Davies v. Dep't of Pub. Safety

1

TOBIUS DAVIES, A1014982, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL., Defendants.

Civ. No. 23-00382 JMS-WRP

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

November 8, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, ECF NO. 7, WITH LEAVE GRANTED TO AMEND

J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the court is a First Amended Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (“FAC”), ECF No. 7, filed by pro se Plaintiff Tobius Davies (“Davies”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] Davies alleges that Defendants^[2] violated his rights under the First Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution during his incarceration at the Halawa Correctional Facility. Id. at PageID. 117-PageID.118. After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the court DISMISSES the FAC with leave granted to amend.

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. BACKGROUND^[3]

On July 19, 2023, prison officials moved Davies into the HCF's “medium special holding unit” (“SHU”) after he fought with another inmate. ECF No. 7 at PageID.118. According to Davies, he should have been either charged with a misconduct violation or returned to a general population housing unit within 15 days of his placement in the SHU. See ECF No. 1 at PageID.8. Davies received a “write up” 23 days after he moved into the SHU. ECF No. 7 at PageID.118.

Prior to an adjustment hearing before Anzai, Davies was not allowed to review purported video footage of the fight. Id. Davies also was not allowed to call any witnesses during the hearing. Id. At the end of the adjustment hearing, Anzai found Davies guilty of a violation and imposed a sentence of 30 days in the SHU. ECF No. 1 at PageID.9. After this 30-day period ended, Davies was not moved back to a general population housing unit. ECF No. 7 at PageID.118. Instead, Davies remained in the SHU until September 27, 2023. Id. According to Davies, he had no “privileges” and “rights” during his time in the SHU. Id.

Davies alleges that Laux refused to provide him grievance forms. Id. at PageID.119. Laux also imposed a “grievance restriction” on Davies. Id. This restriction required Davies to submit written requests for grievance forms. Id. at PageID.120. When Davies submitted these requests, however, Laux refused to give him any grievance forms. Id. Despite this, Davies voiced his concerns to a unit manager, the chief of security, the warden, and the ombudsman. Id.

Davies signed the Complaint on September 7, 2023. ECF No. 1 at PageID.18. On September 15, 2023, the court granted Davies' Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis by a Prisoner. ECF Nos. 2, 3. On October 2, 2023, the court issued an Order Dismissing “Prisoner Civil Right Original Complaint,” ECF No. 1, In Part with Partial Leave Granted to Amend.” ECF No. 4. Although the court dismissed Davies' Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims, the court concluded that he stated a plausible First Amendment claim based on Laux's refusal to provide him with grievance forms. Id. at PageID.45-PageID.62. The court also denied Davies' motion to appoint counsel. Id. at PageID.62-PageID.63.

The court received the FAC on October 31, 2023. ECF No. 7. Davies again alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at PageID.117. He continues to seek $300,000 in damages. Id. at PageID.119. On the first page of the FAC, Davies states that he is “[demanding a] court appointed attorney.” Id. at PageID.114.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of' law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).

There are two situations in which a state official might be liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “First, plaintiffs may seek damages against a state official in his personal capacity.” Cornel, 37 F.4th at 531 (citing Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016)). “Second, state officials are ‘persons' under § 1983 when sued for prospective injunctive relief.” Id. (citation omitted). This second situation applies “where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). “To state a procedural due process claim, [a plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.'” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)) (some brackets in original).

Protected liberty or property interests may arise under the Due Process Clause itself or state law. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). “In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining to liberty.” Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2007). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (“We conclude that a convicted felon also is entitled to the benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to have a mental disease and transferred to a mental hospital.”), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (“[Respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”)).

Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be limited to freedom from restraint that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Id. at 484, 487. In deciding whether an atypical and significant hardship exists, relevant considerations include

1) whether the challenged condition mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, and thus comported with the prison's discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state's action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence.^[4]

Brown v. Or. Dep't of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Administrative Segregation

Davies alleges that he should have been charged with a misconduct violation or returned to a general population housing unit within 15 days of being placed in administrative segregation on July 19, 2023. See ECF No. 7 at PagelD. 118; see also ECF No. 1 at PageID.8-PageID.14. According to...