Daughtry v. KMG Hauling, Inc.

LA'KEISHA DAUGHTRY, Plaintiff, v. KMG HAULING, INC. et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-3361 (TJK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 8, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge.

Plaintiff an African-American woman, sues her former employer and its owner. The gist of her complaint is that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against her under several federal and District of Columbia statutes. Defendants move to dismiss most of her claims for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction over the employer's owner. For the reasons below, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I. The Complaint

According to the complaint, La'Keisha Daughtry is a former employee of Defendant kmG Hauling, Inc. (“kmG”), a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business and headquarters in Sterling, Virginia. ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 11, 14-15. Hugo Garcia is a Virginia resident and the “President and Owner” of kmG. Id. ¶ 16. Daughtry worked there as a driver from October 2018 to March 2020. Id. ¶ 17. When kmG hired her, Defendants agreed to pay her a flat $850 per week no matter how many hours she worked, and another “commission” of $300 per week, for $1150 in total. Id. ¶ 18.

Daughtry alleges that Defendants paid her the agreed-upon amount for the first few months of her employment, during which she worked more than forty hours per week in the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 23. But on or around March 2019, she claims, a male co-worker “verbally attacked” her and “threatened her with a weapon.” Id. ¶ 24. When Daughtry reported the incident to her manager, “her job was threatened and her pay was reduced to around $850 per week.” Id. Daughtry also received a “letter of correction/reprimand” from Garcia that blamed her for “committing prohibited conduct” when she says she was not even on the job. Id. ¶ 25.

Daughtry alleges she was “given a trash route” at some point and was promised a weekly flat rate of $1, 250. Id. ¶ 26. But Defendants then reduced that amount and paid her a flat rate of $1, 200 per week, less than what comparable non-African American and male drivers were paid. Id. After that, Daughtry alleges she faced regular and routine sexual jokes and comments by a co-worker who had a “trash helper” position. Id. ¶ 28. In March 2020, the co-worker “verbally sexually harassed” Daughtry and also “committed [an] unwanted and unwelcome touching . . . of a sexual nature [against her].” Id. ¶ 29. Daughtry reported the incident but was still required to work with the co-worker “over her objection.” Id. ¶ 30. So, she says, she had no other reasonable choice but to leave kmG, which she did in March 2020. Id. ¶ 31.

II. Procedural History

Daughtry filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 3, 2020. ECF No. 8-2. The EEOC issued her a Notice of Right to Sue on September 10, 2020. ECF No. 2 ¶ 9. Daughtry sued on November 20, 2020. The complaint alleges eleven counts: Violation of the D.C. Minimum Wage Act (Count I); Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) (Count II); Race-Based Discrimination in Violation of the DCHRA (Count III); Retaliation in Violation of the DCHRA (Count IV); Sex-Based Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count V); Race/Color-Based Discrimination in Violation of Title VII (Count VI); Retaliation in Violation of Title VII (Count VII); Constructive Discharge in Violation of the DCHRA and Title VII (Counts VIII and IX); Sex-based Pay Discrimination in Violation of the Equal Pay Act (Count X); and Retaliation Related to Sex-based Pay Discrimination in Violation of the Equal Pay Act (Count XI). ECF No. 2. In December 2020, Defendants moved to partially dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction over Garcia. ECF No. 8-1.

III. Legal Standards

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The plaintiff bears “the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Without jurisdictional discovery or an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction, a plaintiff can carry her burden by making a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In “establish[ing] a prima facie case, plaintiffs are not limited to evidence that meets the standards of admissibility . . . Rather, they may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.” Id. “When deciding personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing . . . the court must resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff.” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). But the Court need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts. Id.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the pleading “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff “must furnish ‘more than labels and conclusions' or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Tyler v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 113 F.Supp.3d 88, 90 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court may “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In employment discrimination cases, the Court may consider EEOC charges. Pappas v. Dist. of Columbia, 513 F.Supp.3d 64, 77 (D.D.C. 2021).

IV. Analysis

A. Daughtry Has Not Shown Personal Jurisdiction Over Garcia

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint against Garcia because the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over him. There are “two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general' (sometimes called ‘all-purpose') jurisdiction and ‘specific' (sometimes called ‘case-linked') jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779-80 (2017). Daughtry argues that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Garcia. To establish specific jurisdiction, Daughtry “must show that jurisdiction is proper under both (1) the District of Columbia's long-arm statute and (2) the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause.” IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F.Supp.3d 95, 110 (D.D.C. 2018). Daughtry has the burden to “identify which prong of the long-arm statute she is relying on as the basis for jurisdiction, ” id., and she identifies D.C. Code Ann. § 13-423(a)(1), which provides for personal jurisdiction “over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia.”

“The (a)(1) prong of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute ‘extends as far as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause permits.'” Mouzon v. Radiancy, Inc., 85 F.Supp. 3D 361, 371 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Flocco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 147, 162 (D.C. 2000)). To satisfy due process, there must be sufficient “‘minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum ‘such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). “That is, there must exist ‘a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' such that ‘the defendant's suit-related conduct * * * create[s] a substantial connection with the forum.'” Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2020). To create such a connection “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Not every act will suffice for purposeful availment purposes because whether due process is satisfied turns on the “quality and nature” of the defendant's contact with the forum. Thompson, 734 F.3d at 1194.

The complaint alleges that Garcia is the “President and Owner” of kmG and that he “exercised operational control over the business.” ECF No. 2 ¶ 16. The complaint also alleges that Daughtry worked for kmG in the District of Columbia, as far as she (1) drove “a kmG waste truck on a route picking up waste in the District of Columbia”; (2) drove a route “primarily located in the District of Columbia”; and (3) worked “over fifty percent (50%) of [her] weekly hours in the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 35, 37. For these reasons, Daughtry argues, Garcia is subject to personal jurisdiction in this District.

Daughtry's argument does not quite support specific jurisdiction over Garcia. To make that determination, the Court must consider Garcia's “suit-related contacts undertaken in his corporate role.” Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 47; see also Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S 770, 781 n.13 (1984) (“Each defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.”).^[1] The complaint does not allege that Garcia took any specific action...