Dave v. Lanier

681 F. Supp.2d 68

Prateek DAVE, Plaintiff, v. Cathy LANIER et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 08-0856 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

February 3, 2010.

David A. Branch, Law Office of David A. Branch, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Dwayne C. Jefferson, D.C. Attorney General's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE REHABILITATION ACT

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the defendant's¹ motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination. The plaintiff, a former cadet at the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department Institute of Police Science ("IPS"), alleges that the defendant discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq.; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The court previously denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Title VII claims. The defendant now moves to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Because the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss those claims.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

The plaintiff, an Indian American male, served as a cadet at IPS from September 2004 until September 2006. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6. He alleges that during a training exercise in November 2004, a trainer pushed him down a hill, causing severe injury to his shoulder. Id. ¶ 6. Following the incident, the plaintiff was placed on sick leave, and then on limited duty, for five months, and his probationary period was extended while he received treatment for his shoulder injury. Id.

The plaintiff alleges that after he returned to IPS, his supervisors gave him only academic assignments supplemented by physical training assignments, trained him with a lower-level class made sarcastic remarks about his abilities and withheld training necessary for graduation from IPS. Id. ¶ 7. As a result of the repetitious physical training, the plaintiff developed asthma, resulting in his taking an additional one to two months of sick leave. Id. While cadets normally graduate from IPS within six months, the plaintiff failed to graduate after spending two years at the academy. Id. ¶ 8. In September 2006, the defendant issued the plaintiff a letter of termination from IPS. Id. ¶ 9.

B. Procedural History

The plaintiff commenced this action on May 19, 2008, alleging that the defendant (1) violated Title VII by retaliating against him after he complained that he had been treated in a discriminatory manner, see Compl. ¶¶ 18-22; and (2) violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by subjecting him to disparate treatment and to a hostile work environment based on his disability, failing to accommodate his disability and "retaliating against him by terminating his employment because of his disability" or the perception that he was disabled,²id. ¶¶ 11-17.

The defendant moved to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims in July 2008. See generally Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."). In a memorandum opinion issued in March 2009, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. See Mem. Op., 606 F.Supp.2d at 49-53. The court withheld judgment, however, on the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, observing that Congress had recently enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"), which altered the scope of protection afforded to individuals under the ADA. See id. at 4-5. Accordingly, the court allowed the parties to submit further briefing on the effect of the ADAAA on the plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination. See id.

With the parties' supplemental briefing on the impact of the ADAAA now complete, see generally Def.'s Supplemental Mem. Supporting Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Supplement"); Pl.'s Supplemental Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Supplement"); Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Supplement ("Def.'s Supplemental Reply"), the court turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties' arguments.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). The complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of the claim, giving the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). "Such simplified notice pleading is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pre-trial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), or "plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory," Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Yet, "to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating the oft-quoted language from Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, instructing courts not to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that "no set of facts in support of his claim would entitle him to relief"). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must treat the complaint's factual allegations—including mixed questions of law and fact—as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 (D.C.Cir.2003); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.2003); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. While many well-pleaded complaints are conclusory, the court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C.Cir.2004); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

B. The ADAAA Does Not Apply to the Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether the amendments to the ADA enacted through the ADAAA apply to the plaintiff's claims. It is undisputed that the allegedly discriminatory conduct took place before the ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009. See Compl. ¶¶ 5-10. The defendant maintains that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively and that as a result, the plaintiff's claims are governed by the ADA. Def.'s Supplement at 1-3. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the ADAAA should apply retroactively in this case because he seeks prospective relief. Pl.'s Supplement at 2-4.

Numerous courts, including this Circuit, have considered this issue and concluded that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. See Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 942 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 470 n. 8 (5th Cir.2009); Moran v. Premier Educ. Group, LP, 599 F.Supp.2d 263, 271-72 (D.Conn.2009) (noting that "it appears that every court that has addressed this issue . . . has concluded that the 2008 Amendments to the ADA cannot be applied retroactively to conduct that preceded its effective date")). Thus, the Circuit's holding in Lytes forecloses the plaintiff's argument that the ADAAA applies to his claims of disability discrimination,³ and the court will apply the pre-amendment

C. The Court Grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

1. Legal Standard for Disability Discrimination

To establish that a defendant violated the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act,⁴ a plaintiff must show that he or she is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position, and who suffered an adverse employment decision due to his or her disability. Breen v. Dep't of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C.Cir.2002); LaCorte v. O'Neill, 139 F.Supp.2d 45, 47-48 (D.D.C.2001) (citing Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C.Cir. 1993)). To prove that he or she has a disability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her condition "substantially limited" one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The applicable EEOC regulations explain that an individual is "substantially limited" if he or she is

(i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can

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