Daugherty v. McCloskey

1

MIA MICHELLE DAUGHERTY, Plaintiff, v. MARK MCCLOSKEY and PATRICIA MCCLOSKEY, Defendants.

No. 4:23-CV-00609-NCC

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

May 16, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NOELLE C. COLLINS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Mia Michelle Daugherty for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No 2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will direct plaintiff to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action against Mark and Patricia McCloskey. She asserts that the Court has federal question jurisdiction under RSMo § 571.030, and because the federal court and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police are involved. (Docket No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff has also filled out the section of the form complaint suggesting that diversity jurisdiction is present, but admits that both she and defendants are Missouri citizens. (Docket No. 1 at 4-5).

The complaint contains allegations that defendants pointed guns at plaintiff during a protest.

In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that on June 28, 2020, she was part of a group of peaceful protesters. (Docket No. 1 at 6). As the protest turned onto a street called “Portland PL,” plaintiff saw “a man standing on the side of his home pointing a rifle at the protestors.” Plaintiff states that she “proceeded to walk up the street” with her group, whereupon a woman came out of the house. According to plaintiff, the woman looked disoriented and had a handgun with her finger on the trigger. She alleges that the woman - who she identifies as Patricia McCloskey - pointed the gun at her. Plaintiff states that she yelled at Patricia McCloskey, saying “what are you doing, we are not here for you.” Patricia McCloskey purportedly yelled back “I don't care!”

Plaintiff states that she has “suffered PTSD from this incident,” and that it has affected her life, her work, her relationship with her children, and her relationships with others. She asserts that “due to the negligent behavior of Mark and Patricia McCloskey,” she has suffered anxiety and depression. Plaintiff contends that both defendants have caused her to go to therapy. She also insists that both defendants have “used the images from that day to capitalize off of [her] pain and suffering,” including going “onto the media to slander [her] position as a protester,” and eventually running “for office with the same images that caused [her so] much pain.”

With regard to relief, plaintiff states that she is seeking monetary damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for the violation of her civil rights. Specifically, she asks for $20 million in punitive damages. (Docket No. 1 at 7).

In an attached “Memorandum for Clerk,” plaintiff repeats that her civil rights were violated, and that she was diagnosed with PTSD due to the events on June 28, 2020. (Docket No. 1 at 8). She further notes that both Mark and Patricia McCloskey were “found guilty of unlawful use of a weapon,” and “both attempted to retrieve their weapons in 2022, but were denied.” Plaintiff notes that they have shown no remorse, and have built notoriety “off of [her] pain.”

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who has filed a civil action against Mark and Patricia McCloskey, alleging that they violated her civil rights by pointing weapons at her during a protest. Because she is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court reviewed her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below the Court will direct plaintiff to show cause as to why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to decide a certain class of cases. LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). See also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”). The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). “Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.” Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 830, 838 (8th Cir. 2022).

Because jurisdiction is a threshold requirement, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009). See also City of Kansas City, Mo. v. Yarco Co., Inc., 625 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Federal courts have an independent duty to determine subject matter jurisdiction, even where the matter is raised for the first time on appeal and on the court's own motion”). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Magee v. United States, 9 F.4^th 675, 680 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction rests with the party invoking federal jurisdiction”).

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over both federal question cases and diversity of citizenship cases. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); and McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress has directed that district courts shall have jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). In this case, plaintiff suggests that both types of jurisdiction are present. Upon the Court's review, however, she has not adequately asserted either type.

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Federal question jurisdiction gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co. 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir. 2015). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a claim arises under federal law is determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC, 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016). The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that jurisdiction exists only when a federal question...