Davies v. Iles

1

MATTHEW DAVIES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MAX ILES et al., Defendants and Respondents

C095731

California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin

June 6, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super Ct. No. STK-CV-UPI-2021-0002707

KRAUSE, J.

This appeal is taken from a judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. The primary issue before us is whether a trial court may give preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action to a criminal conviction resulting from a guilty plea arising out of the same incident. Plaintiff and appellant Matthew Davies (Davies) contends that while his guilty plea may be admissible in a later civil action as an admission of the crimes with which he was charged, it is not conclusive of all factual issues that may arise in the civil litigation he is bringing against the other parties involved in the underlying incident. Davies contends the trial court erred by reaching the opposite conclusion. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On Halloween night, October 31, 2018, Davies was involved in a physical altercation with defendants and respondents Max Iles, Mary Iles, and Samantha Iles (collectively, defendants) in a residential neighborhood in Stockton, during which Davies struck defendant Max Iles with a drinking glass. Davies subsequently was arrested and charged with one count of felony assault upon Max Iles (Pen. Code, § 245, subd (a)(4)), with a great bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code § 12022.7, subd. (a)); and one count of misdemeanor battery upon Mary Iles. (Pen. Code, § 242.) The information further alleged a prior prison term enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Davies was not charged with any offenses involving Samantha Iles.

On October 9, 2019, Davies pleaded guilty to each of the charges and admitted the enhancements. He was sentenced to five years of formal probation.

On March 26, 2021, Davies filed a civil complaint against defendants arising out of the incident on October 31, 2018. Davies thereafter filed a first amended complaint, which alleged the following.

On October 31, 2018, Davies left a party, drink in hand, to meet his family and friends who were trick-or-treating in the neighborhood. At the time, Davies was dressed in costume as the scary clown from the novel and movie, "It." When Davies spotted his family and friends across the street he began to approach them "in a dancelike motion . . . with arms outstretched and making a 'Roar!' sound ...." As Davies crossed the street, he was "suddenly and unexpectedly accosted" by a different group of trick-or-treaters that included defendants Max Iles, Mary Iles (Max's mother), and Samantha Iles (Max's sister). Defendants ran up to Davies and shouted at him to stop his behavior.

Upon hearing their shouts, Davies "immediately came to a stop and did not touch Max, Mary, Samantha, or any member of the Iles Group." Despite "standing still and posing no threat . . . at all," the complaint alleges that defendants encircled Davies and physically attacked him. The complaint specifically alleges that Mary Iles attempted to trip Davies by kicking his legs and that she grabbed Davies's head and pulled his hair. The complaint further alleges that Max Iles shoved Davies and struck Davies with a closed fist on the right side of the head. The complaint alleges that all three defendants intentionally struck Davies and that Davies was forced to defend himself against their attacks. The complaint alleges that Davies was "attempting to shake off his attackers" when he swung his hand that was holding the drink glass and struck Max Iles in the head, causing a large cut to the left side of Max's face.

The first amended complaint alleges causes of action against each of the three defendants for battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The complaint seeks to recover compensatory damages from each defendant, and punitive and exemplary damages from defendants Max Iles and Mary Iles.

Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint and each cause of action alleged therein on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against any defendant. In support of the demurrer, defendants requested the court take judicial notice of various records from Davies's criminal case (People v. Davies, San Joaquin County Superior Court case No. STK-CR-FE-2019-2996), including the accusatory pleadings and an excerpt of the plea hearing transcript.^[1] Davies filed an opposition to the demurrer and the request for judicial notice.

Following a hearing on August 6, 2021, the trial court issued a minute order granting the request for judicial notice and sustaining the demurrer in its entirety without leave to amend. The court directed defendants to prepare a formal order.

On October 1, 2021, a signed formal order was filed stating that the "demurrer is sustained without leave to amend; otherwise be dismissed." Defendants served notice of entry of the order on October 6, 2021. On November 19, 2021, Davies filed a notice of appeal from the October 6 notice of entry of the order. In December 2021, this court dismissed the appeal on the ground it was not appealable.

On January 28, 2022, a final judgment of dismissal after order sustaining demurrer was filed. Notice of entry of judgment was served and filed on February 2, 2022. Davies timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal on February 3, 2022.

DISCUSSION

I Timeliness of Appeal

As a threshold issue, we dispose of defendants' argument that this appeal should be dismissed because it was filed more than 60 days after notice of entry of the October 1, 2021 order sustaining the demurrer, which defendants contend was an appealable order.

We previously determined that the October 2021 order was not an appealable order and therefore dismissed Davies's appeal of that order as premature. We stand by that conclusion. Although the trial court's order contains language that the case "otherwise be dismissed," we construe this to mean an order of dismissal would be issued in the future not as an immediate order of dismissal. The case subsequently was dismissed in January 2022 when the court entered its judgment of dismissal, and Davies timely appealed that judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).) Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.

II Standard of Review

The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations of the complaint. (Thornton v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1411.) On appeal from a dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Silva v. Langford (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 710, 715.) In evaluating the complaint, we must assume the truth of all material facts properly pleaded in the complaint. (Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 816, 819.) We also must accept as true facts that are reasonably implied or may be inferred from the complaint's express allegations. (Ibid.) However, we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law, and we may disregard allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact which may be judicially noticed. (Khodayari v. Mashburn (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1189.)

When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we also must consider whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect in the complaint could be cured by amendment. (King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050.) It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 820.)

III Effect of Prior Guilty Pleas in Subsequent Civil Action

Relying on Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601 (Teitelbaum), the trial court held that the issues raised in Davies's civil complaint were conclusively decided against him in the prior criminal proceeding, and therefore Davies is precluded from relitigating them in a civil action. Davies argues that the trial court misconstrued and misapplied Teitelbaum and therefore incorrectly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. We agree.

A. Legal principles

Courts have frequently used" 'res judicata'" as an "umbrella term" encompassing two separate" 'aspects'" of an overarching doctrine that prohibits relitigation of claims and issues which have already been adjudicated. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823-824 (DKN Holdings).) Claim preclusion, the primary aspect of res judicata," 'prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.' [Citation.] Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether." (Id. at p. 824.) "Claim preclusion promotes judicial economy and avoids piecemeal litigation by preventing a plaintiff from '" 'splitting a single cause of action or relitigat[ing] the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief.'"' [Citation.]" (Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 216, 225.)

"Issue preclusion,...