Danny Herman Trucking, Inc. v. Miranda

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DANNY HERMAN TRUCKING, INC. Plaintiff, v. LILIANA MIRANDA A/K/A LILI MIRANDA, and CATALINA VILLEGAS DE CARRILLO, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-00043-DC-DF

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Pecos Division

January 25, 2022

THE HONORABLE DAVID COUNTS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DAVID B. FANNIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Catalina Villegas de Carrillo's (“Villegas”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (hereafter “Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. 6), and Motion for Judgment Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (hereafter, “Motion for Judgment”) (Doc. 6). This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge through a standing order of referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Villegas's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED. (Doc. 6). Additionally, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Villegas's Motion for Judgment be DENIED. (Doc. 6).

I. Background

This case's genesis is a motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff Danny Herman Trucking, Inc. (“Danny Herman”) alleges that on or around May 30, 2021, Defendant Liliana Miranda a/k/a Lili Miranda (“Miranda”) was driving a Honda CR-V sports utility vehicle which was owned at all relevant times by Villegas. (Doc. 1 at 1). Miranda allegedly ventured on a road trip from Texas to Arizona, which Danny Herman asserts would have taken twenty-four hours to complete at appropriate speed limits without any detours. Id. at 1-2. At some point during this road trip, due to allegedly “bald” tires, Miranda lost control of the Honda CR-V. Id. at 2. The Honda CR-V was purportedly stopped in such a “precarious position” that the headlights “were facing south and could not have been seen” by Bradley Johnson (“Johnson”), who was operating one of Danny Herman's tractor-trailers. Id. Johnson's tractor-trailer impacted the Honda CR-V, leaving both vehicles to come to rest on the shoulder of Interstate 10. Id. at 2-3. Another commercial tractor-trailer, driven by Rigoberto L. Villalobos, collided with Johnson's tractor-trailer, resulting in an explosion and fire which ultimately led to Johnson's death. Id. at 3.

Danny Herman's tractor-trailer and other related equipment, as operated by Johnson at the time of the collision, were “damaged and consumed in fire[, ] resulting in a total destruction of those units and the cargo being carried in the trailer.” Id. at 3. Danny Herman claims that the damages exceed $75, 000, and brings this suit under the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 3, 4. Although Danny Herman uses “entrustment” language in its Original Complaint, Danny Herman has clarified that its claims as against Villegas amount to “negligent maintenance” instead of “negligent entrustment.” Id. at 2; (Doc. 9 at 4-6). Specifically, Danny Herman alleges that the ”tires on the Honda CR-V were ‘bald' and a very basic visual inspection of the said tires would have led any reasonable and prudent person to realize the subject vehicle was unsafe to drive on a public highway.” (Doc. 1 at 1).

On September 27, 2021, Villegas filed her combined Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment, claiming that Danny Herman “wholly failed to allege that Miranda was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver” or that Villegas “knew or should have known that Miranda was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver.” (Doc. 6 at 4-5). Danny Herman filed a response to the motions on October 11, 2021, providing the perspicacity that “this is not an instance of negligent entrustment, but rather a common law negligence claim, ” as well as lodging attacks against the timeliness of Villegas's motions. (Doc. 9 at 2). Villegas then filed a Reply to Danny Herman's response on October 12, 2021, countering Danny Herman's assertion of untimeliness as well as Danny Herman's formulation of negligent maintenance. (Doc. 10). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

A. Federal Rule 12(b)(6)

When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the trial court must assess whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012)). The court must accept “all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

On the other hand, if the complaint only offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” dismissal is appropriate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The court should dismiss a complaint if the court can only infer the mere possibility of misconduct, or if the plaintiff has only alleged that he is entitled to relief rather than stating a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

B. Federal Rule 12(c)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides the following: “After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a motion for summary judgment, should be granted only if there is no issue of material fact and if the pleadings show that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Greenberg v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 478 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1973).

As such, motions made under Federal Rule 12(c) are “designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts review a Federal Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under the same standards as a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Terry Black's Barbecue, L.L.C. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., -- F.4th --, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 287, at *5, 2022 WL 43170, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)).

III. Discussion

In Villegas's motions, the arguments for which are the same given that Villegas filed both the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment in a unitary document, Villegas argues that dismissal is proper for two reasons. (Doc. 6). First, Villegas notes that, construed as a petition advancing claims based upon negligent entrustment, the Original Complaint insufficiently pleads the elements of negligent entrustment as recognized under Texas state law. (Doc. 6 at 4-5). Second, in her Reply to Danny Herman's response, Villegas offers an additional set of arguments countering the supposed “negligent maintenance” theory articulated in Danny Herman's response to the motions. (Doc. 10). In pertinent part, Villegas surmises that Danny Herman's complaint does not utilize such keywords as “maintenance” or “maintain, ” and that therefore “no factual assertions [have been made] whatsoever to state a plausible claim” for negligent maintenance. Id. at 2-3. Furthermore, Villegas questions the viability of a “negligent maintenance” cause of action under Texas law for a “co-owner of a personal vehicle.” Id. at 3.

Danny Herman's response to Villegas's motions quash any presumed theory of negligent entrustment as a cause for relief. (Doc. 9). In particular, Danny Herman notes that the claim asserted against Villegas is instead one premised upon common law negligence, constituting in this case a negligent maintenance claim. See Id. at 2. Accordingly, the undersigned will not consider Villegas's arguments addressing negligent entrustment, and will instead construe the Original Complaint as asserting a common law negligence claim against Villegas for the negligent maintenance of the Honda CR-V involved in the collision.

A. Timeliness of Villegas's Motions

At the outset in its response, Danny Herman asserts that Villegas's motions are untimely. Specifically, Danny Herman claims that, since Villegas was served with the Original Complaint on July 6, 2021, the Federal Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss along with her answer to the Original Complaint were due on July 27, 2021. (Doc. 9 at 4). As to the Motion for Judgment, Danny Herman insists that because “this Court has not entered a Scheduling Order, ” the pleadings have not yet been closed, and therefore a motion made pursuant to Federal Rule 12(c) is premature. Id. a. Motion to Dismiss

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any motion made pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b) “must be made before pleading if responsive pleading is allowed.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Federal Rule 12(a)(1) allocates a twenty-one-day timeframe for a defendant to file an answer or Federal Rule 12(b) motion-i.e., a responsive pleading-following service of the summons and complaint. Hydradyne, LLC v. McCurdy, No. 2:13-CV-748-JRG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195267, at *3, 2013 WL 12134083, at *1 (E.D Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (“The deadlines imposed in [Federal] Rule 12(a) apply to...