Daulatzai v. Maryland

556 F.Supp.3d 536

Dr. Anila DAULATZAI, Plaintiff,

v.State of MARYLAND, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. JKB-21-0590

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed August 25, 2021

Filed August 26, 2021

Paul D. Bekman, Bekman, Marder, Hopper, Malarkey & Perlin, LLC, Baltimore, MD, Tonya M. Bana, Tonya Bana LLC, David Manuel Bana, Law Office of David Bana, Esquire, Pikesville, MD, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan M. Stern, Schnader Harrison Segal and Lewis LLP, Washington, DC, Kaitlin Del Vecchio Motley, Thomas W. Morris, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant State of Maryland.

Jonathan M. Stern, Schnader Harrison Segal and Lewis LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant Southwest Airlines Co.

MEMORANDUM

James K. Bredar, Chief Judge

This case arises from Plaintiff's removal from a flight operated by Defendant Southwest Airlines Co. ("Southwest") in September 2017. Plaintiff brings claims against Southwest and the State of Maryland ("Maryland," and collectively with Southwest, "Defendants") for their roles in Plaintiff's removal from the flight and subsequent detention and prosecution for charges stemming from her removal. Both Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 41, 42) to which Plaintiff has not responded. Accordingly, the motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions shall both be GRANTED.

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

On September 26, 2017, Plaintiff was ticketed to fly on Southwest Airlines Flight 1525 from Baltimore to Los Angeles, a flight she took routinely to care for her father. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 8–9, ECF No. 40.) Prior to boarding the flight, Plaintiff noticed several dogs in the waiting area and asked a Southwest agent how many dogs would be on her flight. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) Plaintiff, who "has an allergy to dogs that, at its most extreme, causes itchy eyes and a runny nose," was informed that only one dog would be on the flight and that it would be seated near the front of the plane. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) To avoid issues with her allergies, Plaintiff "took a seat near the rear of the aircraft,"² where she was informed by a flight attendant that there were, in fact, two dogs on the flight, but that both were seated near the front of the aircraft. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff confirmed that this was not problematic as "she has a dog allergy, but it is not a life-threatening one." (Id. ¶ 15.)

Shortly thereafter, another flight attendant approached Plaintiff and informed her "that, in the event that she needed an EpiPen, there was one on board the plane." (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff thanked the flight attendant but reiterated that her allergy was "not that severe and shared that she had never needed to use an EpiPen before." (Id. ) Various other Southwest personnel followed up with Plaintiff about her allergy, "and each time she reiterated that her allergy was not life-threatening." (Id. )

Plaintiff was then approached by an MTA Police Officer who asked if she had a food allergy. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff attempted to clarify that she had a non-life-threatening dog allergy, but the officer insisted he had been informed by various people that she had a food allergy and "that he had been called to discuss her food allergies." (Id. ) After Plaintiff requested to speak to whoever informed the officer that she had a food allergy, he returned with Captain Darren Medeiros, who immediately told Plaintiff that "I do not feel comfortable with you on this plane." (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.)

Plaintiff tried to explain to Captain Medeiros that "she did not have any food allergy and her dog allergies are not life-threatening," and that "she was her sick father's primary caretaker and needed to be in Los Angeles the following morning." (Id. ¶ 19.) While Captain Medeiros "acknowledged that [Plaintiff] did not have a food allergy" he "maintained that she had a life-threatening dog allergy ... and continued to assert without any further explanation that he did not feel comfortable with her on the plane." (Id. ) Captain Medeiros ultimately "summoned additional MTA Police Officers to the aircraft and requested for Dr. Daulatzai to be removed from the plane." (Id. ¶ 20.)

