Daniels v. Becker

1

SIR-JAYMES DANIELS, Petitioner, v. CHRIS BECKER et al., Respondents.

No. 1:23-cv-877

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

September 11, 2023

OPINION

PHILLIP J. GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Sir-Jaymes Daniels is presently serving a sentence of six months' probation under the supervision of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). He has filed this action primarily seeking the dismissal of all criminal charges against him or, alternatively, the reexamination of his guilty plea and the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings with accommodations for his hearing- and communication-related disabilities. Accordingly, the Court has construed Petitioner's action as a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.^[1] In a separate order, the Court granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 4.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge ... may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative respondent's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351.

Rule 4 by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the petitioner. Because Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[2] Petitioner's consent is sufficient to permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review.

The Court conducts a preliminary review of the petition under Rule 4 to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Petitioner reports that he is hard of hearing and suffers from a “compound express communication disorder.” (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.15; ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) On March 1, 2022, Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227, and possession of a loaded firearm in or upon a vehicle, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6; ECF No. 1-1, PageID.16.) As early as March 18, 2022, and throughout the criminal proceedings against him, Petitioner made multiple requests that the court provide accommodations for his hearing- and communication-related disabilities; however, Petitioner did not receive any such accommodations. (Id.) As a result, Petitioner was unable to effectively communicate with his counsel, or prepare and participate in the proceedings against him. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)

Petitioner alleges that his case was scheduled for trial on May 23, 2023. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.20.) However, Petitioner's attorney appeared without trial materials and only the prosecutor's offer in hand. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) Petitioner contends that his counsel was unprepared, withheld evidence, and shared privileged information with the prosecution. (Id., PageID.6, 8, 11.) This, combined with the prosecution's threat of remand, led Petitioner to plead guilty to possession of a loaded firearm in or upon a vehicle. (Id., PageID.6, 8); Offender Tracking Information, https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=762843 (last accessed Aug. 29, 2023). Petitioner's plea was recorded on June 20, 2023. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.20.) Due to Petitioner's communication disorder, Petitioner was unable to adequately express to the court that Petitioner felt coerced into entering a guilty plea. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.)

Petitioner later filed a motion to withdraw his plea on August 11, 2023, but it appears that the motion was denied. (ECF No. 1, PageID.9.)^[3]

On August 16, 2023, Petitioner was sentenced to six months of probation under the supervision of the MDOC. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.20); Offender Tracking Information, https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=762843 (last accessed Aug. 29, 2023). Two days later, on August 18, 2023, Two days later, on August 18, 2023, Petitioner filed the present action, which the Court has construed as a habeas corpus petition. The petition raises 4 grounds for relief, as follows:

I. Violation ADA

II. Coercion and duress

III. Coercion via deceptive tactics

IV. Ineffective assistance of counsel

(ECF No. 1, PageID.6, 8, 9.)^[4]

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Exhaustion requires a petitioner to “fairly present” federal claims so that state courts have a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon a petitioner's constitutional claim. Id. at 844, 848; see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1971); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have fairly presented his federal claims to all levels of the state appellate system, including the state's highest court. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845; Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009); Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). The district court can and must raise the exhaustion issue sua sponte when it clearly appears that habeas claims have not been presented to the state courts. See Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987); Allen, 424 F.2d at 138-39.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). Here, Petitioner was sentenced only two days before filing this action. Petitioner does not contend-nor realistically could he-that he has fairly presented his claims to all levels of the state appellate system. Indeed, Petitioner does not contend that he has even initiated a direct appeal.

An applicant has not exhausted available state remedies if he has the right under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Petitioner has at least one available procedure by which to raise the issues he has presented in this application: he may file an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. See Mich. Court Rule 7.203(B); 7.205(A)(2)(a).^[5] If Petitioner does so, he must then seek leave to appeal any decision by the court of appeals to the Michigan Supreme Court. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845; Hafley, 902 F.2d at 483 (“[Petitioner cannot be deemed to have exhausted his state court remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) as to any issue, unless he has presented that issue both to the Michigan Court of Appeals and to the Michigan Supreme Court.” (citation omitted)).

It appears that Petitioner may have turned to this Court because of the short sentence imposed by the state court. The requirement to exhaust is not absolute. A court may grant habeas relief despite lack of exhaustion where: “(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(b)(1)(B). Ordinary delay in proceeding through the state courts...