Davis v. Castlberry

SADAKA T. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. EGAR CASTLBERRY, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:15-cv-166-WKW [wo]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

December 29, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law (Doc. 5, entered March 24, 2015). By Order entered this same date, the Court granted permission for Sadaka Davis, a frequent pro se litigant in this Court, to proceed in forma pauperis, but stayed further proceedings on his Complaint pending review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).¹

I. BACKGROUND

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff Sadaka Davis ("Plaintiff" or "Davis") filed the complaint in this case alleging Egar Castlberry² [sic] improperly evicted him. This complaint is one of many filed in this Court by Davis which relates to an incident which occurred back in November 2014. See Davis v. Hardesty, Civ. Act. No. 2:15-cv-11-MHT, Davis v. Reynolds, 2:15-cv-12-MHT. In the instant complaint, Davis alleges Edgar Castleberry improperly filed an unlawful detainer andeviction action against him, refused to return Davis' security deposit and personal property, and took aware Davis' home. Davis alleges he did not receive due process by the courts and that his 1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendment rights were violated. See Doc. 1, Complaint at ¶ 5. He alleges the violation occurred on November 4, 2014 at his home in Clanton, AL as well as the district and circuit court systems. As relief, Davis requests $50,000.00 and ownership of the home at issue. Id. at ¶ 6.

On December 2, 2015, the Court granted Davis' request to proceed in forma pauperis, but determined the complaint on its face failed to establish jurisdiction and had legal defects. His amended complaint was due on December 18, 2015. To date, no response or amended complaint has been filed.

II. JURISDICTION

The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). Davis brings claims for violations of the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court now conducts its mandatory review of complaints brought by litigants seeking to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

All litigants, pro se or not, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the court is required to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings, the court does not have "license to serve as de facto counsel for a party. . .or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). When reviewing a case proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court should first determine whether the plaintiff is unable toprepay costs and fees and therefore a pauper under the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, once leave has been granted, the court shall dismiss a case by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis at any time if it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); see also Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1997) (Lay, J. concurring) (Section 1915(e) applies to all litigants proceeding in forma pauperis).

At any stage of the proceedings, a case is frivolous for the purpose of § 1915(e)(2)(B) when it appears the plaintiff "has little or no chance of success." Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 741 (11th Cir. 1987)). A court may conclude that a case has little or no chance of success and dismiss the complaint before service of process when it determines from the face of the complaint that factual allegations are "clearly baseless" or that the legal theories are "indisputably meritless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992) (dismissal of claims when "clearly baseless"). Thus, the court may "spare the defendant the inconvenience and expense of answering a frivolous complaint." Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981).³ In ascertaining whether Davis' Complaint is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court follows the same standard as it would when determining whether to dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2003). The Court assumes the truth of all Davis' allegations for purposes of this determination. Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006).

A. Rooker-Feldman

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine places limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain matters related to previous state court litigation. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co, 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311-15, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The Eleventh Circuit has described the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as follows:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, have no authority to review the final judgments of state courts. The doctrine extends not only to constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment. A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.

Goodman ex. rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has noted the doctrine is narrow and is "confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Molina v. Aurora Loan Servs., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20877 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015) (quoting Exxon Mobil). In short, this Court cannot review and reverse a state court civil judgment.

In the state district court proceeding and circuit court appeal, Davis sought to have the unlawful detainer judgment set aside. See Edgar Castleberry v. Sadaka Tyqua Davis, Chilton County District Court Case No. DV-2014-900120.00. A review of the publicly available statecourt docket shows this case was concluded in the state court proceedings when his appeal was dismissed on December 16, 2014. See Edgar Castleberry v. Sadaka Davis, Chilton County Circuit Court Case No. CV-2014-000065.00.

Davis' complaint seeks injunctive relief (in the form of ownership of the home at issue) by setting aside the orders entered in the state court action and $50,000.00 to compensate him for pain and suffering. This falls squarely within the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This Court cannot review and review the state court judgment.

B. Section 1983 Claims Against a Private Actor

Even if Davis' claims were not barred under Rooker-Feldman, the claims still fail because Defendant Castleberry is a private citizen and not state actor. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of law deprives a plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity security by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁴ In his complaint, Davis identifies the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 14th Amendments. Taking the factual allegations of Davis' complaint as true (which the court must do when performing a review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915), Davis complains that he was not given due process in the state court detainer action. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides no state "shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. "Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1050, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978). In this case, Davisalleges a deprivation of property by Defendant Castleberry without due process of law. See Doc. 1 ¶ 5.

"In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process." Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). The complaint alleges as follows:

Egar Castlberry is not a licensed realitor in the state of Alabama and he acts as a corporation. He has no contract on the deal we made about me owning the house. We have a 3 month lease for his purposes of a probation period between hisself and the tenant. I passed the probation period expecting a contract to pay off the balance for ownership. Instead we went 3 more months without it to find out Mr. Edgar Castleberry had other plans instead. He went and filed a unlawful detainer/eviction to be served on me. He already had a lawyer and refused payment offered by the plaintiff. I gave a security deposit with I haven't received, and most of my gravel, cross tyes, and plants & flowers still on the

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