At Captain Medeiros’ direction two "MTA Police Officer began lifting [Plaintiff] out of her seat by her belt loops." (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff, who was pregnant with her first child and concerned "about her health and that of her unborn child [ ] immediately informed them that she was pregnant and would walk off the aircraft by herself." (Id. ¶ 23.) Despite this, Plaintiff was "physically grabbed and dragged/pushed [ ] from the plane." (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that the officers who removed her from the flight commented that "she looked like ‘some sort of teacher’ and said that she was ‘going to learn a lesson today’ " and then "high fived" each other after successfully removing Plaintiff from the flight. (See id. ¶¶ 22, 27.) A video of Plaintiff's removal from the flight was recorded by a passenger and ultimately went viral. (Id. ¶ 34.) Southwest later issued at least two public statements about the matter. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Following her removal from the Southwest flight, Plaintiff "was told she was being held for questioning" but was later "placed under arrest without a warrant and charged with numerous offenses." (Id. ¶¶ 29–30.) She was then "taken to the police station ... booked, fingerprinted, photographed, and then released on her own recognizance ... the morning of September 27, 2017." (Id. ¶ 31.) The majority of these charges were ultimately nolle prossed , but Plaintiff was found guilty and received probation before judgment on the charge of disorderly conduct. (See Daulatzai Criminal Trial Docket at 8–12, Maryland Mot. Dismiss Ex. A, ECF No. 41-2.)³

Plaintiff, a socio-cultural anthropologist, describes herself in the Complaint as "non-white and ha[ving] brown skin" and explains that "[w]hile phenotypically, it may be difficult to place [her] ancestral origins, she clearly presents and is perceived as non-white." (SAC ¶ 6, ECF No. 40.) She alleges that her removal from the Southwest flight and subsequent arrest were racially motivated, that Southwest's concern about her allergies was pretextual, and that both Defendants violated state and federal law.

On September 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging various state law tort claims on behalf of herself and her husband, Roger Begrich. (See ECF No. 2.) After Defendants filed motions to dismiss that complaint, Plaintiff amended her complaint on February 23, 2021—removing her husband as a plaintiff and asserting for the first time federal statutory and constitutional claims against Defendants. (See ECF No. 3.) Based on the federal claims, Defendants removed the case to this Court (ECF No. 1 at 2–3), and moved again to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 13, 16.) In response, Plaintiff filed what was styled as an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 22.) Ultimately, the Court determined that this amendment constituted a Second Amended Complaint, requiring Plaintiff to seek leave to amend. (ECF No. 39.) However, over Defendants’ objections that amendment would be futile (see ECF No. 29), the Court granted leave to amend. (ECF No. 39.) Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint for a third time. (ECF Nos. 41, 42.)

II. Legal Standard

When "considering a motion to dismiss" pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc. , 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ... ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’ " will not suffice. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. Analysis

In cases "when a plaintiff fails to oppose a motion to dismiss, a district court is ‘entitled, as authorized, to rule on the ... motion and dismiss the suit on the uncontroverted bases asserted.’ " E.g. Benton v. Bank of Am. , Civ. No. PX-16-0613, 2017 WL 588468, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2017) (quoting Pueschel v. United States , 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) ); Belyakov v. Med. Sci. and Computing , Civ. No. PWG-13-3657, 2014 WL 12768920, at *2 (D. Md. May 19, 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That said, "a plaintiff's failure to oppose a motion to dismiss is no guarantee of victory for the Defendants where the motion itself is meritless." Benton , 2017 WL 588468, at *2. Here, Defendants’ Motions are far from meritless and rather provide multiple independent grounds for dismissing the claims in the Second Amended Complaint.

A. Claims Against Southwest (Counts I, II, and VI)

Plaintiff brings three claims against Southwest: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a claim for malicious prosecution, and a claim for negligence. (SAC ¶¶ 38–58, 75–76.) Southwest's broadest argument for dismissal is that it all of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed as barred by the Airlines Deregulation Act ("ADA").

First, Southwest argues that Plaintiff's federal discrimination claim is barred by 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) which provides that "an air carrier ... may refuse to transport a passenger ... the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety." Courts have explained that the broad discretion...