Dass v. City Univ. of N.Y.

KRISHNA DASS, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK,as operators of Eugenio Maria de Hostos Community College, et al. Defendants.

18-CV-11325 (VSB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April 21, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Todd Jay Krouner

Law Office of Todd J. Krouner

Chappaqua, NY

Counsel for Plaintiff

Gary Moy

Littler Mendelson, P.C.

New York, NY

Dominique F. Saint-Fort

New York City Law Dept. Office of the Corporation Counsel

New York, NY

Counsel for Defendants

VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Krishna Dass ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against her employer The City University of New York ("CUNY"), Hostos Community College ("Hostos"), and CUNY administrators Nathaniel Cruz, David Gomez, Johanna Gomez, Joshua Rivera, and Eugene Sohn (the "Individual Defendants," and collectively with Hostos and CUNY, "Defendants"). Before me is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 29.) Because Plaintiff adequately pleads a cause of action only on the basis of sex discrimination, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Factual Background¹

Plaintiff Krishna Dass is a South Asian female of Indian descent who was employed by CUNY as an "Athletic Director" at Hostos Community College—a CUNY two-year community college—from April 17, 2013 until January 15, 2019, when Plaintiff was "constructively terminated."² (FAC ¶¶ 1, 17-19.) Plaintiff was the only athletic director at Hostos, but had a staff that included one full time and two part-time employees, which was the smallest staff overseen by an Athletic Director in the CUNY system of colleges. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 30-31, 76.)

Plaintiff's title was Higher Education Associate ("HEA"), although once she met the criteria approximately two years into her employment, Plaintiff sought a reclassification of her position as HEA to the title of Higher Education Officer ("HEO"). (Id. ¶¶ 18, 41-42, 70.) Defendant Johanna Gomez—the Assistant Dean of Student Life at Hostos—and Defendant Nathanial Cruz ("Cruz")—Hostos' Vice President for Student Development and Enrollment Affairs—each stated that they would support Plaintiff's reclassification. (Id. ¶ 42.) However, after Plaintiff's persistent requests to be reclassified to HEO status, Plaintiff's requests were ignored without justification or excuse, and she never received HEO status. (Id. ¶ 70(c)-(k).) Defendant Eugene Sohn ("Sohn")—Hostos' Executive Counsel and Labor Designee—eventuallyindicated to Plaintiff that for over two years, Plaintiff's reclassification paperwork sat on Defendant Cruz's desk, and was never submitted. (Id.)

Plaintiff was the only Athletic Director working for CUNY who was South Asian and of Indian descent, (id. ¶ 43), was the only Athletic Director employed by CUNY that did not have HEO status, and was paid substantially less than the other CUNY Athletic Directors, (id. ¶¶ 49-62). In 2016, Plaintiff's salary was approximately $82,299 per year, and by 2018 Plaintiff was earning $97,628 a year. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 65.) Plaintiff states that had she been granted the reclassification, she would have earned approximately $30,000 more a year. (Id. ¶ 70.) For example, multiple male Athletic Directors in the CUNY system earned $128,485, as did a non-Indian female Athletic Director. (Id.) Two other non-Indian female directors were paid $120,480, and $104,461, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 59.) One Athletic Director, Ryan McCarthy—who was hired by CUNY in or around June 2017—was promoted to HEO status after approximately one month of employment at CUNY's Bronx Community College campus, and "earned at least $82,090 in 2018." (Id. ¶¶ 61, 63.) In addition to the above, two male Athletic Directors at other CUNY colleges made $97,628 and $94,248, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 60-61.)

Plaintiff states that she was qualified for her position, added substantial value as an employee, performed her job in at least a satisfactory manner, and completed tasks for Hostos above and beyond her job description. (Id. ¶¶ 25-40, 44-45.) In addition to alleging that Defendants failed to adequately compensate her, Plaintiff states that Defendants eventually stripped her of decision-making authority, that she was excluded from department meetings and administrative boards, and that Defendants began corresponding directly with her male subordinates to circumvent her position. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.)

Plaintiff further states that she was subjected to "harassment by administrators,including yelling, cursing, [and] insulting," and that she was demeaned and otherwise disrespected by her administrators, such as Defendants Cruz and Sohn, as well as Defendant David Gomez—the President of Hostos—and Defendant Joshua Rivera ("Rivera")—Hostos' Director of Government and External Relations. (Id. ¶¶ 70(n), 71(a).) During one such occurrence, David Gomez "wielded a bat . . . instilling fear into the Hostos female employees, including the Plaintiff and her union representative." (Id. ¶ 71(b).)

In October 2016, Plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint against a Hostos custodian who had barricaded Plaintiff inside a gymnasium closet, demanding "that Plaintiff give him a hug and kiss in order to be allowed to leave the closet." (Id. ¶ 70(o).) After ten minutes of failed pleas, Plaintiff was coerced into giving the custodian a hug to gain her release. (Id.) Hostos took no action concerning Plaintiff's complaint. (Id.)

In addition to the above, "[f]rom in or about January 2017, Plaintiff ha[d] suffered [a] disability in the form of adverse health consequences, including exacerbation of her allergic asthma, as a result of the conditions of her office at Hostos, including but not limited to mold, rodent infestation, dust and otherwise unsanitary conditions." (Id. ¶ 74.) Plaintiff requested to work from home in May 2017, but her requests were denied. (Id. ¶ 104.) From on or about June 28, 2017, through on or about November 16, 2017, Plaintiff took medical leave for her disability pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act. (Id. ¶ 77.) On October 24, 2017, Plaintiff complained to CUNY about discrimination on the basis of her race, national origin, ethnicity, and sex. (Id. ¶ 76.) Plaintiff states that when she returned from medical leave, she continued to be excluded from meetings and stripped of decision-making authority, and that her requests for reclassification were ignored, all in retaliation for her complaints. (Id. ¶ 78.) Ultimately, Plaintiff alleges she "was constructively terminated by the Defendants on January 15, 2019."

(FAC ¶ 19.)

II. Procedural History

On January 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. ¶ 13; Moy Decl. Ex. A, at 4.)³ Her charge included claims for discrimination on the basis of sex and national origin, and retaliation and hostile work environment. (Moy Decl. Ex. A.) On September 11, 2018, Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC, notifying Plaintiff of her right to sue under, inter alia, Title VII, the ADA, and the Equal Pay Act. (FAC ¶ 14; Moy Decl. Ex. B.)

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on December 6, 2018.⁴ (Doc. 4.) After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on March 25, 2019, (Doc. 20), Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on April 15, 2019, (Doc. 24). In addition, on April 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a rider to her Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, adding claims for race and disability discrimination. (Krouner Decl. Ex. A.)⁵ Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on June 13, 2019, (Doc. 29), supported by a memorandum of law and a declaration, (Docs. 30, 31). On July 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, and a declaration. (Doc. 34.) Briefing on this motion was complete when Defendants filed their reply memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss on June 26, 2019. (Doc. 35.)

III. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ). A claim will have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard demands "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Plausibility . . . depends on a host of considerations: the full factual picture presented by the complaint, the particular cause of action and its elements, and the existence of alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiff's inferences unreasonable." L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Kassner, 496 F.3d at 237. "A complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A court "may also consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken" in ruling on a motion to dismiss. Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008). A complaint need not make "detailed factual allegations," but it must contain more than mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable...