whether a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the non-movant or whether the movant would, at trial, be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir.1991).

Thus, in order "[t]o defeat a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present evidence of specific facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for him or her." Mackey v. Shalala, 43 F.Supp.2d 559, 564 (D.Md.1999)(emphasis added). However, "self-serving, conclusory, and uncorroborated statements are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Int'l Waste Indus. Corp. v. Cape Envtl. Mgmt., Inc. , 988 F.Supp.2d 542, 558 n. 11 (D.Md.2013); see also Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 Fed.Appx. 279, 281 (4th Cir.2008).

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must bear in mind that the "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' " Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).

III. BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Case Defendants

In October 2007, H & F Bros., LLC, ("H & F"), a Wisconsin commercial trucking company, was hired to transport a shipment of goods from Landsdowne, Pennsylvania to Raleigh, North Carolina. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Hotchkiss Trucking, Inc.s (sic) Motion for Summary Judgment at 5,Daniel v. Hotchkiss Trucking, Inc., No. 10–cv–02757–JKB (D.Md.) [ECF No. 106–1]. H & F subcontracted the assignment to R & H Trucking, Inc. ("R & H"), a North Carolina company owned by Aaron Hines ("Aaron").

R & H obtained the truck involved in the accident, a 1997 Freightliner tractor—truck, power unit, or cab—as lessee from Basic Trucking, Inc., ("Basic Trucking"). Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") [ECF No. 46] at ¶ 15. The truck was subleased by R & H to H & F. SAC ¶ 11. A Ryder cargo trailer was attached to the tractor that "was leased and provided by Hotchkiss Trucking, Inc., [ ("Hotchkiss") ] to H & F ... and R & H." SAC ¶ 11.

At the time of the accident, the truck with trailer was driven by Derrick Hines, an employee of R & H. The driver's side door of the truck was labelled "R & H, Inc. Trucking" and contained the North Carolina address and telephone number of R & H. There also was a placard on the truck that stated "Lease to H & F Bros, LLC" and contained H & F's motor carrier and Department of Transportation numbers. [ECF No. 55–10] at 10.

B. The Insurance

H & F obtained, and had in effect on the date of the accident, a commercial trucking liability insurance policy through Northland Insurance Company ("Northland") with a combined single limit liability in the amount of $1,000,000. [ECF No. 47–3] at 4. H & F required R & H to have commercial trucking liability insurance. R & H obtained a policy through National Casualty Insurance Company ("National Casualty") with a combined single limit liability in the amount of $750,000. [ECF No. 10–8] at 2. However, as discussed herein, the policy was not in effect on the date of the accident.

IV. DISCUSSION

As discussed herein, the Court grants summary judgment to National Casualty on the following grounds:

A. Plaintiff cannot prove that Northland sustained any loss by virtue of any action or inaction by National Casualty.

B. Plaintiff cannot prove that the National Casualty policy was in effect at the time of the accident and, even if it were in effect:

1. Plaintiff cannot prove that the Driver Group members were "insureds" under the Northland policy.

2. Plaintiff cannot prove

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