Dantzler v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

OSCAR DANTZLER, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01505 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 6, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Oscar Dantzler, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of mandamus against the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and various agency officials (collectively, "Federal Defendants"). He also sues the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, its National President Derrick Johnson, and its Louisiana State Conference President Michael McClanahan (collectively, "NAACP Defendants"). Dantzler alleges that each set of Defendants failed to help him pursue his claims of discrimination and conspiracy. He seeks to compel them to aid him with those claims. The Federal Defendants and the NAACP Defendants separately move to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, the Court will dismiss the case.

I.

According to his petition and supporting attachments, Dantzler began working as a bus driver in 1993 for the Tangipahoa Parish School District ("School District") in Louisiana. Pl.'s Pet. for Writ of Mandamus Exs. ("Pl.'s Exs.") at 1, ECF No. 1-1.¹ During his employment, heclaims he was "vocal" and spoke "out about discriminatory and unfair labor practices at the School District." Id. He applied for several promotions, but he was never selected. Id. Dantzler, a black male, claims that the School District discriminated against him based on his race and sex.² Id.

So Dantzler filed a charge with the New Orleans office of the EEOC in 2019. Id.; Pl.'s Pet. for Writ of Mandamus ("Pl.'s Pet.") at 4, ECF No. 1. The Louisiana Commission on Human Rights ("LCHR")³ then informed Dantzler that they would handle his complaint. Pl.'s Pet. at 6. A few months later, the LCHR informed Dantzler that they found no violations by the School District. Pl.'s Exs. at 11. The LCHR provided Dantzler with a Right to Sue letter. Pl.'s Pet. at 8. The letter gave him an option to appeal his charge to the EEOC within 15 days or sue his employer within 90 days. Pl.'s Exs. at 11. Dantzler does not allege that he did either.

During the LCHR investigation, Dantzler sought legal representation from the NAACP, of which he is a member. See id. at 12-14; Pl.'s Pet. at 9. The NAACP declined to take up Dantzler's case. See Pl.'s Pet. at 9. Dantzler alleges this violates the NAACP's own bylaws. See id.

Next, Dantzler turned to the DOJ and FBI. See id. at 18; Pl.'s Exs. at 15-19. He sent letters requesting that those agencies start a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") investigation. See Pl.'s Exs. at 15-19. He alleges that Louisiana Governor John BelEdwards, the NAACP, the EEOC, and the LCHR conspired to deprive him of his civil rights. See Pl.'s Pet. at 7-9. Dantzler explains that Edwards "is coming after him" because he ran as a Democratic candidate for governor of Louisiana in 2019, challenging Edwards' incumbency. See id. at 7. Dantzler did not receive responses from the Federal Defendants. See id. at 18.

Dantzler then sued here. He sued the Federal Defendants,⁴ the NAACP Defendants, and others.⁵ Only the NAACP Defendants and the Federal Defendants remain. Dantzler invokes several criminal statutes and constitutional provisions against them. See, e.g., id. at 11-13. His principal claims appear to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Pl.'s Pet. at 13-18, 22-24. The NAACP Defendants and Federal Defendants move to dismiss. Fed. Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Fed. Defs.' Mot.") at 1, ECF No. 10-1; NAACP's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("NAACP's Mot.") at 1, ECF No. 5-2. The motions are ripe for disposition.⁶

II.

Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 1; NAACP's Mot. at 1-2. A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction over his claims. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). If the plaintiff has not met that burden, his complaint must be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court "assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). But the Court is "not required . . . to accept inferences unsupported by the facts or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations." Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). In deciding this motion, the Court "may consider materials outside the pleadings." Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

The Court analyzes a complaint less stringently under Rule 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court treats as true the complaint's factual allegations and grants the plaintiff "all inferences that can be derived from the factsalleged." L. Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). The Court need not, however, credit "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

Dantzler is proceeding pro se. His pleadings are accordingly construed liberally and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Abdelfattah v. DHS, 787 F.3d 524, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). "But even a pro se complainant must plead 'factual matter' that permits [a] court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A court also must consider a pro se complaint "in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss." Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

III.

Dantzler asks the Court to compel both sets of Defendants to take various actions. See Pl.'s Pet. at 21-24. He mainly relies on two mandamus statutes as potential sources of jurisdiction.

In 28 U.S.C. § 1361, Congress granted federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." An "agency" is defined as "any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest." Id. § 451. Mandamus may only issue when "(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff." Council of & for the Blind of Del. Cnty. Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1533(D.C. Cir. 1983). "These three threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction." Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

Dantzler also relies on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. In that Act, Congress provided that federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The All Writs Act "is most commonly invoked by a federal circuit court of appeals to issue a writ of mandamus to a district court judge, or by the Supreme Court to issue a writ to a lower court judge." United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2011). The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that "it is firmly established that section 1651 does not expand the jurisdiction of a court." Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Rather, "the All Writs Act allows the Court to order a remedy only where subject matter jurisdiction already exists." Carson v. U.S. Off. of Special Couns., 563 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 (D.D.C. 2008).

In any case, "[i]t is not disputed that the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, its "consideration of any and all mandamus actions starts from the premise that issuance of the writ is an extraordinary remedy, reserved only for the most transparent violations of a clear duty to act." In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000). "[E]ven if the plaintiff overcomes all the[] hurdles" to show he is entitled to relief, "whether mandamus relief should issue is discretionary." In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

The NAACP Defendants and the Federal Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Dantzler has otherwise failed to state a claim. See NAACP's Mot. at 2; Fed. Defs.' Mot. at 6. The Court agrees. The Court considers each set of Defendants in turn.

A.

First, the NAACP Defendants. Dantzler seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the NAACP to investigate and represent him in his discrimination charge. See Pl.'s Pet. at 21-24. He cites 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and § 1651 as sources of jurisdiction. See id. at 13-14, 19. But neither statute supports Dantzler's claims.

The text is clear: Mandamus under § 1361 may only issue against "an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof." Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. ...