Davidson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civil No. 5: 15-351-JMH

CLIFTON B. DAVIDSON andALFRED L. JENNINGS, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant.

Civil No. 5: 15-351-JMH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON

March 31, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**** **** **** ****

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. [R. 20] Plaintiffs Clifton Davidson and Alfred Jennings have filed their response to the motion, to which the BOP has replied. [R. 34, 38] The plaintiffs also filed a motion to strike the declaration of Alex White, a request which has been fully briefed. [R. 32, 37, 39] The plaintiffs separately filed a motion to amend their complaint, and the parties have concluded their briefing on this motion as well. [R. 46, 49, 51] These matters are therefore ripe for decision.

I

When they filed their complaint in this action, Davidson and Jennings were both prisoners at the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky ("FMC-Lexington"), although Jennings was released from federal custody in October 2016. [R. 45] The gravamen of their complaint is that the BOP poorly administers or misappropriates funds that are supposed to be used to benefit inmates. [R. 1 at ¶¶10-83] They also assert two satellite claims arising from their dissatisfaction with the BOP's handling of their inmate grievances on the subject [R. 1 at ¶¶84-153], as well as the BOP's response to one of seven requests for documents Davidson made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a ("FOIA") [R. 1 at ¶¶ 154-164]. The plaintiffs seek monetary damages and costs, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. [R. 1 at 25-26]

Davidson and Jennings assert that as federal inmates they are beneficiaries of two trust funds administered by the BOP: the "Deposit Fund," which holds money deposited for use by individual inmates (basically, a "checking account" for each inmate), and the "Trust Fund," which, among other things, holds proceeds from the sale of items sold in the prison's commissary. See BOP Program Statement 4500.11, CN-1 Ch. 1, § 1.1 (Dec. 16, 2016). This case involves only the latter, commonly referred to as the Commissary Fund. The plaintiffs allege that these funds are used to pay the salaries of certain prison guards and compensation to some of the inmates working prison jobs; to buy recreational, entertainment, and computer equipment in the facility for use by both guards and prisoners; and to sponsor certain educational programs and interior improvements to the facility.

However, plaintiffs complain that prison guards regularly receive pay increases while inmate pay has remained stagnant for decades, and starting in December 2014, the regular and "bonus" pay for inmates was reduced significantly. They also state that prices for goods in the commissary continue to increase; the BOP does not take care of the equipment purchased for inmates and discards good equipment; and the BOP has used some funds exclusively for the benefit of prison guards. Finally, Jennings and Davidson allege that prison wardens sometimes transfer trust funds from their institution to other facilities or regions in an effort to curry favor and increase their chances at promotion. [R. 1 at 3-10, 18-19]

The plaintiffs assert several claims related to the trust fund. First, in Counts Two and Six Jennings and Davidson separately assert that the reduction in their compensation from their inmate jobs violates their due process rights. Second, in Count Four they collectively assert that the BOP violates its duties as a trustee by using trust funds mostly to benefit staff members instead of inmates. Third, in Counts One and Five Jennings and Davidson each contend that the transfer of funds to other prisons is an abuse of trustee discretion. [R. 1 at p. 20-23]

Upset about this state of affairs, each plaintiff filed separate inmate grievances about the reduction in their pay and the running of these funds, but the grievance process only frustrated Davidson and Jennings further. The BOP's administrative remedy program requires inmates to first attempt to resolve their concerns informally, but the plaintiffs felt that prison officials only gave them the runaround. Davidson and Jennings further complain that their formal grievances and appeals were not received until several weeks after they sent them for filing, were improperly rejected as untimely or for failure to include a copy of the decision appealed from, and were not addressed by the BOP within the time frames established by its own regulations. Plaintiffs assert that as a result of these circumstances inmates incur extra costs for postage and office supplies as well as uncertainty regarding when they may proceed to file suit. [R. 1 at p. 10-18] In Counts Three and Seven, Jennings and Davidson contend that the BOP's failure to adhere to the requirements of the inmate grievance process violates their due process rights. [R. 1 at p. 22, 23-24]

