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Davidson v. Arlington Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff Cherry Davidson sued Defendants Arlington Community Schools Board of Education ("the Board") and Tamara Mason ("Mason") in state court alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (See ECF No. 1-1.)
Defendants removed this case this case to federal court. (See ECF No. 1.) And they now move for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff has responded. (ECF No. 41.) And Defendants have replied. (ECF No. 45.)
For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In a municipal election in 2013, Arlington, Tennessee formed the Arlington Community Schools ("ACS") District. (ECF No. 41-1 at PageID 1106.) Its first school board of education chose Mason as the first Superintendent. (Id.)
Donelson Elementary School, Arlington Elementary School, Arlington Middle School, and Arlington High School—once part of Shelby County Schools—became members of the ACS starting with the 2014-2015 school year. (Id.) And "Plaintiff served as Principal of Donelson Elementary School from the beginning of the 2014-15 school year through the 2017-2018 school year." (Id.)
As part of its yearly operations, the Tennessee Department of Education "conducts anonymous educator surveys" for elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools. (Id. at PageID 1109.) The parties agree that these surveys are generally known "as 'climate' surveys." (Id. at PageID 1109-10.)
Furthermore, within the ACS system, "[w]hen an employee leaves . . . , an effort is made to conduct an exit interview." (Id. at PageID 1110.) (Id.)
In May 2017, "after reviewing the climate survey for Donelson Elementary School and the exit interviews of Donelson Elementary School teachers who had resigned," Mason sent Plaintiff an email to schedule a meeting.1 (Id.; see also ECF No. 25-9 at PageID 492.) The purpose of the meeting was to discuss "the number of resignations from Donelson and information from the exit conferences to date." (ECF No. 41-1 at PageID 1110.)
When Plaintiff and Mason met, "Mason stated that she wanted to find out what was going on and intended to make herself available to speak with teachers who wished to speak with her." (Id. at PageID 1111.) Plaintiff provided Mason with "a list of teachers with whom she would like Ms. Mason to speak, along with a list of question(s) to ask the teachers." (Id.)
Later in May, Mason interviewed teachers from Donelson Elementary School and "met with Plaintiff after conducting those interviews." (Id. at PageID 1112.) Mason told Plaintiff that interviewees had said ungenerous things about Plaintiff, including that she "had no people skills; that teachers complained that she intimidated them; that she would not speak to them in the hallways; and that one-half of the teachers hated her and one-half loved her." (Id.; see also ECF No. 25-1 at PageID 196-97, 223.)
Three months after those interviews, near the beginning of the 2017-2018 school year, Mason drove to Donelson Elementary School with Mr. Jeff Mayo, the chief of staff of the ACS. (ECF No. 41-1 at PageID 1114.)
A problem with the car-rider line had occurred, causing serious traffic backups. (Id.) So Mason "made a suggestion to address that problem, which Plaintiff thought was helpful." (Id.)
Mason told Plaintiff that she might return "that afternoon to see if her suggestion helped." (Id.) But Plaintiff responded with these words: (Id.)
Mason agreed to not come back and "received an e-mail from Plaintiff later that evening, advising that [Mason's] suggestion regarding the car-rider line had helped." (Id. at PageID 1115.)
With the car-rider line incident in the rearview mirror, and with the school year underway, Donelson Elementary School received good news: a national organization had nominated it as a "Blue Ribbon School" in early 2018. (Id. at PageID 1116.) When Mason heard about it, "Plaintiff invited her to speak to the teachers at [the school] and she accepted the invitation." (Id.)
At the celebration event, Mason spoke briefly, thanking the teachers for their work. (Id.) After sitting down, she stood back up "and said that she would be remiss if she [did not] congratulate Plaintiff." (Id.)
Weeks after the Blue Ribbon School celebration event, Mason's staff started working "on a new five-year strategic plan," and "[c]ommittees were assigned to work on four overarching goals." (Id.) "Tyler Hill, Director of Communications for the ACS, was the Chairman of one committee." (Id.) Mr. Hill told Mason that his committee recommended that all four ACS schools have Tigers as the same mascot. (Id. at PageID 1117.) Mason directed Mr. Hill todiscuss that recommendation with Plaintiff and Arlington Middle School's principal because "the proposed mascot change would only affect those two schools." (Id.)
When Plaintiff heard about Mr. Hill's recommendation, she disagreed. She spoke first with Mason and then the Board of Education about her opposition. (Id.) During a Board work session in May, Plaintiff passed out materials that she and her assistant principals had gathered to support her position that the mascot should not change. (Id.)
At the end of her presentation, Plaintiff said that she and her staff "would prefer that [the Board] leave [the school's mascot] as bulldogs." (Id.) And the Board agreed to keep Donelson Elementary School's mascot as is, putting aside Mr. Hill's recommendation at Plaintiff's request. (Id.)
Mason met with Plaintiff on the last day of the school year. (Id. at PageID 1119.)
Mason advised Plaintiff that "her contract as Principal . . . would not be renewed and that she would be assigned to a teaching position." (Id.)
Plaintiff received assignment "to a Sixth Grade social studies position at Arlington Middle School for the 2018-19 school year that began in August, 2018." (Id. at PageID 1120.) "Plaintiff held the social studies position throughout the entire 2018-19 school year and still holds that position as of the date of the filing" of this case. (Id. at PageID 1121.)
As a result of these events, Plaintiff sued Mason and the ACS in state court alleging a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (See ECF No. 1-1.)
As to her First Amendment claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants retaliated against her because of her "communication with the Board regarding the mascot." (Id. at PageID 12.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against her because she "informed the Board that school students voted for the name of the mascot . . . and changing the name of [Donelson Elementary School] would not further the interest of the students because Mason would summarily disrupt the will of the students." (Id. at PageID 13.)
As to her claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated that duty "when they breached Plaintiff's contract in May 2018, demoting Plaintiff for reasons unrelated to performance and in violation of the terms of the contract." (Id.)
And as to Plaintiff's final claim for negligence, she argues that Mason breached her "duty to provide a quality education to the students" at Donelson Elementary School "when she failed in her responsibility to provide Plaintiff with a contract that included performance standards as required by T.C.A § 49-2-303(a)(1)." (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that Mason breached that duty when, "for personal instead of professional reasons, [she] demoted Plaintiff for Plaintiff's alleged lack of people skills." (Id.)
Defendants later removed the case to federal court. (ECF No. 1.) And they now move for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff has responded to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 41). And Defendants have replied (ECF No. 45).
For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Court begins its analysis with the rules and cases about the summary judgment standard.
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is 'material' for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense." Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012).
"In considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). "The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1...
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