Darlene M. v. O'Malley

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DARLENE M., Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security,^[1] Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-1817 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

June 3, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Plaintiff Darlene M. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Social Security disability insurance benefits, or, in the alternative, remand for a new administrative hearing. Now before the Court are Magistrate Judge Harvey's Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), Dkt. 24, Plaintiff's objections to the Report, Dkt. 26, and the Commissioner's response to those objections, Dkt. 27. For the reasons that follow the Court agrees with Judge Harvey that the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff benefits should be affirmed. The Court, accordingly, will ADOPT the Report and Recommendation, will GRANT the Commissioner's motion for judgment of affirmance, Dkt. 20, and will DENY Plaintiff's motion for judgment of reversal, Dkt. 18.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Before a claimant may recover disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., the Commissioner must conclude that she is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act and governing regulations, id. §§ 416(i), 423(d). As relevant here, the Act defines “disability” to mean the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) typically holds a hearing and performs a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

Under this sequential inquiry, the claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps. Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The claimant must first show that she is not presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity;” if she is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” she is “not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, she must show that she has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment”-or “combination of impairments”-that “meets the duration requirement.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, she must show that her impairment “meets or equals one of [the] listings” in the relevant regulation, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, and “meets the duration requirement,” id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); if so, “she is deemed disabled and the inquiry is at an end,” Butler, 353 F.3d at 997. “If the claimant does not satisfy step three, the inquiry proceeds to the fourth step, which requires her to show that she suffers an impairment that renders her incapable of performing ‘past relevant work.'” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)). In making that determination, the ALJ must consider the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and must compare her RFC “with the physical and mental demands of [her] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(iv), 404.1520(f).^[2]

If the claimant carries her “burden on the first four steps, the burden [then] shifts to the Commissioner [at] step five,” who must “demonstrate that the claimant is able to perform ‘other work' based on a consideration of her [RFC], age, education and past work experience.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 997 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)). If the claimant is unable to perform “other work” and she meets the duration requirement, she is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).

B. Procedural History and Administrative Background

The Court need not repeat Judge Harvey's thorough description of the relevant procedural history and administrative background; instead, the Court adopts and incorporates his summary of Plaintiff's disability claims, the evidence and arguments before the ALJ, and the ALJ's decision. See Dkt. 24 at 4-19. The Court will, however, briefly highlight those portions of the administrative record that bear on Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits in June 2017, claiming a disability onset date of May 6, 2017, stemming from right-side weakness as the result of a stroke. Dkt. 156 at 2-4, 6. Her application was denied at the initial level of review in December 2017 and on reconsideration in February 2018. Dkt. 15-3 at 10-11, 22-23. She then requested a hearing before an ALJ. Dkt. 15-4 at 15; see Dkt. 15-2 at 63-97. At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by her current counsel. Compare Dkt. 15-2 at 11, with Dkt. 18-1 at 46. The ALJ issued his decision denying Plaintiff's claim in August 2019. Dkt. 15-2 at 8-26.

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 6, 2017, the date of the alleged onset of her disability. Id. at 14. At step two, he found that Plaintiff had four impairments that were properly classified as “severe” under the regulations: “Diabetes mellitus,” “obesity,” “residual weakness from an acute cerebrovascular episode,” and “tobacco addiction and related throat and breathing issues.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). At step three, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did “not have an impairment” that met or medically equaled the severity of one the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526). The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments under various listings-most relevant here, under Listing 11.04 (the listing for “vascular insult to the brain,” commonly referred to as stroke)-and found that her impairments neither met nor medically equaled any listing. Id. at 14-18.

At step four, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's RFC in considerable detail. See id. at 18-24. Among other things, he found that her “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause [her] alleged symptoms” but that her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of th[o]se symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record” and that “her impairments [were] not as severe as her allegations would suggest.” Id. at 19. The ALJ explained the basis for that finding over several pages of his decision, id. at 19-24, before concluding that Plaintiff “is capable of performing light work,” id. at 24. The regulations define “light work” as work that involves “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds....[A] job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).

At step five, the ALJ found-based on the testimony of a vocational expert-that Plaintiff was “unable to perform [her] past relevant work” as a “mental health clerk.” Dkt. 15-2 at 24. The ALJ next considered whether-in light of Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience-“there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] [could] perform.” Id. at 25. Having already concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing the full range of light work, the ALJ did not rely on the vocational expert's testimony in response to hypotheticals posed at the hearing, both of which were limited to “sedentary work” and one of which included additional limitations as well. See id. at 93-94. Instead, he consulted the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (referred to as the “Grids”) to determine whether an individual in Plaintiff's age category at the time of the alleged disability onset date (“younger individual”) or at the time of the hearing (“closely approaching advanced age”), with a limited education and the ability to communicate in English, and with her RFC could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 24-25. For that criteria, the Grids supported a finding of “not disabled” in both age categories. See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rules 202.11, 202.18. The ALJ, accordingly, found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Dkt. 15-2 at 25.

The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 16, 2020. Dkt. 15-2 at 2-7. Plaintiff commenced this action on July 1, 2020, Dkt. 1, and the Court referred the matter to a magistrate judge for case management and a Report and Recommendation, see Min. Order (Oct. 8, 2020); Min. Order (Oct. 12, 2020); Min. Order (Feb. 25, 2021). Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for judgment of reversal, Dkt. 18, and the Commissioner filed a motion for judgment of affirmance, Dkt. 20.

In seeking reversal, Plaintiff argued: (1) that the ALJ improperly evaluated her functioning when determining whether her symptoms met or medically equaled the requirements for the “vascular insult to the brain” listing, Dkt 18-1 at 10-24; (2) that the ALJ made several missteps when determining that she had the RFC to perform the full range of light work, including by failing to give appropriate weight to her treating physician's opinions, insufficiently explaining his findings as to her exertional limitations, and erroneously rejecting her testimony about the limiting effects of her symptoms, id. at 24-40; and (3) that the ALJ “erred when he relied exclusively on the [Grids] to determine” that Plaintiff was “‘not disabled' at...