Daniels v. Amazon.com

DANTE DANIELS, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM INC, AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, LAST MILE DELIVERED, LLC, and SONSORREA McNAIR, Defendants.

No. 20-CV-3708 (MKB) (RML)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

September 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Dante Daniels commenced the above-captioned personal injury action against Defendants Amazon.com Inc, Amazon.com Services LLC (collectively "Amazon"), Last Mile Delivered LLC ("Last Mile Delivered"), and Sonsorrea McNair on July 9, 2020, by filing a complaint in New York Supreme Court, Richmond County. (Compl. ¶ 1, annexed to Notice of Removal as Ex. A, Docket Entry No. 1-1.) Plaintiff asserts negligence and related claims against Defendants^[1] arising out of "a severe collision between a 2018 Ford van bearing New York State license plate number 64001 ML, with an 'Amazon' logo prominently displayed on the exterior of the vehicle [(the "Amazon Delivery Van")] . . . and a motorbike operated by Plaintiff on June 15, 2019." (Id.) On August 14, 2020, Amazon removed the action to federal court invoking federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1332 and 1441, (Notice of Removal ¶ 6 Docket Entry No. 1), and on February 12, 2021, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings ("Defs.' Mot.") Docket Entry No. 23; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. Defs.' Mot. ("Defs.' Mem."), Docket Entry No. 23-1). On February 15, 2021, the Court referred Defendants' motion to Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy for a report and recommendation, (Order dated Feb. 15, 2021), and by report and recommendation dated July 22, 2021, Judge Levy recommended that the Court deny Defendants' motion, (the "R&R"), (R&R, Docket Entry No. 30). On August 5, 2021, Defendants timely filed objections to the R&R. (Defs.' Obj. to R&R ("Defs.' Obj."), Docket Entry No. 32.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R&R in its entirety and denies Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

I. Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts as set forth in the R&R and provides only a brief summary of the facts relevant to Defendants' motion.^[2]

a. Factual background

Plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against Defendants on July 9, 2020, asserting negligence claims arising from of a two-vehicle collision which occurred on June 15, 2019, in Richmond County, New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-40, 73-209.) At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was driving a 2017 Kawasaki motorbike and McNair was driving the Amazon Delivery Van within the scope of her employment for Amazon and Last Mile Delivered. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 28-31.)

At the time of the accident, McNair and Plaintiff were both heading west on Arlington Place, a residential street in Richmond County, New York. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 37.) McNair was driving in front of Plaintiff and operating the Amazon Delivery Van above the speed limit "at an unsafe and excessive rate of speed" in an effort to "complete her delivery schedule for the day, . . . [and] comply with Defendant Amazon's rules and regulations for Delivery Service Partners." (Id. ¶¶ 34-37.) As Plaintiff and McNair approached "the intersection of Arlington Place and Pond Way," McNair "suddenly, and without any warning or turn signals, abruptly braked and made a sharp left turn onto Pond Way," cutting Plaintiff off and causing a "violent collision" between the Amazon Delivery Van and the Plaintiffs motorbike. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.) Plaintiff was "knocked unconscious," "thrown off of his bike, and landed underneath the truck, getting dragged into the intersection." (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.)

After the accident, "Plaintiff was brought by ambulance to Richmond University Medical Center ('RUMC'), where he remained for ... [five] weeks," undergoing "multiple surgeries to repair the severe fractures in his hip, pelvis and orbital areas." (Id. ¶ 41.) Following his discharge from RUMC, Plaintiff was transferred to Kindred Hospital, in Dover, New Jersey, where he remained for another two weeks. (Id. ¶ 42.) Thereafter, "Plaintiff was transferred to New Vanderbilt Rehabilitation Care Center-Hospital," in Staten Island, New York, where he spent another three weeks. (Id. ¶ 43.) In total, Plaintiff spent ten weeks in the hospital as a result of the accident. (Id.)

After he was discharged from the hospital, Plaintiff began physical therapy at "Richmond Physical Therapy, PC, in Staten Island, New York" and continues to "receive[] rehabilitation from this facility." (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff alleges that "[a]s a direct result of the negligence of Defendants], [he] has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe, permanent and disabling injuries for the rest of his life." (Id. ¶ 46.) "At the time of the . . . accident, [Plaintiff] was employed at United Activities Limited as a counselor and had been so employed there since 2015" but he "has not been able to return to work since the date of the accident." (Id. ¶ 47.)

b, Report and recommendation

Judge Levy recommended that the Court deny Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that: (1) the Complaint "pleads sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss" as Plaintiff "alleges that [McNair] operated the delivery van in an unsafe manner, and that her abrupt braking and sharp left turn without a turn signal was a proximate cause of the collision," (R&R 4 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 38-39)); and (2) even if the Complaint "does establish that [P]laintiff violated the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law and was negligent per se, it does not establish that [Defendants have no liability for the collision," as under New York law "negligenceper se is not a complete affirmative defense to a claim of negligence," (id. at 5-6 (citing cases)).

c. Defendants'objections to the R&R

Defendants object to the R&R, arguing that "Plaintiffs negligence in this case was the sole proximate cause of the accident" and that although "negligence per se does not establish liability per se, where a finding is made that the plaintiffs negligent driving was the sole proximate cause of an accident, then [the] plaintiff must be found completely liable." (Defs.' Obj. 4.)

II. Discussion

a. Standards of review

i. Report and recommendation

A district court reviewing a magistrate judge's recommended ruling "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When a party submits a timely objection to a report and recommendation, the district court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected. Id.; see also United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 340 (2d Cir. 2015). The district court may adopt those portions of the recommended ruling to which no timely objections have been made, provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record. See John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Neuman, No. 15-CV-1358, 2015 WL 7459920, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015) (applying the clear error standard when no objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation were filed). The clear error standard also applies when a party makes only conclusory or general objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2) ("[A] party may serve and file specific written objections to the [magistrate judge's] proposed findings and recommendations."); see also Colvin v. Berryhill, 734 Fed.Appx. 756, 758 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[M]erely referring the court to previously filed papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection under ... Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)." (quoting Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002))); Benitez v. Parmer, 654 Fed.Appx. 502, 503-04 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that "general objection[s] [are] insufficient to obtain de novo review by [a] district court").

Whether clear error review or de novo review applies when an objecting party reiterates the arguments made to the magistrate judge is unclear. While the Second Circuit has suggested that clear error review is appropriate if a party's objection to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation repeats arguments already presented to and considered by the magistrate judge, see Mario, 313 F.3d at 766 ("Merely referring the court to previously filed papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)...."), the Second Circuit has more recently stated that it is "skeptical" that the clear error standard would be appropriate when the objection is based on a previously asserted argument, see Moss v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 516 519 n.2 (2d Cir. 2017) ("[W]e are skeptical that clear error review would be appropriate in this instance, where arguably 'the only way for [the plaintiff] to raise ... arguments [on that point] [was] to reiterate them.'" (third and fourth alterations in original) (first quoting Watson v. Geithner, No. 11-CV-9527, 2013 WL 5441748 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013); and then citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1))). See also Harewood v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ, No. 18-CV-5487, 2021 WL 673476, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) ("[W]hen the objections simply reiterate previous arguments or make only conclusory statements, the court should review such portions of the report only for clear error." (first citing Dickerson v. Conway, No. 08-CV-8024, 2013 WL 3199094, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013); and then citing Kirk v. Burge, 646 F.Supp.2d 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))); Castorina v. Saul, No. 19-CV-991, 2020 WL 6781078, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2020) ("While courts in this [district sometimes state that objections that 'simply reiterate [the] original arguments' merit only clear error review, this rule lacks support...