Davidson also filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents detailing how the BOP uses these funds. While he states that he received almost all of what he asked for, he found incredible the BOP's response that no documents exist to confirm his belief that inmate trust funds were used to improve the dining area used by staff at FMC - Lexington. Davidson filed an appeal regarding this omission, but states that he never received a response. [R. 1 at 19-20] In Count Eight, Davidson contends that the BOP violated FOIA by failing to produce documents he believes exist, but the BOP has stated do not. [R. 1 at p. 24-25]

Because the plaintiffs mention it in their response to the summary judgment motion [R. 34 at 6], the Court pauses here to address the one-sentence suggestion in their complaint that they wished to have this matter proceed as a class action. [R. 1 at 25] In their complaint, the plaintiffs did not attempt to define the scope of the class or the claims encompassed within it, allege or argue that they satisfy the requirements for class certification set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1)-(4), or identify the type of class action appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)-(3). A complaint that fails to satisfy either one of these substantive criteria does not warrant class certification. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) ("Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard."); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F. 2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989). As a procedural matter, they also never filed a formal motion for such certification. Moore v. Curtis, 68 F. App'x 561, 563 (6th Cir. 2003). This matter could not have proceeded as a class action in any event: pro se plaintiffs are not able to adequately and fairly represent the class. Cf. Palasty v. Hawk, 15 F. App'x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court therefore limits its discussion to the claims asserted by Davidson and Jennings.

II

In its motion for summary judgment, the BOP contends that neither plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims, whether under the BOP's internal Inmate Grievance Program or under FOIA. [R. 20-1 at 3-8; 9-10] It also notes that, as a federal agency, it is entitled to sovereign immunity from damages claims [R. 20-1 at 8-9] and that prisoners have no constitutional right to either a prison job or any wages for their work [R. 20-1 at 9]. Finally, the BOP requests summary judgment on Davidson's FOIA claim because it conducted a reasonable search for the records he sought and discovered none. [R. 20-1 at 10-12]

For their part, Jennings and Davidson assert pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) that discovery is necessary before they can respond to the BOP's motion. They also dispute the BOP's characterization of their claims and deny that they have sought monetary relief, while nonetheless contending the BOP has waived its immunity to a damages claim. [R. 34 at 2-7; 21-34] Their primary contention is that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, and that any untimeliness or irregularity in the processing of their inmate grievances was caused by the BOP's failure to adhere to its own regulations. [R. 34 at 7-20; 35-44] Finally, Davidson asserts that the FOIA search must have been unreasonable because a reasonable search would necessarily have revealed the documents he is certain exist. [R. 34 at 45-48]

Before addressing the substance of the BOP's motion, the Court must first resolve two preliminary matters. First, the parties dispute the nature of Jennings and Davidson's claims and the relief they seek. The BOP characterizes Counts One, Two, Four, and Five of the plaintiffs' complaint as asserting due process claims arising out of a reduction in their pay; and Counts Five, Six, and Seven as due process claims related to the BOP's administration of its inmate grievance program. It also notes Davidson's FOIA claim in Count Eight, but makes no attempt to characterize Count Three. [R. 20-1 at 2-3] For their part, the plaintiffs suggest that their only due process claim relates to the inmate grievance program, and that their "claims brought regarding the Trust Fund (and including pay from the Trust Fund) are brought under trust law and not as a strictly-speaking Constitutional claim." [R. 34 at 4-5, 21, 23]

Atypical for most pro se complaints, the plaintiffs' complaint is extensive, detailed, and for the most part, fairly precise. It also establishes that neither party accurately characterizes the claims Jennings and Davidson assert in their complaint. As noted by the Court above, five of the counts are directly related to the operation of the trust fund and/or their inmate pay. Counts Two and Six - expressly titled "Violation of Due Process as to Jennings (Pay)" and "Violation of Due Process as to Davidson (Pay)" respectively - assert that each of the plaintiffs possessed a "protected property interest in his pay" and...